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Preface
This book is an attempt to give at least a provisional answer to two questions 
that have occupied my mind during the best part of my academic career: What 
is the relation of sociology to economics, and what can sociology contribute to 
the analyses of the major economic institutions? From its very beginning, at 
the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, sociology’s relation to economics and 
to the study of economic institutions has been rather complicated and ambigu-
ous. Sociologists have repeatedly criticized what they consider the problematic 
presumptions of economic theory; they have also argued that one should take 
the historical specificity and the social embeddedness of the economic rela-
tions and institutions seriously into account. At the same time, sociology has 
made, with some remarkable exceptions, only relatively modest contributions 
to the analyses of modern economic institutions. It has not succeeded seri-
ously in challenging economics’ conception as the standard interpretation of 
economic life.
More recently, however, the situation has changed with growing interest 
among the sociologists in economic phenomena that has already led to many 
valuable new theoretical insights and empirical results. The growing impor-
tance of economic sociology has certainly many causes. The recent economic 
crises, the increasing importance of the financial markets and the globaliza-
tion of economy are certainly among the most evident ones. The neoliberal 
regime of governance, which has dominated political thinking in Europe, 
North America, and the world at large during the last decades, has led also to 
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a situation in which the economic discourse has gained an almost hegemonic 
position in politics as the interpreter of the economic and political reality. As 
such, it poses an obvious challenge to the other social sciences and sociology 
in particular. The present study takes up this challenge. With the help of the 
classics of sociology as well as modern economic sociologists, it presents a con-
tribution of its own to developing genuinely sociological concepts and theoreti-
cal understanding of the functioning of the modern economic institutions. As 
argued here, economic sociology is in need of a specific sociological theory of 
the commodity markets and money, the two basic social institutions of modern 
capitalism that go beyond the general thesis of the social embeddedness of eco-
nomic relations. Therefore, the central question facing economic sociology, to 
which this study gives at least a partial answer, is how markets and money are 
possible and socially constituted.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Making the Incomparable 
Comparable
Economic sociology has experienced a remarkable revival during the last cou-
ple of decades, and it has become one of the most innovative fields of sociologi-
cal research. The drastic recent economic developments—the financial crises 
above all—took many analysts and experts by surprise. Changes in economic 
policy in Europe, the United States, and the world at large have also contrib-
uted to the increasing interest in the sociological analysis of economic phe-
nomena and institutions by offering new, challenging research questions and 
demonstrating some of the limits and problems inherent in standard economic 
thinking and reasoning. For example, the various new instruments which have 
appeared quickly in financial markets, from subprime loans and loan swaps 
to futures trading and hedging, have become important new objects of study. 
Financialization and the numerous new forms of financial markets are in many 
ways a good test for the relevance and validity of both economics and economic 
sociology. More often than not these analyses have, however, been rather con-
crete and historical, undoubtedly of great value as such, in trying to come to 
terms with the new economic world. At the same time, rather few attempts 
to develop any more general theoretical understanding, for instance about the 
causes, conditions, forms and consequences of financialization, deregulation 
of markets, or other important developments in modern economy, have been 
on offer.
It has been a commonplace in the introductions to the general treatises, text-
books, and anthologies of economic sociology to admit that economic sociol-
ogy has not had all that much to offer since the classics of sociology active at the 
turn of the 20th century, in terms of theoretical inventions and developments 
of its own and even fewer contributions to the sociological thinking in general. 
In the opinion of many of its advocates, sociology has been good at criticizing 
standard economics and its basic postulate of rational economic action char-
acteristic of economic activity in general, also referred to as the postulate of 
Homo Oeconomicus. It has admittedly also offered quite a great deal of inter-
esting empirical and historical studies of all kinds of economic phenomena, 
new financial markets included. In a sense, it looks like economic sociology—
or sociology in general—has not yet passed over the old dilemma of choosing 
2 Deciphering Markets and Money
between abstract theory (in Weber’s times presented by Marginalism, and 
later Neoclassical economics) and economic history (or the historical study of 
concrete economic phenomena, in the spirit of the German historical school), 
which Max Weber, one of the acknowledged classics of sociology, posed explic-
itly in his writings some hundred years ago.
In the introduction to their influential Handbook on Economic Sociology 
(2005: 6), Smelser and Swedberg wrote that
economic sociology has usually concentrated on three main lines of in-
quiry: 1) the sociological analysis of economic processes; 2) the analysis 
of the connections and interactions between the economy and the rest 
of the society; and 3) the study of changes in the institutional and cul-
tural parameters that constitute the economy’s societal context.
Other authors have expressed similar thoughts of the achievements and tasks 
facing sociological analyzes of economy. Zelizer (2003: 15), for instance, talks 
about the importance of the social context in which economic decisions are 
made. However, in her opinion it is important to shift attention from context 
to content, to the variability of markets, and ‘identify the shared understand-
ings that occur within and behind every market, shared understandings that 
underlie the very possibility of market activity’ (Zelizer 2003: 108). At the same 
time, Zelizer admits that the second alternative is the most demanding and 
challenging one, with fewer promising examples to show. She also reminds her 
readers about the parallel approach of extending the economic paradigm of 
rational behavior to such areas of society that economists have usually largely 
ignored. In doing so, Zelizer has Gary Becker’s (1976, 1998) exemplary stud-
ies of, among other things, the family institution and addictions in mind. One 
could characterize Becker as a representative of intellectual imperialism of eco-
nomics that purports to make economic thinking all inclusive, while taking 
some of its more obvious limitations into account.
Portes’ (2010)—who has also actively promoted economic sociology—view 
of the real progress done in the sociological analysis of economy is rather skep-
tic. As he suggested, each field of sociological study should be able to show 
three specific contributions of its own: metatheoretical principles, explana-
tory mechanisms, and strategic objects of research. In his opinion, economic 
sociology has, in fact, quite convincingly presented some metatheoretical 
principles of its own. Among them, one could name in particular the critique 
of the rational choice paradigm as well as the thesis of the social embedded-
ness of economic phenomena. In addition, it has a great amount of sugges-
tions to the strategic objects of empirical research. However, what economic 
sociology research is mostly lacking, according to Portes, are systematic ideas 
and well-argued-for suggestions to the explanatory mechanisms which could 
seriously complement and compete with the standard explanations of the 
functioning of economic markets offered in the textbooks of economics. Such 
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explanations should naturally follow from the metatheoretical principles, and 
they should also be capable of better coordinating the study of the multiplicity 
of strategic objects as well as to help to draw general conclusions from their 
empirical results.
Richard Swedberg’s Principles of Economic Sociology (2003) offers yet 
another interesting evaluation of the state and tasks of economic sociology. 
After a short introduction to the classics of economic sociology, and a descrip-
tion of the ‘present state of the affairs,’ Swedberg goes, chapter by chapter, 
through what he thinks are the main topics of research in economic sociology: 
1) economic organizations, 2) firms, 3) economic and sociological approaches 
to markets, 4) politics and economy, 5) law and the economy, 6) culture and 
economic development, and 7) gender and economy. The structure of Swed-
berg’s book shows his close adherence to the undisputed classic in economic 
sociology, Max Weber. (Swedberg has in fact written a seminal work on Weber: 
Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology, 1998.) Weber was, above all, 
interested in the relations between the economy and other social ‘orders,’ as 
well as culture. Weber, famous for his work on The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (2010(1905)), would undoubtedly have added religion to 
Swedberg’s list of topics.
With the exception of the markets and the firms, Swedberg’s main effort lies 
in clarifying the relations of economic institutions with other social institu-
tions and processes. Sociologists of organizations have traditionally shared the 
study and theory of the organization of firms with both political scientists and 
business economists. This leaves the market as the main economic institution 
about the functioning of which sociologists should have something of their 
own to contribute. More generally, the suggested division of labor between 
sociology and economics leaves sociologists the task of analyzing the social 
and historical—political, legal, and cultural—conditions and preconditions of 
economy. This resonates well with Mark Granovetter’s (1985) well-known and 
much-cited thesis about the principal social embeddedness of economic action 
and its analytic centrality. To study the different forms of this embeddedness is 
thus reserved to the economic sociologists as their main occupation (cf. also 
Granovetter’s Society and Economy, 2017).
In their collection of articles on economic sociology, the editors (Aspers, 
Dodd & Anderberg 2015: 4) make a useful distinction between sociological 
accounts of specifically economic phenomena, for instance markets, money, or 
consumer behavior, and others that do not define economy as a separate dimen-
sion of society but treat it on the same footing as the rest of society. Their advice 
is that, instead of investigating the links between economic phenomena and 
society, we should presume that all actions, including economic, are social. This 
is valuable advice, but at the same time it leaves open the question about the 
specificity of economic institutions and their theory. As social institutions, they 
obviously share many of the same features as other fields or areas of society and 
can therefore be analyzed with the general conceptual apparatus of sociology. 
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Nevertheless, they do obviously also show some important specificities that are 
not typical, or do not play such a central role, in the functioning of other social 
formations. Consequently, they would seem to presume their own analytical 
tools and concepts. As is argued in this study, these concepts circle around the 
centrality of the comparability and commensuration in economic relations.
It is interesting to compare this approach with Granovetter’s in his Society 
and Economy (2017: 1). As he pointed out, ‘I present arguments about eco-
nomic action and institutions that emphasize social, cultural and historical 
considerations in addition to purely economic ones.’ He does this by applying 
such typical sociological concepts, like norms, values, trust and power in ana-
lyzing a great variety of economic phenomena, historical and modern, making 
extensive use of a great number of previous empirical and historical studies. 
He does not, however, systematically emphasize—or analyze—the specificity 
of economic institutions compared to other social institutions, or the historical 
specificity of the economic relations in a modern capitalist economy.
In contrast to Granovetter’s approach, Dirk Baecker (2006), applying Niklas 
Luhmann’s systems theory, begins with the specific system of economy, differen-
tiated from the society and following its own internal principles of functioning. 
Economy has by no means always been a clearly differentiated social subsystem 
of its own, the specific function of which is, according to Beacker, the commu-
nication of scarcity (Baecker 2006: 40). What is remarkable about the system of 
economy is that first it, and only it, both creates the problem of scarcity and the 
means that claim to solve it.1 Only in the modern, differentiated capitalist eco-
nomic system does the quest for overcoming scarcity play a central role. In this 
perspective, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the economic system 
is connected to the external world through its own specific media, money. Money 
is always a scarce resource. The medium of money doubles scarcity because it is 
both ‘omnipotent,’ in the sense of being a universal medium of exchange that 
can realize any wishes or goals, and per definition always scarce: one can always 
have more of it! (Baecker 2006: 53). As a matter of fact, the only distinctions 
that money knows are quantitative. It is the quest for money and rent that keeps 
the capitalist economy running and expanding. Capitalism without economic 
growth, or rather accumulation of capital, would not be sustainable in the long 
run.2 Jens Beckert (2016) identifies the peculiar dynamics of capitalism in the 
openness of the future and the incalculability of outcomes of decision making 
processes that follow from it. These are central questions in his sociological anal-
yses of the economic organizations and institutions of capitalism.
What unites, in spite of their otherwise widely diverging conceptions, Karl 
Marx’s and Max Weber’s theoretical approaches—one could add Georg Simmel 
to this list—is that they emphasize the historical specificity of the modern capi-
talism. What makes economic institutions and relations in a capitalist, market 
economy specific to Max Weber and separates them from other social institu-
tions, as well as its historical predecessors, is monetary calculation or, as he put 
it, money and capital accounting, which makes comparing the input and output 
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of economic actions unambiguous and—seemingly—objective. What is typical 
of the economic action in modern capitalist economy is its formal rationality. 
(For Weber, calculability and formal rationality were almost synonymous since 
in his mind, calculability—and commensurability—guaranteed the highest 
degree of rationality.) To Karl Marx, in his turn, the equal exchange of com-
modities, the commodity labor power included, mediated through money, and 
the following self-dynamic process of the accumulation of capital is the basic 
feature of modern, differentiated economy.
In a well-established market economy, which is characterized by the prin-
ciple of equal exchange, monetary prices are objective in the sense that they 
are the same in all acts of exchange independent of who the trading partners 
might be. They can mostly be taken for granted, and economic agents can ori-
ent their actions accordingly. Commodity exchange, or the exchange of equiva-
lents typical of modern capitalist market economies, is by no means the only 
type of economic exchange. Exchange of gifts played an important role in many 
previous societies, and gave rise and kept up relations of mutual obligations. In 
modern economy, they would easily be regarded as corruption. In many socie-
ties, riches could change hands forcibly and those in power appropriated them 
simply with the threat of violence. In a barter economy, the partners exchange 
their products and services and compare them with each other. The terms of 
the trade are, however, not as fixed as in the equal exchange and the result of the 
exchange vary from case to case, from person to person, and are often up to the 
bargaining skills of the partners. The exchange relations can therefore depend, 
for instance, on the resources and the urgency of the needs of the particular 
partners. In addition, cultural norms and local traditions had often a say in 
what was considered to be a fair price. Even if money can figure in barter too, 
the prices can vary greatly from one case to another or they tend to be tradi-
tionally established. In other words, the institution of money is not in the same 
sense constitutive in the barter, or any traditional economic formation, as it is 
in the ‘real’ market of commodities.
It is true, almost tautological, to claim that economic institutions, like all 
institutions, are socially embedded. Otherwise they would not be social institu-
tions at all. The claim defended here is stronger: markets and money are histor-
ically specific social institutions and therefore one has to analyze their specific 
social constitutions. This means that the economic sociology of the capitalist 
market economy has a theoretical approach or frame of reference of its own, 
with tools and concepts of its own. Following Weber, we can identify them in 
money and capital accounting; following Marx, who perhaps more than any-
one else emphasized the historical specificity of the capitalist economic for-
mation, we can identify them in the commodity and money form as the keys 
understanding the social constitution of the modern capitalist economy. The 
crucial question is what makes objects traded in the market comparable and 
commensurate. To put it in another way: how can they have an objective value 
and a market price?
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The lessons learned from analyzing the constitution of economic markets do 
not restrict themselves to the understanding of phenomena normally regarded 
as economic. In these times of neo-liberal regimes of governance many social 
organizations which traditionally operated following other principles than 
those of economic markets, from universities and schools to social care of 
children and the elderly, from public broadcasting companies to many gov-
ernmental core agencies, armies and police included, have been outsourced, 
privatized and ‘marketized’ in the name of economic efficiency. Marketizing, 
applied as an almost universal remedy to all kinds of social and economic 
problems, has created its own problems and controversies (Hirschman 1982). 
As Miller argues, calculative practices and accounting are a key resource of 
the ‘liberal’ form of government (Miller 2001: 381). Using the example of the 
managerial, or cost accounting, a practice that has spread rapidly to all eco-
nomic enterprises, he shows how such calculative practices allow individu-
als to have ‘both the responsibility and freedom to spend money as they see 
fit’ (Miller 2001: 381). Such managerial practices produce an individual who 
comes to act as a ‘self-regulating calculating person.’ As Miller states, ‘not only 
can the manager of a global corporation be governed in this (neoliberal—JG) 
manner, but so too can a doctor, a schoolteacher, or a social worker’ (Miller 
2001: 381). What makes this new form of governance important is that it has 
spread widely outside private firms to many public organizations that tradi-
tionally have been governed by relatively autonomous professional or polit-
ically elected bodies functioning along traditional rules or are what Weber 
would call ‘value rational,’ aiming at the realization of substantive values that 
cannot be expressed in monetary terms.
Many crucial questions of the conditions and consequences of privatiza-
tion of public organizations circle around the question of commensuration. In 
order to operate as private markets, or as is often the case, as pseudo-markets 
with the public authorities as their main or only buyer, they must rely on some 
market devices—to use the concept developed by Lucien Karpik (2010)—that 
turn their incomparable or non-measurable goods and services, such as aca-
demic and artistic achievements or the well-being of old people, into compa-
rable and measurable entities. This is done, as we know, with the help of such 
market devices as citation indices and impact factors or counting the minutes 
a nurse uses per a customer or a patient, possibly combined with some kind 
of indexes of customer satisfaction. It is easy to agree with Fourcade (2007: 
1018–19) who argued that ‘we simply cannot have a serious reflection on 
modernity without addressing processes of commodification, marketization, 
privatization, and … the powerful role of economics in bringing about these 
transformations.’ Without falling into the trap of the economists’ ‘imperial-
ism,’ it is important to analyze other than economic institutions with the help 
of the theoretical tools of comparability, calculability, and commensuration, 
keeping in mind the distinction between heuristic analogies, useful as such, 
and real commonalities.
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In their article, ‘Commensuration as a Social Process,’ Espeland and Stevens 
(1998) take up the central role of commensuration in many social relations 
and institutions. As the authors define it, ‘commensuration is the expression 
or measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units 
according to a common metric’ (Espeland & Stevens 1998: 315). Prices of com-
modities are naturally the best example of commensuration. In order that two 
otherwise totally different kinds of objects, such as bread and shoes, can have 
the same price, or that we can say that a pair of shoes is ten times more valu-
able that a piece of bread, both bread and shoes must have valid prices taken 
for granted by all partners of trade. In other words, their value is expressed in 
money. However, money as such does not make them commensurate; on the 
contrary, the use of money as a means of exchange and accounting presumes 
that the objects exchanged already have an objective—in the sense of shared 
and taken for granted—value which can be expressed in numerical terms and 
thus compared with those of other objects. In order to be comparable and com-
mensurable two objects must obviously be measured on the same measuring 
stock, as if they both possessed one and the same common substance, differing 
only to a smaller or greater amount from each other. In other words, they must 
be in some respect qualitatively similar. As we know economics and its pre-
decessor, classical political economy has two suggestions for such a common 
quality which all objects of exchange share both deduced by excluding other 
(un)thinkable alternatives. Both suggestions have their own problems. In clas-
sical political economy it is the labor in general, or in other words, that they all 
are products of—different amounts or quantities of—human labor. To neoclas-
sical economics this common substance is their utility, that they are more or 
less useful to human beings or preferred by them. The first alternative, the most 
famous representatives of which were David Ricardo and Karl Marx, is usually 
known as the labor theory of value, or the theory of objective value. The second, 
which the Marginalist economists, Jevons, Menger and Walras invented a cou-
ple of decades after Marx’s Capital, which came out in 1868, is referred to as the 
subjective theory of value. The early Marginalists differed among themselves as 
far as they thought that the utilities of goods depended on the satisfaction of 
some kind of objective needs or thought them simply to reflect consumers’ per-
sonal likes or preferences, whatever the reasons for preferring one object over 
another might be. To later neoclassical economists, it has in fact been enough 
to presume that economic agents can order the objects of consumption accord-
ing to their preferences. More specifically, according to the concept of the mar-
ginal utility, economic actors are presumed to be able to compare the utility of 
an additional unit of an object or service with the utility of an additional unit 
of another commodity.
The problem of commensuration does not restrict itself to purely economic 
processes and relations but covers a much wider range of social phenomena. 
The problem of commensuration has become more acute with the spread of 
neoliberal economic policy. It looks like the market logic of exchange would 
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gradually permeate other spheres of society than economy. The list Espeland 
and Stevens (1998: 315–316) present is impressive in its extensiveness:
Utility, price, and coast benefit ratios are common examples of com-
mensuration, although the logic of commensuration is implicit in a 
very wide range of valuing systems: college rankings that numerically 
compare organizations; censuses and social statistics that make cities 
or nations numerically comparable; actuarial projects that attempt to 
quantify and compare vastly different kinds of risks; commodity futures 
that make uniform units out of products that may not yet exist; voting, 
and the pork-barrel trading of diverse interests that often lies behind it; 
calculation of different kinds of work in terms of labor costs; and the ad 
hoc calculations of trade-offs among such potentially incomparable val-
ues as career and family; bread and depth in scholarship, and freedom 
and commitment in love.
In short, commensuration transforms qualities into quantities that can be eas-
ily compared (Espeland & Stevens 1998: 316). There is an inherent ambiva-
lence in what it accomplishes. On the one hand, by reducing the amount of 
the measured information, it simplifies reality by making it one-dimensional, 
as if all other characteristics and qualitative distinctions of the object were 
either totally irrelevant or unreadable. As such, they can be discarded. Conse-
quently, everyday experience, practical reasoning, and empathetic identifica-
tion ‘become increasingly irrelevant bases for judgment as context is stripped 
away and relationships become more abstractly represented by numbers’ 
(Espeland & Stevens 1998: 317). As a further consequence, all value becomes 
relative and the possibility of an intrinsic value, or any absolute or ‘higher’ 
value, is denied. There are no priceless objects. This conclusion comes, in fact, 
in many ways close to what Marx called the commodity fetishism, an essential 
companion of the capitalist relations of production and exchange. As a matter 
of fact, also ‘real’ or more traditional economic markets face the same prob-
lem of commensuration which, at least in the case of standard markets, they 
seem to solve as if naturally or automatically, without the help of any such 
constructed valuing systems. According to Marx, in commodity exchange the 
social relations between human beings take the form of the relations between 
things, thus hiding their real social nature from the economic actors. On 
other side of the coin, commensuration and the calculative evaluations are 
often associated with increasing rationality and efficiency, and accounting is 
regarded as a prerequisite to them, or even identified with them (Espeland & 
Stevens 1998: 324).
Classification is not, as such, equal to commensuration. It is reasonable to 
restrict commensuration to such comparing that uses ratio scales or, at the 
minimum, scales according to which one can say that something is better or 
more beautiful than another but not necessarily exactly how much better or 
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more beautiful it is. In other cases, such as the Linné’an system of botanic clas-
sification, or the classification of humans in population groups, which Espe-
land and Stevens use as examples, it would be better to speak simply of making 
objects comparable for classificatory purposes by identifying their common 
‘substance’ relevant in the context.3 Once the objects have been classified into 
homogenous groups, according to the relevant criteria in question, or to use the 
authors’ own example, after classifying all inhabitants into population groups 
according to some criteria agreed upon—age, gender, ethnicity, etc.—we can 
also count them and say that there are, for example, more Anglo-Americans 
than Americans of Hispanic origins in the USA today. However, we cannot say 
that a human being or a group of human beings is worth more than another, 
whereas one can routinely say that the price of a commodity is so much cheaper 
or more expensive than that of another.
In introducing their idea of calculative devices in studying economic mar-
kets, financial markets in particular, Callon and Muniesa (2005: 1234) make a 
useful distinction between the various steps of what they call the singulariza-
tion of a good. According to them, ‘the process of singularization consists of a 
series of operations resulting in the calculability of the good.’ More precisely, 
after the good has been placed in a frame with other goods and relations have 
been established between them leading to new classifications that allow com-
parison, ‘the good can finally be calculated’ (Callow & Muniesa 2005: 1235). 
As a matter of fact, Callon and Muniesa downplay somewhat the role of ’real’ 
calculation as a process of quantification, by making it close to Espeland’s and 
Stevens’s broad concept of commensuration that comprehends both qualita-
tive and quantitative comparability, both classification and calculation. One 
can nevertheless agree that ‘with this broad definition of calculation, the most 
appropriate dividing like is no longer between judgement and calculation, but 
between arrangements that allow calculation (either qualitative or quantitative) 
and those that make it impossible’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005: 1232; cf. Preda 
2009: 117).
In classical and neoclassical economics, it is common to presume that the 
process of comparing and commensuration is no problem or that it has been 
successfully accomplished, so that the markets can simply take the commen-
surability and comparability of the goods traded for granted. This presumes, 
however, first, that the quality of the objects of trade is completely ‘transparent’ 
and economic actors are fully informed about them and, second, the goods 
of any one market are homogenous and substitutable for each other. Such 
markets are so-called standard markets. It has become commonplace in eco-
nomics to admit that not all markets satisfy these conditions and that there 
are, for instance, many cases in which actors are not—or cannot reasonably 
be expected to be—fully informed about the terms of the trade, or what they 
are buying and selling after all. In addition, there are markets in which the 
goods are not substitutable; that is, they are not generic but singular. In both 
cases the markets could collapse unless some remedy were ‘invented’ or some 
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mechanism introduced to compensate for these shortcomings. The classical 
example of a market suffering from imperfect information are markets of sec-
ondhand cars, which are notoriously plagued by information asymmetry, the 
seller knowing more than the buyer (Akerlof 1970). The markets of singular 
objects of art that are unique and therefore principally non-substitutable are an 
example of the second case. Despite these serious shortcomings, which should 
make the trade of such objects theoretically all but impossible because of the 
uncertainty of their real quality and value, these markets obviously exist: sec-
ondhand cars are routinely sold and bought, so are artists’ unique paintings 
and pictures. These cases of imperfect information are generally recognized 
in economics, and there are well-known suggestions how to deal with them to 
make them better adhere to the general laws of economics.
As far as economic markets of standard goods and their prices are concerned, 
it is presumed that, in one way or another, the commensuration of the traded 
and exchanged goods takes place automatically, as if guided by an ‘invisible 
hand.’ Or to use Alfred Marshall’s famous metaphor, it looks like there exists 
a universal auctioneer who simultaneously sets the market prices reacting to 
the millions and millions of price offers at any single moment. (Nowadays it 
might make more sense to use the metaphor of a huge computer that counts 
hundreds of thousands of operations in a nanosecond, registering every single 
bid on the market, leading to a market price that guarantees the market equi-
librium.)4 However, many markets of goods and services, including everything 
from cultural products to many financial transactions, consist of such goods 
that for one reason or another are difficult, if not impossible, to compare and 
be valued in any straightforward manner. They effectively resist comparing and 
commeasuring. The objects do not allow for placement on the same measuring 
stock because it is not clear what makes them valuable in each case and what 
they share.
Economics recognize this problem as far as unique objects of art, such as orig-
inal paintings or sculptures, are concerned. Their pricing does not follow the 
standard laws of the demand and supply of economics (see e.g., Baumol 1986 
and Grampp 1989). The economists can, however, also add that they are rather 
exceptional products. Even though the acknowledgement of these anomalies is 
something of a nuisance to those economists whose science aspires to universal 
validity, it is not empirically devastating because the markets of unique objects 
of art are quite marginal and lack much economic weight. However, what if 
this problem of incommensurability is not restricted to these relatively rare art 
collectors’ objects but is shared by many more ordinary objects of consump-
tion too? Status markets, for instance, behave differently from the markets of 
standard goods. The ‘law of supply and demand,’ or for that matter the prin-
ciple of marginal utility, would not seem to apply to them in any straightfor-
ward manner. Their higher price could be the sign of a higher status and thus 
increasing prices would not lead to diminishing demand and sales but, on the 
contrary, make them more desirable and increase their demand. The markets of 
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many seemingly ordinary goods—blue jeans are a well-known example—can 
become differentiated into status markets, which function according to their 
own principles (cf. Podolny 2005 and Aspers 2010, 2011). Branding is a well-
known marketing strategy, which consciously promotes market differentiation 
making homogenous goods heterogenous, non-substitutable and incommen-
surate. This cannot explain market differentiation all by itself, however. To 
better understand such markets and their functioning, one must analyze the 
mechanism of status competition among the market actors, both producers 
and consumers. What is the role of the specific status symbols in each case? 
What is it that ultimately makes some goods or the products of some manu-
facturers more desirable than others to such a degree that they are in a class of 
their own and not substitutable for others? These questions have been a stand-
ard object of sociological studies at least since Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the 
Leisure Class (1918[1899]).
Status markets are a well-known and classical example of markets with socially 
determined hierarchies of value. Lucien Karpik (2010) presented commensu-
ration in a more challenging way, if possible, in his highly innovative work on 
the market of singularities.5 Instead of talking only about unique objects of 
art we should, according to Karpik, pay attention to all kinds of singularities, 
of which objects of authentic art are but a tiny part and an extreme example. 
What is common to all singularities, including authentic art, is their principal 
quality uncertainty. Therefore, the evaluation of their relative worth and good-
ness, which presumes their comparability, is highly problematic. According to 
Karpik, the main criteria of the singularity of a product or a service are their 
quality uncertainty, multi-dimensionality, and the following incommensurabil-
ity. Comparing their quality presumes a holistic approach: the whole is always 
more than the sum of its parts. In judging and discussing objects of art, paint-
ings, musical performances, movies, wines, or restaurant dinners, and so on, 
we regularly express our own personal judgments of taste about their respective 
goodness. These judgments are subjective. We can often also give good reasons 
why we think that this or that painting or a movie is beautiful, and even claim 
that it is better than another one, as well as dispute over the value of art. Some-
times we can also reach with the other discussants involved, at least a provi-
sional, agreement about their value. What is however typical of such aesthetic 
judgments, of which wine tasting is a perfect, or an ideal-typical example, is 
that they cannot refer to or rely on any common, objective standards or rules of 
goodness or beauty. Therefore they are often ambiguous and indeterminate. In 
evaluating them, we rely on our personal judgment power in a way that can be 
considered aesthetic. There cannot be any guarantee that others share the same 
judgment with us. Our judgment is just one among all the others and as such 
always ambivalent and insecure.
Karpik discovered that in order for the markets of singularities to function at 
all, and not to implode, they have to rely on some kind of market devices that 
support and simplify the art of judgment and make it shared and less insecure. 
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These devices vary a lot from one market to another, from critiques, reviews, 
and cicerones to stars of goodness, sales charts, top-ten lists, and prizes. Cus-
tomers rely often also on personalized devices, in other words on the recom-
mendations of their personal networks. These are common in the markets of 
personal services. These devices, which differ quite radically from each other 
and therefore have to be analyzed in detail in each case, establish what Karpik 
calls market regimes. According to him, there are four basic market regimes: 
the authenticity, mega, the expert opinion and common opinion regimes. Mar-
ket devices, via market regimes, in fact first constitute the economic markets 
of singularities.
Karpik’s singularities cover quite a wide range of goods and services, from all 
kinds of cultural goods to personal services. The decisive criteria is not, as has 
been common in many critical treatises of the consequences of the commodi-
fication of culture, the ‘mechanical’ reproducibility or non-reproducibility, or 
uniqueness, of the objects of art or culture. Karpik’s concept of singularity is 
broader, including all kinds of objects of culture—from art to wine and quality 
restaurants, from books to movies and musical recordings, from theatre plays 
and concerts to legal services and medical care, from scientific articles to aca-
demic teaching programs, etc. As such, they undoubtedly form a remarkable, 
and arguably increasing, part of the global economy. One can also quite reason-
ably argue that in a modern capitalist economy many commodities, which at 
the first glance do not bring to mind Karpik’s typical examples and which are 
often regarded as standard, share at least some features with the singularities, 
or objects of art and culture. How does one judge, for instance, the relative 
goodness and value of a new car model, or a new PC, or the latest model of a 
vacuum cleaner? An enlightened consumer could certainly rely on standard-
ized technical tests published regularly in the press or on the internet. However, 
all such tests comprise necessarily only of a certain set of standardized criteria, 
some of which can be more or less objective (cf. the consumption of gas per 
hundred miles vs. the comfort of driving). They are, in fact, market devices like 
many others. Technical tests are labeled objective because technical profession-
als conduct them, and their expert knowledge guarantees their reliability. In 
addition, they are standardized from one test to another, from one model to the 
next. Reviews of art exhibitions or of new movies give a much more subjective 
impression. In this respect, the distinction between, say cars and movies, has 
become more relative, partly due to the prominent role of advertising, market-
ing, and design in almost any branch of trade today. Car dealers are not only 
selling technically more superior and economically advantageous cars but also 
images of freedom, safety, luxury, environmental friendliness, or even a good 
and happy life. In sociological studies of consumption, it has become common 
to speak about the almost all-inclusive process of aesthetization of the world 
of consumption and modern everyday life in general. The modern consumer 
is a hedonist who is never satisfied (Campbell 1987) and never can be sure if 
his or her experiences are the real or authentic ones that are as good as others’ 
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(Schulze 1992). If this tendency is as real as it looks, it gives a good reason to 
take Karpik’s singularities and their problem of quality uncertainty in the con-
stitution of commodity markets all the more seriously.
Market devices guide the individual tastes towards a common taste and they 
also create and keep up distinctions of taste. But they do not explain which 
social mechanisms operate behind them. What are after all the social for-
mations which bind the members of a taste community together and guide 
their tastes? Sociology has three alternatives to offer for a candidate of such 
an explanation: fashion, social worlds, and cultural fields, all of which share 
many common features but also differ from each other in important respects. 
In contrast to the two social formations, fashion and social worlds, status com-
petition plays an important role in Pierre Bourdieu’s analyzes of the fields of 
culture (1983, 1984) which are therefore closely associated with status markets. 
What is common to them all is however that they all are aesthetic formations in 
the sense that they are non-instrumental, unlike organizations or social move-
ments, which aim at realizing some goals external to them. Fashion and social 
worlds are ‘play worlds’ if any and their activities can best be characterized, 
following Immanuel Kant, as being purposive without any purpose or inten-
tional without any intention (‘zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck’; cf. Gronow 1996). 
It is exactly their self-purposiveness, having an end in themselves, which makes 
them conducive to the constitution of economic markets, which in their turn 
are clearly instrumental as such with an explicit purpose to produce profits to 
the investors of capital.
The three basic institutions, fashion, social worlds, and social fields, have 
each been analyzed and conceptualized in detail by sociologists, fashion by 
Georg Simmel (1957[1904]) at the turn of the 20th century, social worlds 
by Howard Becker (1982), Anselm Strauss (1978; 1983; 1983), David Unruh 
(1979; 1980), and others in the 1970s. Finally, Pierre Bourdieu (see e.g. 1984; 
1995a) analyzed the social mechanisms and functioning of the various fields of 
culture in his seminal works on cultural distinctions and social capital. In all of 
them taste plays a central role: They are all collective taste formations and offer 
a deeper understanding of the social processes behind Karpik’s market devices 
and regimes as well as the markets of singularities in general.
Financial markets, which according to many observers have greatly gained 
in economic importance during the last couple of decades, offer a challenging 
object of study in many ways. One can show quite concretely that many finan-
cial markets have come into being first with the help of quite specific market 
devices, some of them legally regulated, some more self-organized and unof-
ficial, and could not exist at all without them. They rely both on mathematical-
statistical models of calculation and on the professional judgments of the rating 
agents and market analysts. The claim of a close parallel between ‘aesthetic’ 
markets of culture and art and financial markets might sound strange. Finan-
cial markets deal simply with money or financial assets, the value of which is 
expressed in money and can therefore be easily compared and measured in 
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quantities of money. Nevertheless judging their quality and ‘real’ value is highly 
problematic because they trade in futures. Both their future value and the risks 
involved are always principally uncertain and unpredictable.
In a classical bank transaction, an individual debtor and creditor often knew 
each other personally and had accumulated information about the organiza-
tions they represented. They could rely on the personal reputation and the 
credit history of the debtor and their professional expectation of the value of 
the assets used as guarantee to the loan. In other words, they relied on personal 
networks as their market devices in evaluating the risks involved. There were 
always risks involved, and the outcome of the transaction was unpredictable. 
Modern banking relies instead on all kinds of standardized indices and statis-
tical risk calculations. Stock markets already have a long history. They could 
not function without their organized trading practices and the daily lists of the 
stock prices and their volatility. As Zuckermann (1999) has shown, the value 
of corporate shares sold and bought on the market is dependent on the evalu-
ation done by the professional financial analysts who report regularly on the 
expected development of their dividends and value. Exaggerating only a lit-
tle, one can claim that they have the same role in stock markets as art critics 
have in the art markets. To take another example, capitalist firms could not 
function without the double-entry book keeping that allows reporting turnover 
and profitability in annual reports in a highly standardized and straightforward 
manner. The introduction of the double-entry bookkeeping was a tedious and 
long process that did not restrict itself to learning to keep the well-known col-
umns of debits and credits but demanded a more systematic classification of the 
different kinds of expenses and income flows (Carruthers & Espeland 1991; see 
also Miller 2001). The importance of market devices for the constitution of the 
market is even more obvious in the markets of derivatives, such as the notori-
ous US subprime loans, sold further bundled together, with relatively high risks 
but with the promise of high profits. The highly developed formal methods of 
risk assessment were supposed to guarantee the relative safety of the investors, 
and a satisfactory profits/risks ratio on the secondary market of these deriva-
tives. Subprime loan markets are a good example of the commodification of 
risk. Hedging risks did not make them safe but created new risks and turned 
them into tradeable assets.
The question of the comparability and commensuration of economic objects 
runs through the chapters of this book. The first chapter presents a short outline 
of the classical sociologists’ often ambivalent relation to the economic thinking 
of their times. Sociology established itself as a discipline of its own in a largely 
one-sided dialogue with economics. Economics was to many early sociologists 
an exemplary social science, which, however, did not fully comprehend the 
conditionality and limits of its own theoretical reasoning. Max Weber, perhaps 
more than anyone else, developed his own sociological thinking in an open 
dialogue and even confrontation with economics, which made him comple-
ment it with his own systematic concepts of economic sociology, calculability 
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and accounting as the central concepts. The chapter ends with a short discus-
sion of a modern classic of economic sociology, Parsons and Smelser’s Economy 
and Society (1956), which in many ways laid the foundations for the idea, com-
mon in sociological analyses, of the social embeddedness of economic actions 
and institutions.
The second chapter addresses the question of money, the most central eco-
nomic institution of the modern market economy, and obviously highly rel-
evant to the question of the comparability and commensuration of economic 
objects. The chapter starts by presenting two competing conceptions of money, 
represented, on the one hand, by money as a means of exchange common to 
both classical political economy and to the standard text books of neoclassical 
economics and, on the other hand, by the state theory of money, or money as 
a means of accounting, which had its historical origins in settling debts with 
the state. As the chapter claims, following Marx’s reasoning, the real question 
to be posed and answered is why and how a commodity expresses its value in 
money. Marx pointed out that the social form of value and money are an inevi-
table companion to the society of private and independent producers related to 
each other in the economic sphere only through the exchange of the products 
of their labor. The relevance of Marx’s question does not depend on whether or 
not we adhere to his (in many ways) problematic labor theory of value, nor to 
the equally problematic subjective theory of the utilities of the Marginalists. It 
does presume that the objects exchanged are comparable with each other and it 
is not money as such that makes them comparable. Not claiming to have solved 
the problem of the value and money conclusively, the chapter ends, following 
Orléan (2014) and others, arguing that value should be understood not as any 
inherent or natural substance of commodities but rather as a social construct, 
inherent and realized in the process of exchange.
The next chapter tackles the problem of the principal quality uncertainty 
of the goods and services exchanged in the economic markets, which makes 
comparing them difficult or even impossible. Economists reduce the problem 
to the question of the imperfect information. However, the problem is more 
complicated and its consequences theoretically more serious, not restricted to 
the available information. If quality is not any natural substance of goods but 
a social construct, it is essential to analyze the social processes that determine 
it. In some standard markets the worth of goods can be rather self-evident and 
unproblematic due to their conventionality. As a rule, however, there are no 
objective or general standards to rely on in judging the quality of goods and 
services sold and bought on the markets. This is true, in particular, of cultural 
goods and personal services of all kinds, which Karpik (2010) calls ‘singulari-
ties.’ The chapter introduces the reader both to the markets of singularities and 
to the status markets, which cope with the problem of quality uncertainty in 
their own ways. It analyzes in detail the role of the aesthetic judgments of taste 
and connoisseurial judgment devices, introduced by Lucien Karpik (2010), 
and procedural devices or technical quality standards (see Blanc 2007) in the 
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constitution of the modern economic markets. It also discusses Karpik’s clas-
sification of the four market regimes based on the different market devices. 
They offer a more specific way of analyzing economic markets as social institu-
tions than the general postulate of the social embeddedness of all economic 
relations. Since the market devices vary between the markets, the economic 
functioning of the markets also differs quite radically.
As the fourth chapter argues, the four social formations of taste, fashion, 
social worlds, and fields of culture explain the social processes that lie behind 
the various kinds of market devices and regimes of coordination, including the 
status markets. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of the status hierarchies and 
cultural distinctions in the fields of culture, Georg Simmel’s (1957) theory of 
fashion, and Howard Becker’s (1982) and others’ theory of social worlds each 
offer a developed sociological conceptual apparatus to analyze these forma-
tions. This naturally leads to the question, posed in the fifth chapter, about the 
extension and spread of the non-standard markets, or markets of singularities 
in the modern capitalist market economies. If we take the thesis of the aesthe-
tization of modern consumption and everyday life as well as the increasing 
weight of creative industries in the economy seriously, as presented in many 
interesting diagnoses of our times, the principal quality uncertainty does not 
plague cultural goods or personal services alone but is typical of most, if not all, 
consumer goods markets, most durables included. In other words, they are all 
dependent on the social formations of taste.
Financialization has been a very prominent global trend in the world econ-
omy during recent decades, accompanied and promoted by the invention and 
introduction of many new financial assets, derivatives, futures, and options. 
This has opened up new kinds of financial markets by homogenizing different 
capital assets, thus making them liquid. As the sixth chapter shows, these mar-
kets are not only in need of market devices but, very concretely, they first create 
and make them possible at all. Financial markets rely on both kinds of devices, 
connoiseurial, in the shape of the market analysts, and procedural, in the shape 
of the mathematical-statistical models. Their main task is to commodify risks 
and make them marketable. The chapter ends up with a discussion about the 
performativity of economic theory. The general conclusion is that even though 
it is possible to identify some rather clear cases of performativity, or counter-
performativity, in the new financial markets, it makes more often sense to ana-
lyze how the market devices, created with the help of economic theory, ‘only’ 
constitute financial markets.
In addition to summarizing the main results of the book, the concluding 
chapter takes up some more general consequences to economic policy of the 
idea of the social constitution of the economic markets, as well as of the role 
of the various kinds of market devices and taste formations. A policy that pro-
motes privatization and marketization ‘of almost everything’ believes that it 
solves many, if not most, economic and social problems by increasing eco-
nomic efficiency, the freedom of the individual market actors, and, in the last 
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instance, the general well-being of the citizens. If anything, the reasoning in 
this work proves that any general conclusions about the market performance 
are highly dubious because economic markets, in particular the new markets or 
pseudo-markets, created by political measures with the help of economic and 
legal experts, differ greatly from each other depending on their specific market 
devices and their social constitution. So does their economic performance and 
the general social consequences of their establishment. Just as the new finan-
cial markets have not succeeded in minimizing risks, but only changed their 
character by turning risks into a marketable commodity, the market devices 
used in evaluating and measuring the quality of the performance of other kind 
of economic organizations analyzed in this study never succeed in abolishing 
the principal quality uncertainty conclusively. It only changes its appearance in 
order to show up in another form. It does not make any sense to claim in gen-
eral that markets tend to make optimal use of the economic resources in order 
to satisfy the individual preferences of the consumers if their preferences are 
unstable and remain largely indeterminate.

CHAPTER 2
Economic Sociology in a  
Theory-historical Perspective
Classical sociology and economics
The emergence of sociology as an academic discipline is usually dated to the 
last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. In 
later codifications of its history, the list of its founding fathers varies a bit in dif-
ferent accounts, but at least Emile Durkheim from France and Max Weber from 
Germany are unanimously counted into them. The position of some others, for 
instance Thorstein Veblen from the USA and Georg Simmel from Germany, is 
less certain. However, as sociologists commenting on economics and develop-
ing an alternative conceptions of major economic institutions they easily exceed 
the achievements of Durkeim and can well compete successfully with Weber 
for the title of one of the founding fathers of economic sociology. The classi-
cal sociologists who were looking for the legitimation of the new science they 
claimed to represent faced a dual challenge from economics and psychology 
(Noro 2016). Economics and psychology had established themselves as inde-
pendent fields of academic study only shortly before. Modern science of eco-
nomics stood on the shoulders of the classical political economy that had been 
part of the project of European Enlightenment at the 18th century. It was also 
associated with the somewhat younger and influential philosophical doctrine 
of utilitarianism. Psychology had, in its turn, emerged as an independent dis-
cipline in Germany with Wundt’s studies of consciousness and the mind based 
mostly on introspection. The new science of sociology distanced itself from 
them both and criticized them, explicitly or implicitly, for their individualism 
and/or utilitarianism. The new field of sociology was presented as an alternative 
to the Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism and the new Marginalist economics, which it 
claimed was principally wrong or at least seriously restricted in its understand-
ing of human action and social institutions. On the other hand, economics 
acted in many ways, not only as a contrast but also as a model of a theoretical— 
or ‘abstract’—science of human behavior. However, in particular in the German 
context, economics was understood to be closer to natural science than his-
tory, which was the general guide to understanding human action. This was the 
case with the older German school of historical economics. The competition 
20 Deciphering Markets and Money
between the new theoretical or abstract school of economics with the old his-
torical school left deep traces in the emerging sociology’s understanding and 
analysis of human action and economic institutions. This is most evident in the 
writings and self-understanding of Max Weber as a sociologist. He developed 
his sociology in close dialogue with the economists and economic historians 
of his time.
Less explicitly than Weber, Emile Durkheim took a critical stance to eco-
nomic thinking as his starting point to his own theory of society. His target 
of critique was not so much economic thinking as such but rather the closely 
related idea of the social contract and its false assumption that social order 
was based on the private interests of the individuals and conscious agreements 
between them. He was also an ardent critic of the philosophical doctrine of 
utilitarianism, which understood private interests in terms of the pursuit of 
the happiness of the individual as the driving force of social life. In so doing, 
Durkheim came to postulate, in his early works The Division of Labour (1997 
[1893]) and Suicide (1951 [1897]) as well as his work on methods (1982 [1895]), 
all published before the turn of the 20th century, social norms which are col-
lective and over-individual and which explain and guide—or even dictate, to 
some degree—the behavior of all the individual members of a society. These 
collective norms exist before and independently of the consciousness of any 
single individual. Individuals born into the society become gradually social-
ized into the prevailing norms by their parents, peers, and other social contacts. 
This does not mean that such norms could not change at all, but their develop-
ment is not the result of any conscious act of any individual actor or actors. For 
the most part, individuals take these norms and rules as given in orientating 
their social actions. Even though Durkheim did not develop his ideas into a 
fully fledged theory of social institutions, later sociologists have analyzed social 
institutions, whether private or public, economic or familiar, as a set of rela-
tively stable and well-established social norms and role sets. This understand-
ing of the social institutions can well be called proto-sociological.
The American classical sociologist—or institutional economist—Thorstein 
Veblen presented the most systematic and poignant critique of the rational 
choice theory, which he saw as the fundamental mistake in the reasoning of 
modern economic theory. In this respect, he is unsurpassed even today. Eco-
nomics, as he wrote, ‘can take account of conduct only in so far as it is rational 
conduct, guided by deliberately and exhaustively intelligent choice’ (Veblen 
1932 [1919]: 235). As he added, ‘it deals with this conduct only insofar as it 
may be construed in rationalistic, teleological terms of calculation and choice’ 
(Veblen 1932 [1919]: 239). Veblen argued instead that
an adequate theory of economic conduct, even for statistical purposes, 
cannot be drawn in terms of individual simply—as in the case of mar-
ginal-utility economics—because it cannot be drawn in terms of the 
underlying traits of human nature simply; since the response that goes 
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to make up human conduct takes place under institutional norms and 
only under stimuli that have an institutional bearing; for the situation 
it provokes and inhibits action in any given case is itself in great part 
institutional, cultural derivation (Veblen 1932 [1919]: 242).
For Veblen it does not suffice to enrich the economic model of action with 
some sociological or normative elements since its conception of action is prin-
cipally wrong, and therefore the whole model has to be overhauled.
Veblen’s basic idea, which he shared with other pragmatists of his time, is the 
habituality of human action (cf. Kilpinen 2000). According to him, people do 
not usually act by making decisions or conscious choices at every step, even less 
do they rationally ponder the possible results of their actions. Mostly they act 
habitually. Consequently, the economic image of the rational actor who makes 
conscious choices using his or her own preferences is principally wrong—or 
valid only in some exceptional cases or situations. According to Kilpinen’s 
interpretation of the pragmatist’s concept of human action:
while human individuals produce their own institutions by their ha-
bitual doings, they are themselves produced by these same institutions. 
The institutions make up the arena and the material for the doings of 
individuals, and they are the inescapable framework which both con-
straints and enables individual action. (Kilpinen 2000: 206).
People can act more reflectively whenever confronted by novel situations that 
pose a challenge to them and their previous ways of behaving. In Veblen’s under-
standing, habituality and rationality are, however, not necessarily opposed to 
each other. Even habitual action can be and is often perfectly rational, a ‘rea-
soned habit.’ One could also add, that the Homo oeconomicus of the Marginal-
ist economists—or of later neoclassical economics codified by Alfred Marshall 
in 1890—does not, unlike the pragmatists’ actor, really act at all but is only 
presumed to make decisions equipped with total information about the relative 
worth of the alternatives open to him or her (Campbell 1998).
Despite this rather devastating critique targeted at the fundamentals of Mar-
ginalist economics Veblen never developed any systematic alternative theory of 
modern market economy. However, his works offer many very insightful and 
comprehensive analyses of modern economic institutions from an evolution-
ary perspective. Each social and historical institution obviously demanded, in 
his opinion, an analysis of its own. However, they could apply some common 
theoretical and conceptual starting points. His most famous work, The The-
ory of the Leisure Class (1918 [1899]), with its idea of conspicuous consump-
tion, or showing-off, which analyzed in any ordinary sense a totally irrational 
type of consumption, has become a classic of the sociology of status and con-
sumption. It has many followers, from Vance Packard’s Status Seekers (1960) 
to Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984). The leitmotif of Veblen’s study is the 
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gradual evolution of human societies from a stage governed by the spirit of 
workmanship to a society in which relations of money dominate and pecuniary 
wealth becomes a source of status instead of work performance. Since pecuni-
ary wealth is mostly invisible to the eyes of others and therefore cannot receive 
the admiration it deserves, it must be expressed in all kinds of acts of con-
spicuous consumption. In addition to his arguably most famous work on the 
leisure class, Veblen published extensively on economic issues, business cycles, 
absentee ownership, higher learning in America, and the industrialization of 
Germany and the conditions of its recovery after the First World War. All these 
analyses emphasized the institutional and historical setting of economy and 
economic action.
Georg Simmel’s work can with good reasons be considered a classic of eco-
nomic sociology too. His main contribution to the study of modern economic 
institutions is his major work, Philosophy of Money (1989) which came out 
originally in 1900. He did touch upon many aspects of the modern economic 
life, in particular the cultural consequences of the use of money, in many other 
works and essays as well. The Philosophy of Money is divided into two rather 
distinctive parts; the first part analyzes the constitution of money and presents 
Simmel’s original theory of value and valuation, while the second part concen-
trates on the multiple social and cultural consequences of the general use of 
money in social intercourse. It is mainly these last issues that Simmel develops 
in his other essays too, most notably in his best-known essay, ‘The Metropo-
lis and Mental Life’ (2002 [1903]), where the social interaction in the big city 
becomes a model for the social relations in all of modern society, with its over-
whelmingly intellectual and calculative character. Typically, Simmel acknowl-
edges both the liberating potentials inherent in the metropolitan way of life, 
which allows the individual more freedom, as well as its constraining aspects. 
At its worst, it threatens to submit the subjective culture, or the life-world of 
the individual, under the increasingly dominant objective culture—or objective 
social institutions, most notably, money. Simmel’s theory of economic value is 
but a special case of a general theory of value, or valuation, and at the same time 
its primary example.
These three classical sociologists, Durkheim, Veblen and Simmel, have the 
honor of standing for three different sociological foundations of the analysis 
of economic action and relations in later economic sociology. Durkheim’s gen-
eral critique of utilitarianism and methodological individualism as well as his 
emphasis on the importance of social norms and institutions resonates most 
directly with the thinking of the school of economic sociology, often associated 
with Mark S. Granovetter’s important contributions, starting from The Strength 
of Weak Ties (1973), his famous study of the different kinds of social ties in 
economic relations, to his general treatise on economic sociology, Society and 
Economy (2017). They have had an important impact on sociological discus-
sions since the late 1970s. Granovetter coined the term ‘social embeddedness’ 
of economy, and it has become commonplace in much of economic sociology 
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(Granovetter 1985; see also Barber 1995); however, Parsons and Smelser, in 
trying to come to terms with the relation between sociology and economics 
in their Economy and Society from 1956, had already analyzed in detail how 
economic institutions are embedded in other social institutions and how these, 
in their turn, are embedded in the system of economy. They formulated their 
theoretical framework in terms of the functionalist systems theory. Embedded-
ness refers in general to the fact that economic relations are, just as Durkheim 
and Veblen thought, always dependent on social rules and norms. In other 
words, they are social institutions. This is equally true of economic markets, 
money, and the relations of labor. This idea has become almost a basic socio-
logical wisdom or truth. The main difference between these two sociologists is 
that whereas Durkheim polemically postulated a separate sphere of objective 
norms and values, Veblen emphasized that it was the habituality of action that 
ultimately constitutes social institutions (A. Gronow 2011). Veblen’s evolution-
ist perspective was also alien to Durkheim, but later sociological institutional-
ists have followed it (see e.g., Hodgson 1999).
The evaluation of the reception and role of Simmel’s thinking among later 
sociologists who have developed economic sociology is more problematic. 
Simmel was, after all, the only one among the early sociologists who wrote a 
major concise treatise on the main institution of modern market economies, 
money. Until quite recently, it has however received relatively little attention. 
This is particularly true of the first, analytic part of his work, or the analysis of 
the social constitution of money. I shall pay more attention to it in the chapter 
on money. Simmel’s various contributions to the analysis of the social and cul-
tural consequences of the use of money and the objectification of culture are in 
their turn regularly referred to in the sociology of culture (Frisby 1992; Frisby 
& Featherstone 1997). Simmel associated them with many of the same features, 
calculation, rationalization, and objectification as his contemporary and co-
patriot Max Weber.
Our fourth classical sociologist, Max Weber, has arguably come to play a 
more prominent role in later developments of economic sociology than the 
three others. His conceptual framework of economy in his posthumous work 
Economy and Society (1968a [1920–21]) acted as a model for Parsons and 
Smelser, who published their book with the same title as Weber’s in 1956. 
Weber’s reputation is in many other respects also unsurpassed in social science 
if one takes into account his impact on many later sociological and histori-
cal studies and disputes, including methodological, theoretical, and empiri-
cal. One has only to consider his contributions to the dispute about the value 
freedom of social science or of his study of the historical genesis of modern 
capitalism, not to mention his ideas about the specific nature of modern capi-
talism. However, his role in modern economic sociology has a more specific 
explanation. Richard Swedberg, who has written many treatises and edited 
several volumes on economic sociology, starting from his and Smelser’s influ-
ential Handbook on Economic Sociology, first published in 1994 (2005), and his 
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own systematic study of Weber’s economic sociology (Swedberg 1998), has 
taken many of Weber’s ideas on economy, economic history, and theory as 
his own and developed them further. Weber’s central role as a guide to later 
developments is understandable because, arguably more than any other, he 
wrote about all kinds of economic institutions and organizations, from stock 
exchange to capitalist firms, from market competition to fiscal policy, in ana-
lyzing the relations between economy and other social institutions (Maurer 
2010). In doing so, he also commented widely and critically on many impor-
tant works on economics and economic history. Above all, he explicitly posed 
the question of the relation of his—then brand-new—sociology to both eco-
nomics and history.
In fact, Weber waged a war on two fronts. He had to clarify the position of 
his sociology not only in relation to modern economic theory, or Marginalism, 
but also to the German historical school of economy and history in general—
during his lifetime the dominant mode of economic thinking in Germany. The 
new Marginalism was in fact a new challenger to this older historical school. 
Weber faced the task of developing an alternative understanding of economic 
action and institutions, as a competitor, or at least a complement, to economic 
thinking of the historical school. He also felt obliged to determine the method-
ological status of sociology in relation to the ‘abstract’ or theoretical economics. 
In his understanding, theoretical economics operated with general concepts, 
whereas economic history operated with concepts that designated unique indi-
vidual events, or ‘historical individuals.’ Even though influenced by the Neo-
kantian doctrine, in particular Heinrich Rickert’s teachings (Ageval 1999), 
Weber did not share its idea of the crucial distinction between natural science 
and humanities that was central in the German Methodenstreit. His problem 
was the place of social inquiry or, if you like, social sciences in this division of 
labor. As Lepenies (1992) pointed out, to Weber, sociology presented a ‘third 
way’ in between (natural) science and humanities, or history, a position that, 
according to the Neokantian theory of knowledge, which many German aca-
demics shared in his time, was in fact principally impossible. There was no 
place for a natural science, with its general laws and theoretical concepts, in 
understanding human societies and the meaningful actions (‘sinnfulles Han-
deln’) of human beings. Marginalism, operating as if it were a natural science, 
was thus an anomaly. Many of Weber’s famous methodological ideas and solu-
tions become understandable in this context, from the ideal types to the com-
bination of understanding of the meaning of action with causal explanations. 
Additionally, he insisted on the value freedom of science, the concept forma-
tion of which depended, however, on general cultural values. Weber thus com-
bined elements of the methodologies and principles of the concept formation 
of both (natural) science and history that, according to the Neokantians, totally 
excluded each other. However, to him, it was not enough to try to clarify the 
division of labor between economic history and economic theory. His ambition 
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was to create a new alternative to theoretical economics—namely, economic 
sociology. (See, however, Mikl-Horke 2010: 114.)
Following Swedberg (1998), one can say that Weber’s interest in economic 
phenomena consisted of three central elements. He set as his task to clarify the 
following:
1. The historical, social and cultural conditions of the emergence of mod-
ern market economy or modern capitalism. (Weber’s famous work on the 
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism was dedicated to this question.)
2. The social and cultural consequences of modern capitalism, always seen 
through the lens of the process of rationalization.
3. The theory or the systematic conceptual analyses of modern capitalist eco-
nomics or modern economic institutions, such as the market and the firm.
Many of his efforts concentrated on the first two questions, that is, the historical 
conditions and origins of modern capitalism as well as its cultural consequences. 
Weber wrote in many treatises about the cultural consequences of capitalism, or 
more specifically in what ways economic activity—for instance the generalized 
money accounting typical of modern capitalism—leaves its impact on other 
areas of social life and culture. In particular, he identified processes of increas-
ing rationalization, typical of modern capitalistic economy, but also evident in 
almost all other areas of modern life. For example, in his sociology of music he 
analyzed the Western tonal system as a good example of the process of cultural 
rationalization and calculation (Darmon 2015). Weber was, however, by no 
means a historical materialist who would have searched for the determination 
of culture and art in economy. On the contrary, he explicitly criticized historical 
materialism for its shortcomings and one-sidedness. Instead of causal relations, 
he preferred to refer to ‘Wahlverwandtschaft,’ elective affinity, or the cultural 
homologies existing between different social ‘orders’ or institutions.
Marginalism—in particular, its Austrian variant in the figure of Carl 
Menger—played a decisive role in Weber’s own systematic conceptual analy-
ses of modern economic institutions, such as markets, price formation, and 
the firm. At the same time, he maintained a critical stance to it. The school of 
Marginalist economics had as its starting point the idea that the marginal util-
ity is equal to the additional utility that the consumer gets from one more unit 
of the product in question. This determines its value to the consumer and the 
price they are ready to pay for it. Weber’s relation to it was ambivalent. Swed-
berg (1998: 25–26), for instance, questioned whether Weber in fact shared this 
conception in his economic sociology. Despite the fact that Weber questioned 
many of the presumptions and conclusions of the new Marginalist economy, it 
was without any question in many ways an important, at times explicit, point 
of reference to him in his critical appraisal of the contribution of economics to 
the understanding of modern societies.
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The advent of Weber’s Economy and Society and the tasks of 
economic sociology
The historical background and context of the advent of Weber’s manuscript 
Economy and Society (1968a [1920-21]) in many ways clarifies many of its fea-
tures which may, at the first glance, look peculiar to its reader today. Before 
the First World War the German publisher Paul Siebeck asked Weber to edit 
a handbook of political economy that could take the place of Gustav Schön-
berg’s old Handbuch der politischen Ökonomie, Handbook of Political Econ-
omy (from 1880), as the standard German book of reference. He started on 
this big project in the end of the first decade of the 20th century. He called it 
Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (A Ground Plan of Social Economics).1 Weber’s 
posthumously published work, Economy and Society, was originally planned as 
his own contribution to the first volume of this multi-volume handbook which 
would deal both with economic theory and economic history. He did not man-
age to edit and publish the whole series.2 He never finished his own manuscript 
either, and it remained fragmentary, consisting of various parts written at dif-
ferent times. The chapter on the sociological concepts of economic action writ-
ten for Ground Plan, which he succeeded in finishing, includes the basics of his 
economic sociology.
According to Weber’s original plan, the first part of Ground Plan would con-
sist of three comprehensive volumes, the first of which was Economy and the 
Science of Economy. Karl Bücher wrote for this first volume about economic 
history (1914), Friedrich von Wieser (1914) about the theory of socioeconom-
ics, and Joseph Schumpeter (1914) about the history of economic thought. 
Schumpeter’s work came out later in a revised English version, Economic Doc-
trine and Method (1954a). It became a standard textbook for some decades. 
The second part of the Ground Plan of Social Economics dealt with the relation 
of nature and technics to economy, as well as with geography, population, and 
consumption. It included, among others, Friedrich Gottl-Ottilienfeld’s (1914) 
major study on the role of technique in economy. Gottl-Ottilienfeld’s work 
became, together with Schumpeter’s contribution, a standard work of reference 
in the German-speaking world between the two world wars. The other parts of 
this series, which were published first after Weber’s death after the First World 
War, dealt with many other important issues of economy and economic policy, 
among them international trade and trade policy.
What was then after all the role that Weber had reserved to himself in his 
ambitious project? Even more, what was the role of sociology in it? He set it as 
his task to write the third book of the first volume of the series. From the start, 
he had thought of writing about the relationship between economy and other 
social orders as well as about the cultural and social conditions of different types 
of economic action. The original plan consisted of three parts, the first of which 
dealt with economy and law, the second with social groups, and the third with 
economy and culture. The last one carried the subtitle ‘A Critique of Historical 
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Materialism.’ Weber also planned a chapter on economy and race, but he soon 
left it to Robert Michels to write. The only part that Weber managed to finish 
before his death was ‘Economy and economic orders and powers.’3
One of Weber’s last writings, written in 1919–1920, was the relatively short 
chapter later included in Economy and Society entitled ‘Sociological Categories 
of Economic Action’ (Weber 1968a: 63–206). It can be regarded as his basic 
contribution to economic sociology in the strict sense of the word. Originally, 
he had thought of writing a methodological chapter on the object of the basic 
concepts of economics and their logical nature. Its task was obviously to put 
the economic writings of the other contributors of the series in their proper 
place by showing how economic theory was—at least partly—valid if only it 
understood its own limitations and cultural conditions and acknowledged 
complements from history and sociology. It appears that Weber had thought 
that Wieser’s contribution would be an adequate presentation of economic 
theory and therefore there was no need for him to deal any more with its basic 
concepts. Insofar as Wieser acknowledged the validity of the subjective value 
theory of Marginalism, but claimed that it could not explain the formation of 
empirical market prices, his approach was in line with Weber’s own. Wieser 
thought that it was important to pay attention to the changing historical and 
social conditions of the process of economic evaluation. (Wieser 1884: 40; cf. 
Schluchter 2009: 24 and 47–48).
Both Karl Bücher’s writings on the historical stages of economic develop-
ment and Friedrich von Wieser’s on economics turned out to be disappointing 
to Weber. Bücher’s part was the less problematic of these two (Schluchter 2009: 
36–37). It was a rather standard and short textbook presentation of the histori-
cal stages of economic development. Wieser’s writings caused more headache 
for Weber. Wieser thought that economic actors do not act all by themselves 
but are subordinated in their interaction to social forces that are often more 
powerful than their own private interests. As a conclusion, Wieser, just like 
Weber, emphasized the role of the legal regulations and the struggle for power 
in the economy and public life (Schluchter 2009: 48). In his contribution to 
Weber’s Ground Plan, Wieser did not, however, advance this question any 
further. Consequently, he ended up in a theoretical cul-de-sac: the theory of 
marginal utilities is a valid theory, but it is of little help in determining empiri-
cal prices. This could well be one of the reasons that Weber felt obliged to 
develop his own concepts of economic action and add them to the planned 
volume (Schluchter 2009: 81). He might also have been uneasy with Wieser’s 
solution to the problem of how to advance from the study of individual eco-
nomic actions to the social actions of several actors in the market (Swedberg 
1998: 160). Wieser made a distinction between a ‘simple economy,’ consisting 
of only one economic actor, and a ‘social economy,’ consisting of several actors. 
However, he did not, according to Weber’s judgment, build the necessary con-
ceptual bridge between these two constellations. This question must have been 
quite central to Weber because of his principal methodological commitments. 
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He was consistent in his methodological individualism, emphasizing that 
sociology should be able to deduce all social formations conceptually from 
the meaningful acts of single individuals. In his own presentation, he made 
a distinction between the struggle inherent in any act of exchange and the 
real competitive market struggle. In the first case, two individuals engage in 
the exchange of products, the outcome of which is always principally uncer-
tain. When, instead, real competition reigns in the market, many actors engage 
simultaneously in buying and selling, and consequently, the outcome of every 
participant’s action depends on the actions of the other participants in the 
market. Weber made also a distinction between the ‘formal validity’ and ‘sub-
stantive validity’ of money as a means of exchange, the first one referring to 
its value in exchange, the second to the fact that it is accepted as a means of 
payment usually guaranteed by law (Weber 1968a: 74–75). In the end, Weber 
did not solve the problem of how to deduce the conditions and results of social 
interaction from the meaningful actions of individuals. As a consequence, he 
could not show how the objective market prices evolved from the struggle 
between anonymous market actors any better than Wieser could. He referred 
to the process of mutual bargaining on the one hand and social struggle on the 
other. As if by common consent, the market actors had agreed on the use of 
money and objective, monetary prices. However, as he readily admitted, this 
was just a way of speaking (‘as if ’) and no real explanation (Bader et al. 1976; 
see also Lichtblau 2000).
Weber’s big project, The Ground Plan of Social Economics, to which he dedi-
cated some fifteen years of his life and which he never finished, was a heroic 
attempt not only to synthesize the economic knowledge of his times in order 
to solve all the major questions concerning both the conditions and conse-
quences of modern capitalism, but also to develop an alternative sociological 
complement to economic theory. Weber’s huge project was delayed several 
times. These delays were caused by dramatic historical events, including the 
outbreak of the First World War and personal problems, both his own and his 
co-authors’. His premature death in 1920 terminated his project and no one has 
dared to attempt anything nearly as ambitious ever since. Most of Weber’s own 
extensive, but fragmentary and often hard to decipher, contributions and com-
ments were published posthumously, mostly without paying attention to their 
original context.
Weber’s critique of the theoretical postulates of Marginalism
The Marginalist ‘revolution’ in economics is usually dated to the 1870s when, 
within a couple of years and independently from each other, three main works 
with ideas resembling each other came out: Stanley Jevons’ The Theory of Politi-
cal Economy in England (1871), Carl Menger’s Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaft-
slehre in Austria (1871) and Leon Walras’s Elements d’economie politique pure 
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ou theorie de la richesse sociale in France (1874). Marginalism provided, among 
others, a solution to the famous diamond paradox: Compared to pure water, 
diamonds are of little use to man, but they are much more expensive; water is 
a life necessity but very cheap or available practically free of charge. As a con-
sequence, the relative value of any one commodity cannot be deduced from 
its utility to a human being or its capability of satisfying any human needs 
as previous political economy assumed. The theory of marginal utilities could 
solve this paradox by taking into account not only the utility of an object but 
its marginal utility due to its relative scarcity and availability. Scarce commodi-
ties have a greater value because the utility of an additional item of them is 
big. Therefore, diamonds, which are relatively useless are expensive; water, a 
life necessity, but freely available, is cheap. More precisely, the marginal utility 
of a commodity is the value that one more item of the commodity adds to the 
satisfaction of the needs of a consumer. It can be presumed that these utili-
ties tend to decline asymptotically with the increasing amount of one and the 
same commodity until finally an added unit does not make any difference at all 
in the satisfaction of the need. Therefore, the absolute utility of a commodity 
can be significant even if its marginal utility is small or almost non-existent. 
As Menger (2007 [1871]: 132) formulated, a bit cryptically, in his principle of 
marginal utility:
the value to this person of any portion of the whole available quantity of 
the good is equal to the importance to him of the satisfactions of least 
importance among those assured by the whole quantity and achieved 
with an equal portion.
Marginalism was not initially a unified doctrine. It was codified in Alfred Mar-
shall’s Principles of Economics (1890), which presented the determination of the 
prices of commodities as a function of their supply and demand. Paul Samuel-
son’s Foundations of Economics, published in 1947, mathematically formalized 
the basic principles of what became known as neoclassical economics in a sys-
tematic way. It became the standard textbook of economics for several decades.
Weber was familiar with the early Austrian school of Marginalism with 
Menger as its founding father and Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk as his close fol-
lowers. It differed from its English and French counterparts in many impor-
tant respects. The theoretical status of the concept of utility varied among the 
early Marginalists. For instance, Menger, in the spirit of the classical political 
economy, still spoke of human needs as something that were objectively given:
Value is therefore nothing inherent in goods, no property of them but 
merely the importance that we first attribute to the satisfaction of our 
needs, that is, to our lives and well-being, and in consequence carry 
over to economic goods as the exclusive causes of the satisfaction of our 
needs (Menger 2007: 116).
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He even provided a classification of human needs, in terms of their relative 
importance, which he regarded as universal.
Gradually, the Marginalist economists developed the concept of util-
ity, abstracting it from its physiological or psychological foundations,4 and 
understood it simply as a subjective preference or a set of preferences that are 
expressed in the concrete choices—whatever the reason for preferring one item 
to another might be in any one case. For the purposes of the theory of relative 
market prices and the market equilibrium, it was enough to order the goods 
on sale on a market according to the relative preferences of the buyers. It pre-
sumed that the economic actors were fully aware of the order of their own 
preferences and that these preferences were independent from each other and 
remained stable.
As Stephen Parsons (2014: 3) has shown, Weber’s stance regarding the con-
cept of utility differed from Menger’s, as he emphasized the subjective nature of 
individual preferences. He left the relative utility of an economic object to the 
subject to decide. The Austrians did not consider marginal utility as a derivative 
of the total utility. They also did not advocate for the formalization of econom-
ics, for which Walras strongly advocated. Weber, in his turn, seemed to be in 
favor of formalization, even though with the important reservation that only 
the theoretical ground plan of economics based on the presumption of the pure 
type of rational economic action could be formalized, and not the analyses of 
any real empirical economic activities or relations which often differed quite 
drastically from those theoretically postulated (Parsons 2014: 14, 23).
If, following Stephen Parsons (2014), one can reasonably presume that Weber 
shared many, if not necessarily all, of the basic theoretical presumptions of 
Austrian Marginalists, it is difficult to explain why he did not simply refer to 
them and repeat their teachings in his own writings but went into great deal 
of trouble in order to develop his own, quite unique, categories of economic 
action. Weber’s explicit comments on some specific ideas of Marginalism do 
not explain it either, nor do they explain how he distanced himself from some 
of its more specific conclusions.
What united Weber’s economic thinking most notably with the basic 
assumptions of the Austrians was, after all, his understanding of the method-
ological status of economic and social theory. Economics was to Menger an 
exact theoretical science and as such, alien to empirical reality. It left an open 
space to history and sociology. Therefore, it was in need of concrete studies that 
complemented it. To Weber, economic theory could not be anything else but 
an ideal typical construct that was useful and necessary for heuristic purposes 
but could not cope with any causal deductions or predictions about the future. 
Consequently, in his understanding, economics did not differ all that much 
from the idea of his new sociology, which operated with pure, or ideal typical, 
concepts; the more abstract, well defined, and alien to the concrete reality the 
better. However, Weber did not share Menger’s and other Austrian economists’ 
idea that economic analyses should be complemented and approach reality 
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with all its empirical richness by taking into account new factors, describing 
new dimensions or layers of the multi-faceted reality, whether historical, psy-
chological, or sociological. In Weber’s opinion, sociology could, in fact, help 
economics by first, showing the limits of the ‘pure’ economic theory and, sec-
ond, complementing it by offering additional theoretical concepts of social 
action. Their purpose was not to add up to a richer, more concrete, picture of 
reality but rather complement the analysis with alternative or parallel—equally 
abstract—conceptual tools and interpretations. In the end, the picture would 
not get more concrete, but the rich empirical reality could be analyzed with 
alternative conceptual frameworks seeing which one of them, or perhaps a 
combination of them, could best make us understand the meaning of economic 
action in any concrete, historical case.
Weber did share an important starting point with modern economic theory. 
Both his methodological writings and systematic sociology emphasized that 
sociological analysis should begin with individual action. In addition, instru-
mental rationality—the choice of the best and most effective means to reach a 
goal—played a central role in his sociology. In inspecting and analyzing social 
action it is, in Weber’s opinion, often useful to presume that it is rational in 
the above sense. In reality, actions only seldom coincide with this ‘ideal’ type 
of rationality, but one can nevertheless question to what degree any single act 
converges to or diverges from purely rational actions. He was, however, keen 
on emphasizing that this was simply a sort of thought experiment and did not 
claim anything about human nature. In reality, ideal types and concrete action 
hardly ever coincided, ‘real’ action only rarely followed the pattern of its ideal 
type (Gronow & Töttö 1996: 305–312). The principles of legal casuistry inspired 
Weber’s concept formation (Turner & Factor 1992).
Instrumental rationality was by no means Weber’s only ideal type of action. 
To him, there are other types of action, which are quite as important in under-
standing social and economic phenomena. It was not possible to justify the 
presumption of human rationality psychologically (see Zafirovski 2001).5 The 
early sociological critics of economic thinking often had (and many still have) 
as their main target the postulate of Homo oeconomicus understood in more 
general terms than the theoretical construct of an rational individual actor 
aiming at optimizing his or her utilities. In the early critical appraisals, it was 
often associated with hedonistic ethical principles, the doctrine of the calculus 
of pleasure and pain á la Bentham, and criticized as such. Classical sociologists 
distanced themselves from it also because of its close affinity to the postulates 
typical of the political philosophy of individualism, according to which soci-
ety consisted of atomistic and egoistic individuals who act purely in their own 
interests. In addition, the postulate of the Homo economicus was often associ-
ated with the predominance of instrumental rationality as the guiding princi-
ple of human action in general, not only in economy: Human beings would, 
whenever possible, tend to rationally choose the best means to reach any goal 
they were after. Weber was a most ardent opponent of the ethical postulate of 
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the utilitarians, according to which human action is predominantly guided by 
the rational hedonistic calculus of pleasure and pain.
All these aspects undoubtedly contributed to Weber’s critiques of Marginal-
ism. Many of them were not unique to him but quite often heard among other 
Continental social philosophers and historians who associated all or some of 
these aspects with the new spirit of British commercialism and anti-etatism—
a mode of economic and political thinking referred to in Germany as ‘Man-
chestertum.’ At the same time, Weber’s own thinking also differed in some 
important respects from these typical German or Continental ‘prejudices.’ He 
thought that Germany could not avoid becoming as capitalistic as Britain and 
the rest of the world. He also thought that the basic assumptions of economic 
theory could be freed from older socio-philosophical or moral connotations, 
and consequently, economic theory of modern capitalism did not rest on them.
What was, then, the relation of Weber’s sociology, and more precisely eco-
nomic sociology, to economics after all? In clarifying this question, it is use-
ful to compare his position to Joseph Schumpeter’s, whose idea of the roles of 
economics, history, and sociology resembled those of Menger’s. Weber seemed 
to agree with Joseph Schumpeter on many points. Schumpeter wrote the Eco-
nomic Doctrine and Method (1954a), the first version of his famous History of 
Economic Thought (1954b) for the first volume of the handbook series, Grun-
driss der Sozialökonomik (1914) that Weber edited. According to Schumpeter, 
both economic history and economic theory belong to economics. Economics 
was the mother science but sociology had a quite essential side role to play. 
Sociology offered a helping hand whenever the concrete economic phenom-
enon did not correspond to the theoretical construct. This was often the case 
when factors external to economy, such as power, violence, legislation, and the 
like, interfered in economic action. Other kinds of economic systems, not based 
on economic exchange and the general use of money, demanded yet another 
approach. Schumpeter relied mostly on economic statistics and economic his-
tory to assist economics pure. He seemed to share Weber’s interpretation of 
the relationship of theoretical economics and economic history in that both 
had their own area of competence, which in the case of economic theory was 
the ‘pure’ market economy. However, it is possible and often useful to compare 
other kinds of non-rational economies, such as traditional home economy or 
an economic monopoly, with this pure type in order to explain how they devi-
ate from it.
What must have appealed to Weber in the Austrian Marginalism was that, 
according to it, the abstract economic theory could not provide any explana-
tion of the determination of the real market prices. Marginalists were interested 
in empirical price formation too—and not only in the theoretical deduction of 
prices—but thought that it is best analyzed in terms of a bargaining process, 
involving the interlocking expectations of the bargaining partners (Parsons 
2014: 10). Weber shared their opinion that prices are formed in a bidding pro-
cess based on subjective evaluations of the partners, which culminated in price 
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struggles. In Weber’s opinion, the relative power positions of the actors decided 
the result in the last instance (Parsons 2014: 48–49).
Many of Weber’s comments and observations are quite polemical, short 
observations or notes. He did not develop them more systematically to explain, 
for instance, how the mechanism of the struggle for power affected ‘empirical’ 
prices under various market conditions (see Bader et al. 1976). He referred 
approvingly to Georg Knapp’s legal, or state theory, of money but did not 
comment or develop this idea or ponder explicitly on how it related to the 
economists’ standard conception of money as a medium of exchange (Weber 
1968a:78–79).
If Weber’s interpretation of the area and limits of the competence of econom-
ics resembled Schumpeter’s, his own understanding of the economic theory, 
or theoretical economics, was close to Wieser’s (1914; cf. Schluchter 2009). 
Following Wieser, Weber separated ‘pure’ prices, which in his mind could be 
deduced from economic theory, from ‘real’ prices, which resulted from power 
struggles. He claimed most emphatically that in explaining prices, power strug-
gles should be taken into account: ‘money prices are the product of conflicts of 
interest and a compromise, they thus result from power constellations’ (Weber 
1968a: 108). Even though he expressed himself in stronger terms, this did not 
differ all that much from the standard understanding among Austrian Margin-
alists, who also emphasized the importance of bargaining and price struggles in 
economic reality (Parsons 2014: 48–49). In line with this, the Austrian Margin-
alists analyzed individual economic action or interaction as an ongoing social 
process that obviously appealed to Weber. In other words, both Wieser and 
Weber agreed that, when studying the formation of prices, economic analysis 
should be complemented with historical and sociological factors. This stance 
could be understood in two different ways: Either prices differ from theoreti-
cal, pure, or equilibrium prices only under some exceptional conditions (e.g., 
under ‘imperfect’ competition) when power relations interfere; or power strug-
gle and the power position of producers should always be taken into account, 
even under the conditions of perfect competition. Weber stood for the second, 
more demanding position. Analyzing prices, he declared that the importance 
of power was not restricted to the economic markets alone, but the struggle for 
survival was in fact the general motor behind human history.
Another important reservation that Weber had concerning the area of com-
petence of marginal utility was that it concerned only the activity of consumers 
or home economies. The economic activity of enterprises to achieve interest or 
profits cannot be understood with the help of the same principle since, obvi-
ously, enterprises are not motivated by the satisfaction of any human needs that 
could be expressed and measured as utilities. The calculations of the entrepre-
neur are not oriented to the marginal utility, but to profitability (Weber 1968a: 
92). This critical question was not Weber’s originally but posed by the first-
generation Marginalists and was part of their internal discussions.6 Weber had, 
however yet another, more demanding reservation. In his mind, consumers 
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were not as autonomous as presumed by the economic theory, since entrepre-
neurs can often affect their likings and choices. Their wants did not stay stable 
but were undergoing continuous change. As Weber formulated it,
it goes without saying that in terms of economic theory the direction in 
which goods can be profitably produced by profit-making enterprises is 
determined by the marginal utilities for the last consumers in conjunc-
tion with the latter’s incomes. But from a sociological point of view it 
should not be forgotten that, to a large extent, in a capitalistic economy 
(a) new wants are created and others allowed to disappear and (b) capi-
talistic enterprises, through their aggressive advertising policies, exercise 
an important influence on the demand functions of consumers. Indeed 
these are essential traits of a capitalist economy (Weber 1968a: 99–100).
In addition to the question of the preference and the price formation, Weber 
had several other reservations concerning economic thinking. He did not 
approve of the explanation of the origins of interest paid on money with the 
‘principle of abstaining.’ He thought that an interest is not a compensation for 
the delayed satisfaction of needs or pleasures. Economic actors take risks in 
orienting their actions towards the future. The future is always unpredictable 
and therefore they can never know the outcome of their choices. Recognizing 
the principally uncertain nature of the future, and in contrast to later Marginal-
ists, Weber thought that imperfect information was the normal case and not 
just an exception.
The historical validity of theoretical economics
Weber’s (arguably most famous) study on the historical and ideational ori-
gins of modern capitalist rational orientation of action, The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Modern Capitalism (2010 [1904–05]), claimed that the early 
Protestants or the Calvinist Puritans did not work and invest money in econ-
omy in order to enjoy its fruits for any personal pleasure. In his understand-
ing, entirely different motives guided their actions, namely the aspiration to 
save their souls or receive some kind of assurance that they were among those 
that God had chosen to eternal life. They did not waste money on consump-
tion but—completely irrationally from the point of view of their own pleasure 
and well-being—invested it in their enterprises or loaned their capital to other 
entrepreneurs for interest. They interpreted economic success as a sign of being 
among God’s chosen ones. Early capitalists, just like their later descendants, 
were profit seekers who were interested in the future of their souls and not 
pleasure-seeking hedonists.
If The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Capitalism and his other related 
studies of world religions had remained Weber’s only major contributions to 
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the study of economy we could bypass him as yet another German economic 
historian. This interpretation is also supported by his posthumous work on 
economic history, based on his lectures in Munich, General Economic History 
(Weber 1927[1923]). The German historical school thought that individual 
historical events were always by their nature unique and never repeated them-
selves in history in the same way. Historical change was always a result of a rich 
and many-faceted composition of factors differing from one case to another. 
Therefore, history and other studies of culture operated with the concept of the 
historical individual instead of general concepts. For instance, the French Rev-
olution was a unique historical event caused by the coincidence of a great mul-
titude of smaller and bigger factors and, therefore, it could neither be subsumed 
under any generalized concepts, such as revolution in general, nor explained 
with the help of any universal laws. Politically this position was related to the 
belief, common among German historians in Weber’s time, that Germany 
would not develop its modern market economy to be relatively autonomous 
from the state or the government as Britain had done. German had its ‘Sonder-
weg,’ its specific way of its own.
In some of his works, Weber seemed to think that Marginalism, or abstract 
economics, as it was referred to in Germany, presented a valid theory of eco-
nomic action specific to and typical of modern capitalism alone.7 He even 
seemed to think that the developed market economy, with its generalized 
exchange of commodities and money, gradually came to resemble its abstract, 
theoretical model as explicated in Marginalism. Economics did not recognize 
and acknowledge its own historical conditions and restrictions. In Weber’s 
opinion, the Marginalist economics was not a universal theory of economic 
action; neither was the rationally acting Homo oeconomicus a universal human 
being or the incarnation of the human species, but at best it was a historically 
specific phenomenon. This particular postulate was valid, as an approximation, 
only in modern capitalism, which predominantly comprised rational, individ-
ual economic actors who had come into being in a historical process leading 
from other, more traditional forms of economic organizations. Furthermore, 
acting rationally in the economic sense was possible only under the conditions 
of a generalized monetary exchange of commodities in the market. Thus, it was 
the specific task of sociology—historical sociology, if you like—to point out 
this fact to economists, thus narrowing their universalistic aspirations. Weber 
formulated this limitation concretely in his Economy and Society. The explana-
tion presented in Marginalism about the reasons that people abstain from con-
sumption and pleasure in favor of future interest is only partially true:
Economic theory approaches this problem of the relative marginal utili-
ties of goods under present and under future control. So far so good. 
But the sociologist would then like to know in what human actions this 
supposed relation is reflected in such a manner that the actors can take 
the consequences of this differential valuation (of present and future 
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goods), in the form of an ‘interest rate,’ as a criterion for their own op-
erations. For it is by no means obvious that this should happen at all 
times and places. It does indeed happen, as we know, in profit-making 
economic units. But here the primary cause is the economic power dis-
tribution (Machtlage) between profit-making enterprises and budget-
ary units (households), both those consuming the goods offered and 
those offering certain means of production (mainly labor). … Economic 
theory …. might then very well say that this exploitation of the power 
distribution (which itself is a consequence of the institution of private 
property in goods and the means of production) permits it only to this 
particular class of economic actors to conduct their operations in ac-
cordance with the ‘interest’ criterion (Weber 1968a: 97–98).
Weber is here almost paraphrasing Marx’s Capital by arguing that it is first the 
power position granted by private ownership of the means of production that 
makes the collection of interest and accumulation of profits and capital possible 
at all. Standard economics does not, as a rule, pay attention to this important 
fact. According to Weber, the theory of Marginal utility analyzes human action, 
for certain purposes of thinking, as if it proceeded from a to z under the control 
of calculation typically exercised by a merchant (Weber 1968a: 394).
At one point, Weber went so far as to claim that the economic reality of mod-
ern capitalism approaches more and more the abstract model of Marginalism:
The historical peculiarity of the capitalist epoch, and thereby also the 
significance of marginal utility theory … for the understanding of this 
epoch rests on the circumstances that—while the economic history of 
some epochs of the past has not without reason been designated as ‘his-
tory of non-economic conditions’—under today’s conditions of exist-
ence the approximation of reality to the theoretical propositions (of 
rationality) (Weber 1975 [1908]: 33).
Even though one could read this paragraph almost as a prophecy of the vic-
torious process of rationalization inherent in modern capitalism, it is safer 
to interpret it in line with Weber’s general methodological insight about the 
relationship between theoretical and general concepts and concrete reality in 
human science.8 According to him, there is hardly ever a perfect match between 
them. This by no means indicates that we could do completely without any gen-
eral concepts like the typical ones in Marginalism. Such concepts are needed 
simply to create order out of a reality that is chaotic and incomprehensible, or 
can be comprehended in multiple ways depending on our ‘knowledge inter-
est’ (cf. Habermas 1972). Theoretical concepts pick out of the multifaceted 
concrete reality what is important or relevant to us as cultural beings at the 
moment. Reality must always be interpreted or constructed. In this process, 
general concepts are not only useful but quite indispensable. This explains why 
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Weber, in his economic-historical writings, used both systematically general 
concepts and developed a conceptual apparatus of his own in order to con-
strue a theoretical framework to analyze human history. This is accomplished 
predominantly by comparing historical cases, identifying their similarities and 
differences with the help of the conceptual apparatus.
Weber’s own sociological concepts of economy
The very starting point of Weber’s ‘understanding sociology’ was the individual 
actor whose action was meaningful (‘sinnhaftes Handeln’). From economics he 
adopted the concept of calculative rationality, which he believed characterized 
modern economic activity.9 In this way, he integrated some of the concepts of 
theoretical economics into his own system of sociological categories to better 
fit his broader framework of sociology. In a way the calculating, rational Homo 
oeconomicus had a kind of a privileged position also in Weber’s thinking. He 
tended to relate or contrast other types of irrational or alternative rational 
actions to instrumental rationality. As an ideal typical concept, Weber’s formal 
rationality was quite specific. One can say that, in this type and in this type only, 
both the subjective and objective meaning of action coincided and appeared, 
both to the acting subject and to his or her external observer.
In his system of sociological categories of economy, he distinguished dif-
ferent types of action depending on the degree of calculation they allowed. 
The basic division is between money calculation and calculation in kind. The 
last one faced obvious problems from the point of view of commensuration 
and, hence, calculation: how to compare and qualitatively measure different 
objects. This was obviously totally impossible if the value standards of their 
evaluation differed from one person and case to another. It was monetary 
calculation that made explicit and unequivocal comparison possible. Weber 
further distinguished money accounting from its subtype, capital accounting. 
The most important and original concept of his economic sociology is formal 
rationality and its counterpart, substantive rationality. The definition of for-
mal rationality is simply an action that allows and is based on calculation—its 
only characteristic is calculation and nothing else. As Weber defined it, formal 
rationality depends only on ‘the degree of the technically possible and actu-
ally applied quantitative calculation’ (Weber1968a: 85; see also Norkus 2010: 
60). In his understanding, the great benefit of this concept is that it is unam-
biguous. Therefore, it perfectly fulfills the criteria that he set to his ideal types. 
They should be as unambiguously defined as possible even at the cost of their 
increasing distance from reality. It appears that he thought that there cannot be 
any dispute or problems of interpretation concerning the purpose and results 
of money accounting or its meaning, contrary to human activity in general, 
because money accounting deals only with distinctions in quantitative units, 
of more or less of the same, which should be self-evident to everyone (Gronow 
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1979). As he further claimed, ‘from a purely technical point of view, money is 
the most “perfect” means of economic calculation.’ In addition, it is formally 
the most rational means of economic activity (Weber 1968a: 86). Thus, money 
accounting is not only the most typical example of formal rational action but 
also its perfect or ‘pure’ type.
Capital accounting is similarly unambiguous as a concept. It is a special case 
of money accounting. It is simply defined as the budgetary accounting of a firm 
(Weber 1968a: 91). The means and ends, input and output, of capital account-
ing typical of a capitalist firm are simply bigger or smaller quantities of money, 
or numbers in the columns of debits and credits in bookkeeping. In making 
his conceptual distinction between these two kinds of accounting, Weber paid 
homage to the understanding common in the Marginal economics of his time 
according to which consumers’, or households’, economic orientation differs 
principally from a firm’s. According to him, consumers orient their actions in 
the capitalist market according to money accounting, whereas firms or enter-
prises orient themselves to capital accounting. He thought that the ‘rational’ 
accounting—or the system of double bookkeeping with its debits and credits—
of the modern enterprise was one of the main landmarks of modern Western 
capitalism that distinguished it from all other historical economic formations. 
In this Weber was by no means alone. His contemporary and challenger in 
explaining the origins of modern capitalism, Werner Sombart (1902) thought 
the role of the double bookkeeping to be decisive too. The distinction of the 
enterprise from home economy as well as the capitalist organization of formally 
free labor were, however, equally important steps in the development of mod-
ern capitalism.
An economic actor who orients his or her actions according to the principle 
of capital accounting can evaluate the effectiveness of such actions unambigu-
ously by comparing the inputs with outputs in purely quantitative, monetary 
terms. In order to be able to compare things and services in quantities of 
money, they must obviously have an objective value or price. The price of any 
singular object can of course vary, but in relation to an individual actor, it is at 
any one moment given and easily comparable. It can be bought or sold for that 
particular price and, in a modern capitalist economy, one cannot usually bar-
gain about it. One does not usually have to or cannot negotiate or dispute about 
it. It is not in the power of the individual actors to change it.
Weber did not present any systematic theory of the determination of the 
economic value or price of goods or services that could have competed with 
the standard economic theory and explained how and on what grounds such 
objective market prices are formed. Neither did he analyze systematically the 
social conditions of the use of money. He defined money quite simply, and not 
originally, as a contractual means of payment that functions as a medium of 
exchange: ‘”Money” we call a chartal means of payment which is also a means 
of exchange’ (Weber 1968a: 76). Just as Simmel had divided his Philosophy of 
Money into an analytic and a synthetic part, Weber divided the question of 
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money into a material or substantive and a formal theory, respectively. How-
ever, his interpretation differed slightly from Simmel’s: The substantive theory 
of money dealt with the quantitative value of money and its historical changes. 
The task of the formal theory was, in its turn, to explain and analyze the social 
conditions of the use of money, a task that obviously demanded a sociological 
and historical supplement to economic theory. Weber did not discuss at any 
length either of these questions and analyzed mainly the social and cultural 
consequences of the use of money. In doing so, he regarded economy from 
the point of view of the individual economic actor who, as a rule, takes both 
money and prices as given. Consumers, under normal conditions, know how to 
use money without having any idea what really explains its quite extraordinary 
characteristics or makes its many functions possible. Even specialists dispute 
about them. This proves clearly that modern men have no superior knowledge 
about the social conditions of their own life compared to the ‘wilds.’ What sepa-
rates them decisively from their predecessors is the belief that the conditions 
of their ordinary life, such as the tramway, medicine, law courts, or money, 
are human products that are open to human knowledge and control as well 
as operate in a rational manner according to some established rules (Weber 
1968b: 473).
Weber did not leave this question about the nature of money quite so easily; 
he listed several characteristics or consequences of money accounting:
1. Monetary accounting evaluates all alternatives according to their market 
situation;
2. Calculating and comparing of costs and benefits is typical of money 
accounting;
3. In money accounting it is always possible to evaluate all products and 
other economic conditions at the disposal of each economic unit both at 
the beginning and at the end of a time period;
4. With the help of money accounting it is possible to evaluate how much 
money a person would have at his or her disposal if he or she realized all 
the economic assets at his or her disposal (Weber 1968a: 86–87).
It is easy to see that all the above specifications deal with the uses of money, and 
they explain mainly its practical functions. Furthermore, they concern money 
mostly as a means of accounting, which in Weber’s—just as in Knapp’s (1918 
[1905])—understanding was obviously crucial in the understanding of money 
as it is. In explicating the conditions of monetary accounting, Weber referred 
simply to the principle of marginal utility:
5. Money accounting presumes ‘the orientation of consumption to these 
data by the utilization of the money available (on the basis of point 4) dur-
ing the accounting period for the acquisition of the requisite utilities in 
accordance with the principle of marginal utility’ (Weber 1968a: 87).
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The calculative rationality, evident in monetary and capital accounting, is 
according to Weber the primary type of rationality from the technical or for-
mal point of view only. For instance, the development of the productivity of a 
firm can be measured unequivocally only in monetary prices. Use values or the 
subjective utilities of products of various kinds are not directly commensurate. 
We face the same problem of commensuration when comparing the utility of 
two products to one and the same person and that of one product to two differ-
ent persons. Consequently, in Weber’s mind, natural economy—or economy in 
kind—is never formally rational and, even more important, ineffective (Weber 
1968a: 102–104). As he added, to be more precise, it is ineffective only in the 
sense of formal rationality. We can measure and compare economic action 
effectively from the perspective of formal rationality, but there can very well 
be other arguably more ambiguous but as important, as he would call them, 
substantive criteria of evaluating effectiveness, such as the satisfaction of needs 
to which formal rationality is, at best, indirectly related.
Weber divided economic action not only into two opposite and mutually 
exclusive ideal types—formal, calculative rationality and substantive or mate-
rial rationality—but also considered their mutual relations. In acting according 
to substantive rationality, one orients one’s actions according to some concrete 
goals like the satisfaction of needs or, alternatively, according to some ethical 
values (e.g. fairness or equality), whatever they might be in any one case. These 
intrinsic values cannot be reduced to quantitative terms that would make them 
comparable and commensurate. The parallel ideal type to substantive rational-
ity is value rationality in Weber’s list of the general sociological ideal types of 
action. It aims at the realization of a substantive value—whatever that might 
be in any case—at all costs and disregarding other possible consequences of 
the action. In this case, the calculation of the costs is totally irrelevant since 
the attainment of its goal has an absolute value, or an ethical or aesthetic value 
in itself. Formal rationality, or means-ends-rationality, is not quite similar to 
instrumental rationality, the counterpart to value rationality, since the peculi-
arity of formal rationality, as compared to the more general concept of instru-
mental rationality, is calculation and accounting. This means that the only 
difference between the means and ends of action is a quantitative one and the 
end results differ only in quantities: more or less money.
What makes Weber’s division of economic action into these two types inter-
esting, and at the same time problematic, is that formal rationality and substan-
tive rationality seem to exclude each other. He went so far as to characterize 
the contradiction or anomaly between the formal and substantive rationality as 
the great problem of our times. Modern capitalist economy, in his understand-
ing the utmost case of economic effectiveness in terms of formal, calculative 
rationality, is by no means rational from the point of any kind of substantive 
rationality, the satisfaction of human needs or the achievement of some ethi-
cal values or goals. Even worse, formal rationality is not only totally irrelevant 
in regard to all ethical goals or material needs, but tends to reject them since 
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it can take into account only those means and goals that can be counted and 
compared in money. On the other hand, the commensuration of other, non-
monetary means and ends is not only almost impossible but it does not guaran-
tee economic efficiency either. This was the main reason that Weber expressed 
strong doubts about socialism as well as the goals of other alternative social, 
ethically oriented movements of his times, from lovers of nature to vegetari-
anism. He believed firmly that, sooner or later, such ethically or aesthetically 
inspired movements and their alternative policies would face the challenges 
of effective mass production and administration which, out of necessity, will 
interfere, sidestep and even prevent the realization of their ideal—qualitative 
and incomparable—goals and ethical imperatives (Mommsen 1974: 172–176).
Formal rationality and the importance of accounting
Despite the closeness of Weber’s position to the Austrian Marginalists, his 
approach to modern capitalist economy was quite different from theirs. In his 
article on the objectivity of the social science he argued programmatically that we 
should not study economy only from the point of view of the problem of scarcity, 
as economists did, but we should pay attention to its general cultural meaning:
The cultural significance of a phenomenon, e.g., the significance of ex-
change in a money economy, can be the fact that it exists on a mass scale 
as a fundamental component of our culture. The analysis of the gen-
eral aspects of exchange and the technique of the market is a—highly— 
 important and indispensable—preliminary task. For not only does this 
type of analysis leave unanswered the question as to how exchange his-
torically acquired the fundamental significance in the Modern World; 
but above all else, the fact with which we are primarily concerned, 
namely the cultural significance of the money-economy, is not derivable 
from any law (Weber 1949 [1904]: 77).
Weber states further that the choice of the economic concepts we operate with 
is by no means without its prerequisites and consequences:
The question of what should be the object of universal conceptualiza-
tion cannot be ‘presuppositionlessly’ but only with reference to the sig-
nificance of certain segments of that infinite multiplicity which we call 
‘commerce’ have for future (Weber 1949 [1904]: 78).
Parallel to editing and writing his own contribution to The Ground Plan of 
Social Economics, Weber continued his comparative studies of the world reli-
gions that focused on the peculiarities of the Western process of rationalization 
and the role of Western culture compared to other cultures of the world. This 
42 Deciphering Markets and Money
major question of the nature and future of Western civilization had a decisive 
impact on the development of Weber’s systematic economic sociology as well 
(Schluchter 2009: 63). He shared with Heinrich Rickert and other Neokan-
tians the methodological conception that cultural values direct our concept 
formation. However, these values are not subjective but general and objective 
cultural values. They determine what are, to us, the members of Western cul-
ture, important and relevant questions at each time and, consequently, what 
our main objects of study should be. By directing our concept formation, these 
cultural values shape the chaotic and uncomprehensive reality. Therefore, in 
order to be able to understand the cultural meaning of modern capitalism, we 
have to conceptualize it differently from ordinary economics, which pays atten-
tion only to the questions of scarcity and utility. Instead, formal, calculating 
rational action as the essence of modern capitalist economy—which presumes 
the existence of objective prices and money—offers the key to understanding 
the cultural meaning of modern capitalism. In this perspective, the shortcom-
ings of the Marginalists’ price theory or, for that matter, Knapp’s state theory 
of money were of minor importance in solving Weber’s wider problem of the 
general cultural meaning of Western capitalism. Weber’s insight into monetary 
calculation and formal rationality had penetrated both modern capitalism and 
Marginalist thinking, making them both an essential part of the reality of the 
modern economic actors.
Weber’s Ground Plan of Social Economics is unquestionably one of the most 
ambitious projects in social sciences to this day. As we know, he did not manage 
to finish it. One can wonder whether many major questions in his sociology 
remained unsolved not only because his untimely death made an end to this 
demanding enterprise—to my knowledge, no one else has ever seriously taken 
over the burden of trying to finalize them. It looks like Weber set himself to a 
task that was simply unsolvable from his own methodological and theoretical 
presumptions. What remains alive from his heritage, in addition to his exem-
plary confrontation with economics, is the question of the social and cultural 
consequences of the Western process of rationalization, the central cultural 
meaning of modern capitalism. One can express certain doubts as to whether 
we have made all that many theoretical advances in this respect since his days 
(cf. e.g., Ritzer 1996, 1998).
From the more narrow point of view of the sociology of economy, Weber’s 
lasting contribution is his system of the sociological categories of economic 
action, calculating and numerical accounting as the central features of eco-
nomic action in modern capitalist market economies. Since he was interested 
programmatically in the cultural meaning as well as the social preconditions of 
economic action, he paid more attention to the peculiar, calculative disposition 
both presumed and conditioned by modern capitalism than to the social condi-
tions and mechanisms through which the economic objects express their value 
in objective prices first making their commensuration, calculation, and prices 
possible. The fact that Weber did not have any value theory of his own and 
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is of little help in understanding the ‘secret’ of money restricts the value of his 
economic sociology in understanding the functioning of the basic institutions 
of modern capitalism. At the same time, both his numerous historical studies 
of a great variety of economic phenomena and many of his theoretical and 
methodological deliberations remain unsurpassed even today.
Georg Simmel was the only classical sociologist who developed his own the-
ory of money, and he devoted a whole thick volume to it (Simmel 1989 [1900]), 
arguably the best known of his numerous sociological treatises. To Simmel, 
money was the pure medium of social interaction and, as such, an ideal exam-
ple for the purposes of his study of social relations in general. Simmel’s theory 
of value, on which his theory of money rested, can be characterized as a combi-
nation of the subjective and objective theories of value. To him, value is always 
relational and not any natural substance of the objects of exchange. The value 
of any object is a combination of its desirability and the difficulty of achieving 
it or getting access to it. In this sense, it depends on the distance between the 
object and the aspiring subject.10 What makes economic goods scarce is the 
amount of sacrifice that their acquisition requires. Without desire, scarce goods 
would not be scarce at all, nor would they have any economic value (Cantó 
Milà 2005: 169). To Simmel, the distance between us and the objects makes 
them desirable and valuable. When the objects are in an immediate or direct 
relation to us, as if an integral part of ourselves, they do not have any value to us 
(cf. the air we breathe without giving it any further thought or effort, at least as 
long as it is pure and freely available). Valuing objects always presumes that we 
desire the objects and that there is a distance between us and the desired objects 
that needs to be overcome. The talk about distance should naturally be taken 
metaphorically and not as a concrete fact. Thus, the combination of desire and 
distance determine the subjective value of any one commodity, or external 
object in general, to us. On the other hand, one can claim that the problem 
of general scarcity emerges first with the market economy and its monetary 
relations, because money, and only money, has the potential of satisfying any 
need, including the ones which we are not even aware of. The desire for money 
is what motivates the economic actors in a modern economy. Therefore, there 
are no natural limits to the need for money and there could always be more of 
it. After all, the only distinction that money recognizes is a quantitative one.
Simmel is not explicit regarding how his value theory relates to or is distinct 
from others’. Simmel’s value-analysis largely lacks the deduction of the objec-
tive values out of subjective, or individual values or preferences: How do the 
values of commodities become socially shared and objectified? Both the theory 
of marginal utilities and the labor theory of value offered a solution to this 
question in their own ways, but Simmel neither shared them nor confronted 
his own value theory directly with them even if his concept of value comes in 
some respects quite close to the Austrian Marginalists’, Carl Menger’s in par-
ticular. It is, however, obvious that he does not adopt the idea of marginal utili-
ties central to the science of economics. His concept of desire does not translate 
44 Deciphering Markets and Money
into utilities; it has almost metaphysical dimensions. In addition, the distance, 
which constitutes the relation of value between us and the external objects, 
does not translate directly into any calculation of the effort, either in terms of 
labor time or the costs of production.
Simmel’s analysis of economic value is just a special case of a general theory 
of value, but at the same time, economic exchange and value becomes a model 
to the process of valuation of the external world in general. Only in economic 
exchange does the value become both objectified and generalized as the media 
of money. The results of his analyses of money have relevance far outside the 
narrow domain of economy. To Simmel, as with Marx before him, money and 
monetary relations were the primary example of the objectified social relations 
and formations. The objectification of human culture threatened the modern 
man. In the long run, and obviously with increasing speed in capitalism, the 
objective, or objectified, culture would become overwhelming in relation to the 
inner subjective culture of human beings.
Economy and society once again—35 years later
The second heroic effort to solve the question of the relation between econ-
omy and society, and economics and sociology, was published some 35 years 
after Weber’s death. It was co-authored by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser 
(1956) and had the same title that Marianne Weber had given to her hus-
band’s posthumously published collection of manuscripts, Economy and Soci-
ety. Despite many quite drastic differences between Weber’s understanding 
of sociology and society and Parsons and Smelser’s structural-functionalist 
systems theory, these works stay firmly on common ground as far as the con-
frontation of sociology with economics, which had established itself firmly as 
an academic discipline in the USA in the 1950s, is concerned. Both considered 
Marginalism—in Parsons’ and Smelser’s case Neoclassical economics—to be 
in many ways a valid theory of economic action if only it knew its own limita-
tions and recognized its historical and social conditions of validity. For this, 
it needed the help of sociology. By integrating economy into their wider con-
cepts of society and sociological thinking, Weber, as well as Parsons and Smel-
ser, came to develop an approach of economic analysis of their own into which 
the standard economic theory hardly fitted without serious modifications. In 
Weber’s case, this was determined by the role modern capitalism played in the 
unique Western process of rationalization; in Parsons and Smelser’s case, this 
was determined by the structural-functional general systems theory of soci-
ety and particularly its core idea, the functional differentiation of society into 
several subsystems with their specific functions. Each of its basic institutions 
or subsystems fulfilled a separate function in the whole system. This idea was 
condensed in Parsons’s famous AGIL scheme (Parsons & Smelser 1956: 19; 
Parsons 1951).
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According to Parsons and Smelser, the science of economics is an abstract 
theoretical science that is able to solve empirical problems, but only under 
strictly specified conditions. In the beginning of their impressive work, the 
authors formulated their task as follows:
On the theoretical level economists agree fairly well that economic 
theory is an abstract theoretical scheme which by itself is adequate to 
solve some empirical problems, but only under carefully defined condi-
tions. Economists define these conditions as postulates and parameters, 
and spell out limitations to be observed in their application. For certain 
kinds of analysis, however, economists disagree among themselves as 
to the appropriate assumptions and parameters. We hope, first, to show 
that such disagreements arise from a selective use by different econo-
mists of concepts on the theoretical borderline of economics. More im-
portantly, we hope to demonstrate that these postulates and parameters 
possess more than economic significance; they articulate with other 
parts of the theory of social systems in theoretically specific ways. If 
this can be done, the problems concerning the limitations of economic 
theory—problems, which derive from its abstract character—can be 
given more specific solutions than is now possible (Parsons & Smelser 
1956: 1–2).
‘Empirically’ human action is always the result of both economic and non- 
economic factors and therefore an economist’s scope is necessarily limited. 
Parsons and Smelser thus seem to follow Weber’s and other classics’ principal 
position: modern, neoclassical economics is fine in general if only it better 
understood its own restrictions and limitations. What is more, many of its 
internal disputes could be solved by paying more attention to the borderlines 
of the system of economy and how other social systems penetrate into it.
Parsons and Smelser’s Economy and Society is an impressive and systematic 
commentary on all kinds of economic theories, problems and questions. They 
were obviously very well read in the economics of their times, just as Weber 
had been in his times (cf. also Parsons 1949). At the same time, the study rested 
heavily on Parsons’s structural-functional systems theory, which Parsons (in 
The Social System, 1951) had developed shortly before and condensed in the 
AGIL formula and the idea of the differentiation of the social system into four 
subsystems, one of which was the economy.
According to the AGIL formula, economy is the subsystem in the social sys-
tem that is mainly concerned with adaptation (A) and resource achievement. 
The other subsystems take care of goal-attainment (G; political institutions), 
integration (I; religion and law) and latency or pattern maintenance (L; fam-
ily). Following the structural-functional general theory, the economic subsys-
tem adapts the social system to the external surroundings and takes care of the 
necessary resources for the society as a whole as well as for all its subsystems. 
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It is essential to Parsons’s systems theory that the economic system—just like 
all other subsystems—has also to fulfill all the same four basic functions within 
itself. Consequently, it is further divided into four subsystems following the 
AGIL scheme, each fulfilling their own functions or tasks. Thus, economy has 
also its own integrative mechanisms, which guarantee and keep up its value 
orientation, as well as mechanisms to guarantee that the various economic 
roles will find adequately motivated persons to fulfill their tasks. Analyzing 
economic institutions with the help of the AGIL scheme has obvious relevance 
to the theory of economic organizations.
It goes without saying that Parsons’s systems theory offers a totally dif-
ferent understanding of economic institutions than the standard one in the 
neoclassical economics. All subsystems, as well as the whole social system, 
aim at keeping up a balance with their surroundings. Despite some obvious 
resemblances, this is a different view of the role of economy from the one 
generally presented in neoclassical economics, in which economy aims at an 
equilibrium optimizing the use of scarce resources. Parsons and Smelser do 
not, however, draw any principal consequences from this fact concerning the 
validity of economic thinking. Instead, they mainly show how the subsystem 
of economy is, at the ‘borderlines of economy,’ related through functional rela-
tions of dependence to each of the other subsystems of society. Similarly, all 
the other subsystems are dependent on economy for their resources. By ana-
lyzing the functional relations between the subsystems, the authors’ purpose 
is to show concretely in what kind of questions sociology can extend a helping 
hand to economics.
The two authors do so by identifying and describing the modes of double 
interchange between the economy and each of the other three social subsys-
tems. The polity (G) makes decisions in order to control capital funds and 
encourage productivity in private enterprises. The economy in its turn has a 
right to intervene in political decisions to supply liquid resources through crea-
tion of capital funds and through the control of productivity (Parsons & Smel-
ser 1956: 77). The integrative subsystem (I) offers integrative services to the 
economy and presents demands for new product combinations. The economy 
provides part of its profits to the integrative subsystem and makes decisions to 
innovate new output combinations (Parsons & Smelser 1956: 79). Finally, the 
pattern maintenance subsystem (L) makes decisions to accept employment and 
spend money in order to buy goods and services. The economy in its turn pays 
household members wages and sells them consumer goods and services. Fol-
lowing the terminology that became common first after the publication of their 
work, one could say that Parsons and Smelser describe the ways through which 
economy is embedded in other social systems, and vice versa, how these other 
systems are embedded in economy, most of all through their need of economic 
resources. To put it in a slightly different way, economy is not a completely 
independent system of its own but penetrates other systems as well as is pen-
etrated by them (Beckert 2012: 258).
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At first sight, many of these relations of interchange between the subsys-
tems look self-evident and almost commonsensical, for instance, the relations 
between households and economic enterprises; others are more innovative, 
such as the idea that the integrative subsystem is decisive in creating a demand 
for new product combinations. This idea might very well have originated from 
Schumpeter’s famous distinction between technical discoveries and innova-
tions, according to which technical discoveries produced by research depart-
ments of economic enterprises become marketable innovations first after they 
get integrated into new social practices that they are often active in promoting. 
At the same time, Parsons and Smelser’s classical work can very well be read as 
a very extensive list of the numerous ways in which the economic subsystem is 
embedded in the three other social subsystems and vice versa. In this respect, 
as well as in being extremely well informed about the state of neoclassical 
economy of its times, it is still today unsurpassed (cf. for instance Granovetter 
2016). Parson’s structural-functional systems theory was intended as a general 
conceptual frame of reference, of the society, but in emphasizing the differ-
entiation of the social system into separate subsystems that all have specific 
functions of their own, it can also be interpreted in the spirit of the theory of 
modernization.
One of the lasting contributions of Parsons’s systems theory was his concept 
of the four symbolically generalized media, money, power, influence, and sta-
tus, each of which coordinates action in the different subsystems and medi-
ates the interchange between them. By characterizing them as symbolically 
generalized media, Parsons referred to the fact that, like money, they, on the 
one hand, have value only as representations of something else and, on the 
other hand, they have general validity. This is clear in the case of money that 
has ‘command’ over all kinds of possible objects of exchange, not depending 
on who and in what position the partners of exchange might be or what the 
objects in question might be. Money, just as power, is omnipotent. The posses-
sion of money makes the satisfaction of all kinds of needs or the realization of 
all kinds of goals possible without having to specify them in advance. However, 
in writing their Economy and Society, Parsons and Smelser did not make full 
use of Parsons’ concept of money as a generalized media. They did not dedicate 
all that much space and effort to analyzing it. However, the following quote, 
in which Parsons and Smelser (1956: 141) compare the ‘omnipotence’ of both 
money and power as generalized media, is interesting: ‘It becomes possible to 
exchange not only goods and services, but also generalized power to command 
whatever particular factors may be required.’ Power as a generalized media is 
in many ways similar to money by offering its owner the freedom to command 
over everything just as money gives access to all commodities (Orléan 2014). 
Or as Beckert (2016: 209) formulated it even more pointedly: money ‘is the 
most perfect material representation of an unbound imagined future, in that it 
withstands the disillusionment of appropriation. The only threat to the imagi-
native force of money is its devaluation.’ As a matter of fact, Parsons’s main 
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contribution in this respect might well be that he taught us more about the 
nature of power and status by comparing them with money.
In their work on economic sociology, Parsons and Smelser go through doz-
ens of very illuminating cases to show how sociology can help economics to 
solve its open problems by analyzing the borderlines between economy and the 
other subsystems. The theory of business cycles offers a good example. At the 
time of writing their book, three mathematical models, Samuelsson’s, Hicks’s 
and Kalecki’s, competed in explaining business cycles. They all shared the basic 
assumption, according to which increasing demand leads to increasing invest-
ments and finally to economic growth, and vice versa—decreasing demand 
leads to economic recession. The relation between demand, investments, and 
growth, however, is not a linear one but takes place with a certain delay or can 
also accelerate. Therefore, each of the three models had its own coefficients of 
acceleration and lag. These coefficients are the main difference between them. 
They are a good example of the ad hoc parameters and assumptions which eco-
nomic theories are full of. As Parsons and Smelser claimed, they are arbitrary 
and their empirical testing is not easy, or hardly possible at all, since it is impos-
sible to find enough empirical and historical cases that are in other respects 
close enough to each other in order to be really comparable. This is exactly the 
kind of a situation in which sociology can offer its helping hand to econom-
ics, not only with empirical results of research but also, and more importantly, 
with theoretical reasoning, by pointing out such factors in other social subsys-
tems that can either slow down the demand and investments or accelerate them 
under various circumstances.
Housing and mortgage markets offer a good, real-life example, which can 
be interpreted in Parsons and Smelser’s spirit. Homeowners often show great 
unwillingness to sell their houses or apartments in order to pay their loans, even 
when it would be economically most rational, typically in the case of decreasing 
household income due to unemployment and/or increasing rent. The reasons 
are simple to understand once we take into account that the economic actors 
on the housing markets are not pure capital owners and investors but house-
holds and families, often with children, who are in many ways ‘embedded’ in 
the social systems of social integration and pattern maintenance. They more 
often than not do not act economically rationally and sell their houses or apart-
ments whenever they have difficulties in paying their loans. They are hardly 
ever fully informed about the cyclical fluctuations in interest rates and housing 
prices, which remain a secret even to the experts. In addition, they might often 
have very good reasons not to move and prefer to stay in the old apartment, in 
order to keep up their and their family’s social relations and status, as well as 
not to disrupt their children’s school attendance and friendship ties. If the rent 
continues rising and their income decreases at the same time, for instance due 
to unemployment, they will end up forced to sell, but this often takes place too 
late from the point of view of pure economic (formal) rationality. Since all or 
most of the other actors on the housing market will follow their example, the 
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housing prices will collapse abruptly and totally when they are finally forced 
to sell, and as a consequence the homeowners are all left not only without any 
housing but also with unpaid loans (Poppe 2003). In this case, the fact that the 
economic actors are households and families, and not predominantly investors 
of capital, or abstract economic actors, means that the housing price cycle is 
delayed, and when it finally hits it will hit quite abruptly and hard, often with 
quite devastating consequences to all those private individuals involved.11
In their Economy and Society, Parsons and Smelser followed Weber’s exam-
ple, directly confronting the economists of their times. Unlike Weber, Parsons 
and Smelser did not offer a comprehensive system of sociological concepts 
of modern market economy. (Admittedly, Weber’s remained unfinished too.) 
Instead, Parsons and Smelser willingly offered their helping hand to the econo-
mists; however, the economists showed hardly any interest at all in their offer. 
The confrontation did not lead to any real dialogue between sociology and 
economics but resulted instead in a practical truce in academia.12 Sociolo-
gists, political scientists, and economists continued to take care of their own 
turf; sociology studied values, norms, and the institutions of social integra-
tion and pattern maintenance, including religion, family, and school; political 
scientists the system of decision making and politics; and economists mar-
kets, prices, and the effective use—in the sense of formal rationality—of eco-
nomic resources. Sociologists continued to express from time to time, more or 
less actively, their critical stance toward the basic theoretical presumption of 
economics, Homo economicus with its assumptions of rationality of action, 
perfect information, fixed and stable preferences, and the independence of 
individual decision making, thus seriously doubting the general validity of 
the science of economy. Weber’s unfinished contribution was almost forgotten 
for decades, and he is still today better known for his analyses of the cultural 
conditions and consequences of economic institutions and orders, modern 
capitalism in particular, than his sociological concepts of economy, or what 
might be called real economic sociology. His leading idea, according to which 
commensuration and calculability offers the key to the understanding of the 





The functions of money
In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith explained the invention of money as 
follows:
In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations [where the pro-
ducers of different commodities do not find anything In the market 
they need to exchange their own produce with] every prudent man in 
every period of society, after the first establishments of the division of 
labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such 
a manner, as to have at all times by him, beside the peculiar produce of 
his own industry, a certain quantity of someone commodity or another, 
such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for 
the produce of their industry (Smith 1995[1776]: 35–36).
Smith also presumes that ‘in all countries, however, men seem at last to have 
determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, 
to metals above any other commodity’ (Smith 1995: 37–38). Metals are dura-
ble and can be cut into equal portions. Finally, for equally irresistible reasons, 
as Smith thought, the most precious metals, gold and silver, have become the 
commodities, which have acted as means of general exchange or money.
This explanation of the emergence of money in terms of its function as a 
general means of exchange has become commonplace in economics and has 
been repeated in slightly modified forms since ancient times. For instance, Carl 
Menger, whose economic thinking influenced, as we have seen, Max Weber 
and Georg Simmel, among others, repeated it more or less as such. Smith did 
not invent it either. It was common knowledge. The historical validity of this 
explanation or myth can be seriously questioned; it suffers from the same short-
coming as all functional explanations. It claims that—unconsciously—people 
agreed out of common consent on the use of money in order to satisfy a social 
need and make their life easier.
Marx repeated this story in his Capital (1973a [1867]: 84–93) in describing 
the ‘inevitable’ development or transformation of the value forms from simple 
to general, culminating in the deduction of the money form. In contrast to 
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many other political economists, Marx made a principal distinction between 
the historical genesis and the general validity of money, or the historical and 
logical deduction of money, not making the latter dependent on the former, 
recognizing that the historical origins of money, whatever they may have been, 
do not explain why it is generally valid as the generalized media of exchange.1 It 
explains even less why commodities take the specific social form of money, or 
as Marx expressed it: why a commodity becomes doubled as a commodity and 
money. In Marx’s reasoning, it is no secret that money is a commodity among 
all others. Instead, we must explain why a commodity takes the money form 
or, in other words, has an objective and generally valid price. However, despite 
separating these two aspects of the emergence and establishment of money, 
Marx also thought that the ‘logical’ deduction of money follows in the main 
features its historical development, which makes it more plausible.
It was common knowledge in classical political economy as well as in modern 
economics that money has three functions. It is a medium of exchange, a store 
of value, and a unit of account. If ‘money is what money does,’ one could well 
argue that in order for something to deserve to be called money it has to fulfill 
all three functions.2 The standard economic theory of money concentrates on 
one of the functions: money as a means of exchange. In these theories, money 
comes into being as an unintended consequence of the economic rational rea-
soning of the individuals.3 As Smith believed, in order to maximize their barter 
options, astute traders will hold in stock some of the most regularly exchanged 
commodities that they expect others will accept in the future in exchange for 
the goods they possess. Consequently, one of these, more or less gradually, and 
as if by chance, emerges from among all the myriad options on offer as the 
general media of exchange, mainly because of its advantageous material proper-
ties, such as durability, divisibility, and portability. In various historical periods, 
different kinds of valuables have acted as means of exchange, for instance, furs 
in the Novgorod Russia’s fur trade with Western Europe or huge stone rings in 
ancient Polynesia. Finally, a generally accepted coinage emerges, as if crystal-
lized out of all available options, the value of which is based on the extraordi-
narily high value of precious metals. The general media of exchange, or money, 
allows for the natural process of barter trade to develop into more extensive and 
general exchange of commodities, and finally to a fully fledged market economy.
In these mythical genealogies of money, the traders come to realize that their 
life would be much more convenient if they could trade with each other using 
a generally accepted commodity, money. Money is, in other words, invented 
and based on a social contract, as if men had in ancient times come together 
and agreed on the use of some particular commodity as their general means of 
exchange. In the more scientific accounts of the origins of money, like Menger’s, 
money is not a result of a conscious decision and consent of human beings but 
explained by some kind of a hidden and subconscious rationality inherent in 
the economic action of men. It goes without saying, that such ‘as if ’ explana-
tions, or functional explanations, have, at the most, a heuristic value.
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As a matter of fact, the early Marginalists, including Karl Menger, expressed 
doubts about such a historical deduction of money. According to Ingham 
(2004: 23), Menger asked why individuals should be ready to exchange goods 
for worthless little metal disks or pieces of paper. The problem was, how can 
institutions such as money make for the common interest, while conflicting 
with the nearest and immediate interests of contracting individuals? The indi-
vidual use, or the rationality of the use of money for the individual, presumes 
that it is already generally accepted and in use by all partners of exchange. Why 
then should the participants acknowledge the validity of money and commit 
themselves to its use before they can be certain that everyone else does? Since 
Georg Simmel and other classics, sociologists have emphasized that monetary 
institutions are based on trust. As Beckert (2016: 47) put it more recently, 
‘money is essentially a relationship of trust.’ (See also Seabright 2010.) But why 
should the market participants have trust in money? The explanation becomes 
easily circular: what is to be explained is already taken as a given. Alternatively, 
the validity of money, as well as the prices of commodities, is understood sim-
ply as an empirical, historical fact; in normal times, people seem to acknowl-
edge without questioning the use of money in their relations of exchange. The 
advantages of money in promoting the exchange of commodities presume 
well-established monetary institutions, which, on their part, cannot possibly be 
deduced from the practice of accepting money in exchange. As Ingham put it: 
‘To state the sociologically obvious: the advantage of money presupposes mon-
etary institutions.’ As he continues, ‘modern neo-classical economics has been 
entirely unsuccessful in its attempt to explain these from their spare “micro” 
assumptions’ (Ingham 2001: 308).
There is another interesting consequence of this kind of historical explanation 
about the emergence of money. If we follow its advocates’ reasoning, the intro-
duction of money into an economy of barter does not add anything essential 
to it. Money is just a technical instrument, which makes the economic transac-
tions more fluent and efficient, as if oiling them. It does not, however, change 
the nature of the exchange relations at all. The value of the commodities is prior 
to their exchange relations. Expressed in modern economic parlance: money 
reduces transaction costs, undoubtedly an important achievement, but this 
means that a barter economy could function without money, perhaps even more 
effectively if all monetary transactions were substituted, for instance, for a com-
plete set of accounts stored in a universal computer. Following Esposito (2010: 
73), one can argue that neoclassical economy does not have any theory of money 
because it is ‘based on the model of exchange which functions without money, 
and money is just an abstraction which comes into play first in the second order.’
The quantity theory of money, well-known due to the long reign of mon-
etarism in the economic policy in the USA and Europe, is a natural compan-
ion of the exchange theory of money (see Fischer 1911). It follows from the 
assumption of the neutral or purely technical role of money that the purchasing 
power of money is thought to be equal to the total value of all commodities and 
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services on sale in an economic system or, more concretely, in a national econ-
omy with its own currency. The only difference that money makes is that an 
increase in the total amount of available money decreases all prices equally, and 
vice versa: a decrease in the amount of circulating money increases prices of all 
other commodities. It was this theoretical conception of money that Keynes 
opposed to in his Treatise of Money (1950 [1930]). Keynes’s main insight was 
that money is not neutral in relation to production and does not affect the gen-
eral price level alone. Furthermore, state budgets are not like family budgets 
that have to keep the debits and credits in balance, at least in a longer perspec-
tive. The state monopoly of creating money makes all the difference.
It is amazing that despite the quite evident weaknesses—or mythological 
nature—of the exchange theory of money, economists adhere to it and fre-
quently refer to it in textbooks of economics. For instance, Mankiw and Taylor 
(2011: 617) refer simply and quite straightforwardly to our commonsensical 
understanding according to which ‘money is the set of assets in the economy 
that people regularly use to buy goods and services from other people.’ How-
ever, it has a serious challenger, which is over a hundred years old, systemati-
cally formulated by Georg Friedrich Knapp in his Staatliche Theorie des Geldes 
(1918 [1905]), or the State Theory of Money.4 Knapp’s theory of money takes 
as its starting point another function of money, namely money as a unit of 
account, and not as a medium of exchange. (To my knowledge, no one has tried 
to claim that the third function which any real or genuine money must fulfill, 
the store of value, is the crucial or historically primary one.) Knapps’s theory is 
a credit theory because to him money is primarily something that the citizens 
of a state, or a sovereign’s subjects, can use in order to pay their debts—or rather 
taxes—to the state. The state accepts it in settling its accounts with its citizens. 
Money is thus a device of calculation used in clearing accounts and paying 
debts. The power of government to impose a tax and to name what is approv-
able as a proper payment of taxes is both the sufficient and necessary factor 
in the establishment of money (Wray 2014: 14). Money is, in other words, a 
medium of balancing any accounts approved and authorized by the state.
According to Ingham, who is its strong supporter, in the state theory:
money is uniquely specified as a measure of abstract value (….) and as a 
means of storing and transporting this abstract value (for means of final 
payment and settlement of debt (…). All the other functions—medium 
of exchange, for instance—may be subsumed under these two attrib-
utes. … Money of account is logically anterior to any form of money 
that bears the abstract value. …. ‘Moneyness’ is assigned by the money 
of account, not by the form of money (Ingham 2004: 70).
As a consequence, money can take many forms, and it may just as well exist 
‘materially’ as paper money or even, to take a modern alternative, as mere 
entries of magnetic traces in the computer networks that represent the credit 
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relations that comprise the whole monetary system. (Ingham 2004:70). Ing-
ham summarizes the basic truth of the state theory of money in the following: 
‘Money is a “token” value established by an abstract money account.’
According to Knapp, the state determines by law the monetary unit of value 
and chooses the valid means of payment of all the debts to and from the state. 
In the last instance, money is a system of tokens that do not have any value 
in themselves (fiat or paper money ) and that the state is willing to accept as 
payments of taxes. It can simply be a piece of paper with a sign or a label of 
authorization from the state treasury or the central bank of the state. There-
fore, one can reasonably argue that the relation between a creditor and a debtor 
constitutes money (Ingham 2004: 73). Fundamentally, this takes the form of a 
promise that the money, or ‘credit,’ will be accepted by the issuer in settlement 
of its own debt (Ingham 2004:75). It presumes that the issuer has the authority 
to guarantee its validity. It is therefore natural to presume that only the state 
enjoys such general authority.
The state theory of money, or the fiscal policy which takes it as its starting 
point, is referred to as Chartalism, and its modern version Neo-chartalism, 
because, according to it, money is a chartal ‘instrument’ of payment. As Wray 
(2014: 2) formulated it, ‘in the Chartalist approach, the State (or any other 
authority able to impose an obligation) imposes a liability in the form of a 
generalized, social or legal unit of account—a money—used for measuring 
the obligation. This does not require the pre-existence of markets, and, indeed, 
almost certainly predates them.’ Money and prices preceded markets, a claim 
which turns the neoclassical econonomic orthodoxy on its head by reversing 
the historical order of the constitution of money. The generalized exchange of 
commodities did not precede money and money prices. Quite the contrary: 
‘once prices and money were established, it was a short technical leap to crea-
tion of markets’ (Wray 2014: 14).
Knapp explained that the decisive criterion of ‘moneyness’ is not any intrin-
sic value of goods but the fact that money enjoys authorization of the state and 
is therefore a valid means of payment within the jurisdiction of the state. As he 
lamented, the natural man is a “metallist” and has difficulties in admitting that 
something which is totally useless and valueless as such, like a piece of paper, 
can function as money without being convertible, at least in principle, into gold 
or some other valuable substance. This explains, in his mind, the persistent 
equation of ‘money’ with a ‘coin’ and with some substance possessing intrin-
sic value and such material properties, like divisibility into equal portions or 
durability, typical of valuable metals (Knapp 1918[1905]: 8–9).5 More recently, 
some economic sociologists have rediscovered the state theory of money, most 
notably Ingham. However, Knapp had an early and highly influential follower 
among economists, in the shape of John Maynard Keynes. As Paul argues, ‘in 
accordance with Knapp, money is for him [Keynes] both structurally and his-
torically the creation of the community or the state which enforces, for the 
first, the keeping of trade and credit contracts and, for the second, determines 
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in which form, that is in which kind of coinage the corresponding debts can 
be cleared or made even’ (Paul 2012: 161). To Keynes as well as to Knapp, all 
money is a form of credit. It follows that finance markets are just derivatives of 
credit (Paul 2012: 183; cf. Wray 2014: 15).
In his Treatise of Money, Keynes added to the two types of money, commod-
ity money and fiat money, a third one—managed money. Fiat money or a bank 
check is a token, a currency without intrinsic value. It has value only because 
a government maintains and guarantees its value, whereas ‘managed money 
is similar to fiat money, except that the State undertakes to manage the con-
ditions of its issue in such a way that, by convertibility or otherwise, it shall 
have a determinate value in terms of an objective [gold] standard’ (Keynes 1950 
[1930]: 9). Managed money and fiat money are alike in that they are repre-
sentative of paper money, having relatively little or no intrinsic value apart from 
the one determined by law or practice of the state. Both ‘commodity money 
and managed money are alike in that they are related to an objective stand-
ard of value’ (Keynes 1950 [1930]: 9). The ‘pure’ fiat money is, however, the 
most interesting one since it concretely proves, in the minds of the supporters 
of the state theory of money, the independence of money from any material 
substance with an intrinsic or fundamental value. Such money is a creation of 
banks (bank notes) or the central bank (which accepts bank notes as a means of 
settling the accounts). In Keynes’s reasoning, money is not neutral in relation to 
production, or ‘real economy,’ and does not only affect the general price level. It 
can also affect the relation between the different actors in an economy. Accord-
ing to Keynes, the real challenge of a theory of money is to treat the problem 
of prices and money dynamically, analyzing the different elements involved, 
in such a manner as to exhibit the causal process by which the price-level is 
determined, and the method of transition from one position of equilibrium to 
another (Keynes 1950 [1930]: 133).
The new historical research about the origins of money would seem to sup-
port the state or credit theory of money. For instance, one can argue, that there 
never was any real gold standard. Coins with the same denomination printed 
in valuable metals could vary a lot in weight. According to Ingham (2001: 319), 
‘the continuous stability of the abstract ratios over very long periods of time 
and the existence of abstract purchasing power, regardless of the precious metal 
content of any coinage, is the most telling evidence for the fact that, in the first 
instance, money is a “token” value established by an abstract money of account.’ 
Instead, the seigniorial stamp on the coin was decisive in establishing and 
confirming its authenticity and value. It did not differ that much from paper 
money, after all. As the historical evidence goes, money as an accounting device 
(e.g., small pieces of clay or marked wooden sticks) developed long before any 
general market exchange relations in Babylonia and Egypt as a means of count-
ing and paying taxes (debt) to the state. Referring to Wray’s (1998) account of 
the history of money, Ingham (2001: 316) argues that it is well established that 
abstract money accounting was a fundamentally important technique for the 
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economic organization of the command economies of ancient Near East. He is 
quite convinced that money of account was an essential means of accounting 
for both debtor-creditor relations and the allocation of resources in these pre-
market, pre-capitalist economies. Mitchell-Innes, one of the founders of the 
state theory of money, was an advocate of the claim according to which money 
evolves not from a pre-money market system but from the ‘penal system’ based 
on the ancient practice of ‘Wehrgeld,’ used as a compensation for offending the 
honor of a person (Wray 2014: 9). Historically, money emerged as a means for 
the state to pay for the king’s mercenary armies, for which the king had to take 
a loan from rich merchants. The king, or the state, remained thus in debt to its 
creditors, and the debt was guaranteed by the king’s treasurer.
These, and similar historical facts all strongly support, in the minds of its 
adherents, the state or credit theory of money. The same serious doubts that 
can be raised against the exchange theory of money concerning the relevance 
of the historical origins of money to its present-day validity as a general means 
of exchange can, however, be directed against the state theory of money too. 
More fundamentally, one can question the logical conclusion of the state the-
ory, according to which money functions primarily as a mathematical instru-
ment of calculation in accounting, enabling numerical equations. Knapp is 
undoubtedly right in presuming that in order for any item, or ‘token,’ to func-
tion as money it needs an authorization from the state or some other legitimate 
institution. This is, in fact, also presumed in other theories such as the theory 
regarding relations of barter and the exchange of commodities, even though 
according to these, that is not the decisive moment in ‘moneyness.’ In the usual 
historical or ‘pseudohistorical’ accounts, a certain commodity has been selected 
as the commodity money—or elevated to function as the general equivalent—
and the role of bullion fell naturally on gold and other valuable metals because 
of their concrete material qualities, but it was still in need of the sovereign’s 
authorization. The state guaranteed, either by force or by its legitimacy and the 
trust it enjoyed, the validity of the state currency.6 However, in the state theory 
of money, the decisive moment is when the state accepts the money at its value 
as the final settlement of accounts or a payment of debt. Private bank notes can 
circulate as money within a closed circle of their own but not as generalizable 
means of payment, unless guaranteed by the state (central bank). Private IOUs 
can similarly function as money, as did notes of private banks (in England) as 
long as they can freely be transferred to a third party as a means of payment. 
The invention of modern transferable debt certificates was in fact crucial to the 
birth of modern capitalism, allowing private debts to be paid and the obligation 
transferred to third parties.7
In emphasizing the role of power struggles in economy, Max Weber did in 
fact draw the right conclusions from Knapp’s state theory of money. Monetary 
policy results from the conflicts between different economic agents: bankers, 
producers, and consumers. In the final instance, their struggle determines the 
value of money, the rate of inflation, exchange rates and the rate of interest, 
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among other things, which are never neutral entities but always economically 
more or less favorable to some of the involved parties. The state can act, more 
or less successfully, as a guarantee of the stability of prices, but this goal of 
monetary policy is by no means neutral either. It always favors one or another 
actor, either the creditors or debtors. As Ingham (2004: 81) formulated it, ‘as the 
social relations for the production of money and of commodities must be seen 
as comprising two distinct, relatively autonomous sectors, the value of money is 
the enacted outcome of social and political conflicts between the main interests 
in the economy.’ According to him, changes in the balance of power between 
capital and labor, as well as between producers and consumers, affects the 
purchasing power of money. Ingham goes so far as to argue that historically, 
the struggle between creditors and debtors ‘could be the most important class 
struggle’ (Ingham 2004: 81).
Even if one were ready to accept the main arguments of the adherents of the 
state theory of money, one serious problem remains: the value of commodi-
ties must precede the value of the commodity money. The state can only deter-
mine the unit of accounting. The state does confer the quality of ‘valuableness’ 
according to a money of account, but it cannot determine the relative prices of 
commodities, and in this sense the real value of money as purchasing power. 
The commodities must first have a value and be comparable with each other or 
differ from one another, as far as their quantitative value, expressed in money 
prices, is concerned. Money does not make them comparable—nor commen-
surate—but presumes it. We are facing the same fundamental problem as, in 
a more general sense, with Karpik’s (2010) singularities: how to compare the 
incomparable or measure the unmeasurable, the value of different commodities, 
and calculate it in money. It is self-evident fact that one can compare monetary 
prices with each other and measure their prices once we know them, but what 
determines the relative prices of commodities? As use values, or if you like utili-
ties, all commodities are qualitatively different from each other. How can, say, 
a pair of trousers have the same value as two kilograms of beef? How can they 
be compared quantitatively with each other? The state theory of money does 
not address this question. One can therefore agree with Lapavitsas’s (2005: 398) 
critical conclusion concerning the fundamental wisdom of the state theory of 
money: ‘the approach … confuses the undoubted ability of the state (or another 
socially constituted authority) to set the standard of price with an (imaginary) 
ability arbitrarily to set the measure of value. The state can create its own price 
numeraire, but this is because a spontaneous measure of value already exists that 
is conventionally denominated as standard price and acts as means of exchange.’
The secret of the social form of money—or ‘moneyness’
One of the problems plaguing different economic and sociological theories 
of money is that they focus on different aspects of money. Therefore, it is no 
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wonder that their explanations of ‘moneyness,’ what money is, differ from each 
other quite radically. According to Karl Marx’s Capital (1973a[1864]: 47–48), it 
is no secret that money is a commodity exchangeable with all other commodi-
ties. The real question, which economists had not posed before Marx, is why a 
commodity, as if out of inner necessity, takes the form of money. Why do com-
modities take the dual shape of a commodity and money? Marx tackled this 
problem in the Capital in his ‘logical’ deduction of the different value forms, or 
the dialectic of value forms, culminating in the ‘highest’ form, money form. It is 
important to note that Marx explicitly understood this question—what makes 
a particular commodity money or why the specific use value of one of the com-
modities becomes the expression of the value of all other commodities— to 
be both different and primary in relation to the question of the substance and 
quantity of value. (In his understanding, the labor theory of value gave a satis-
factory answer to this.) All the other questions, including the determination of 
the unit of accounting, the certification of money, and the guarantee of the rela-
tive stability of its value by the state, or the question of the primacy of the metal 
coins or the metal (gold) standard of money, are of secondary nature to Marx. 
(Marx took, like all his contemporaries, the gold standard as given, which does 
not make his deduction of the money form less interesting.)
Marx’s central question was why the commodity takes the form of value and 
money. Another way of putting it is to ask why and how do subjective  values—
that is the value of a commodity to an individual consumer whatever that might 
be—become objectified, socially shared, and inter-subjectively valid and taken 
for granted by the involved economic actors. Marx’s value form analysis in the 
beginning of Capital Volume One (1973a) gave an answer to this. Marx starts 
with the simple value form or the exchange relation between any two, arbitrar-
ily selected, commodities A and B. Let us assume that
x commodities A = y commodities B
According to Marx, this equivalent form, in which the commodity A expresses 
its value in the use value of the commodity B, or any such exchange relation 
between two arbitrarily selected commodities, is indeterminate. Therefore, it 
can just as well be turned the other way around:
y commodities B = x commodities A
In this equation, the commodity B in its turn expresses its value in use value of 
the commodity B.
It is important to Marx in this equivalency that one commodity, in the first 
case A, expresses its value in the use value of another commodity, B. To Marx, 
value is relational, and a commodity has value only in relation to another com-
modity with which it is compared and exchanged. One can therefore say that 
even for Marx, value comes into being first in the process of exchange and is in 
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need of another commodity in order to present its value and make it apparent. 
This conclusion may seem to contradict the labor theory of value that Marx 
adopted from his predecessors, David Ricardo in particular, and according to 
which the value of a commodity depended and was determined by the amount 
of labor used in producing it or ‘materialized’ in it. In his historical deduc-
tion of the money form, Marx too assumed that exchange partners in the sim-
ple exchange of two commodities, or more generally in relations of barter or 
any such pre-monetary exchange relations, would determine their exchange 
‘rate’ by somehow consciously or subconsciously comparing and calculat-
ing the time they had needed in manufacturing them. It makes more sense, 
however, to interpret Marx in such a way that such a presumption, commonly 
made in the treatises of political economy of his times, is only a projection of 
the conditions reigning in monetary exchange into any kind of pre-monetary 
exchange between partners. To Marx himself, as well as to several of his follow-
ers in the socialist movement, most notably Karl Kautsky (1936[1906]), it obvi-
ously was a convenient shorthand that was supposed to make Marx’s theory 
of money more accessible to the reader. However, it had serious consequences 
that reached all the way to the revolutionary perspectives of the movement. In 
the later socialist literature, the labor theory of value was, for instance, often 
presented—against Marx’s own explicit intentions—as a normative standard 
of fair and equal exchange, which was supposed to have been the rule in the 
period of simple commodity production, in contrast to the relation of exploita-
tion, or surplus production, which reigned in capitalism between the capital 
owner and the wage worker (see Gronow 2015).
The next step in Marx’ logical reasoning of money is the extended value form:
x commodities A = y commodities B, or z commodities C, or …
Now a specific commodity expresses its value in the use values of all the other 
commodities in the commodity universe, one after another. Even this form 
leaves the value of the commodity A undetermined, or contingent, since every 
single act of exchange following these equivalency relations is an independent 
act, and hence the commodity A expresses its value only in relation to one par-
ticular commodity at any one time. Their internal relations remain therefore 
undetermined.
First the equivalent form, the next step in Marx deductive reasoning, fixes 
the value of a specific commodity in relation to all other commodities. At first 
glance, Marx’s operation looks almost like a hat trick. He simply turns around 
the terms of the previous equation into the general value form:
y commodities B
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Now all other commodities express their value in the use value of one and the 
same commodity—A—which takes the form of the general equivalent, thus 
fixing their mutual exchange relations and making all the commodities quanti-
tatively comparable with each other.
The deduction of the money form is complete when a particular commodity 
is fixed as the general equivalent. As a matter of fact, this does not add anything 
new to the developed value form. Quite understandably, from the point of view 
of his historical experience, Marx suggested that historically and for practi-
cal reasons, precious metals, gold and silver, have in general had the honor of 
acting as money. In principle, it could be something else as well, as long as the 
particular commodity is recognized as the general equivalent, thus becoming 
equal to the money form. What have we now achieved following Marx’s ‘dialec-
tic’ deduction of the money form?
At first glance, Marx’s deduction looks as if he were following the standard nar-
rative of the historical process of the advent of money due to the needs of more 
extensive exchange relations familiar from the political economy of his times. It 
looks as if all the commodities had gradually selected from among the universe 
of commodities a specific commodity as the general equivalent—money. On 
the other hand, it is obvious that Marx thought that the equivalent exchange 
of commodities would become the general rule first in a fully fledged mar-
ket economy. All tales about ‘simple commodity’ producers, or medieval arti-
sans and traders counting their working hours and thereby determining their 
mutual, correct, and fair exchange relations are imaginary, after all. Barter rela-
tions and relations of exchange of gifts have certainly existed since the ancient 
times, and can still exist side by side with the exchange of commodities, but 
they do not follow the principle of the exchange of equivalents.
The main wisdom to be taken from Marx’s reasoning is that in a mode of 
production in which the manufacturers produce for an anonymous market, 
as opposed to for themselves or for any particular customers by order, one can 
never know in advance whether the products satisfy any social need or demand 
at all. One can agree thus with Lapavitsas’s (2005: 391) interpretation in his cri-
tique of the state theory of money advocated by Ingham (2004): Marx’s funda-
mental starting point is the presumption that the commodity owners approach 
each other as ‘foreign’ and completely isolated individuals. Therefore, com-
modities are socially useful only when mediated by monetary exchange. There-
fore, the ‘market community’ is, out of necessity, the community of money. As 
Marx reasoned, the private labor of an individual producer becomes socially 
useful only through exchange of his commodities on the anonymous market, 
and therefore the whole system of commodity exchange and production pre-
sumes the existence of a commodity in the form of the general equivalent, or 
money. One could even say that it is first money that constitutes the market of 
equal exchange. Commodities are produced by private labor of the individuals 
and become social only through exchange. Therefore, their value must be pre-
sented in a socially general form. Private labor must, in the process of exchange, 
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be transformed into general, social labor, and commodities must express their 
value in a specific commodity—money (Gronow 2015: 260–1). Backhaus con-
cluded that the concept of a pre-monetary commodity is a contradictio in 
adjecto, and therefore it is impossible to think of a process of equal exchange 
with pre-monetary commodities. Consequently, Marx’s social theory of value 
should be understood as a critique of a pre-monetary value. Value does not 
precede its form of appearance, money. But value cannot be reduced to it either 
(Backhaus 1981: 141, 128; see also Backhaus 1997: 41–66).8
Marx shows that the social constitution of the market economy is only pos-
sible with the use of money as the general equivalent. Otherwise objective val-
ues of commodities and presumed prices would not exist. Marx continued his 
analysis of the money commodity in a standard way by introducing the three 
main functions of money: exchange medium, medium of accounting, and pres-
ervation of value. They were all common knowledge to the political economists 
of the time. However, the discovery of the ‘secret’ of the value and money form 
solved only half the problem. In this respect, Marx’s discussion of the deter-
mination of value in his Theories of the Surplus Value is highly illuminating. 
Marx proceeds in a classical manner by playing two contradictory positions, 
Ricardo’s labor theory of value and Bailey’s exchange theory of value, against 
each other. He showed that, while both possess a grain of truth, they cannot 
both be true at the same time. He uses the old Aristotelian rhetoric device of 
saving the argument by introducing a third alternative that both overcomes 
the contradiction and saves the rational kernel of both the arguments. The first 
of these contradictory arguments claims that because the value of a commod-
ity varies from one exchange relation to another depending on the exchanged 
objects, it obviously comes into being only in the relation of exchange and does 
not exist prior to that (Bailey). Therefore, it cannot be an inherent property or 
substance of the objects. On the other hand, it is reasonable to claim, as Ricardo 
did, that in order to be exchanged two commodities must possess some com-
mon quality that makes them comparable and commensurate, independent of 
and prior to the process of their exchange. According to Marx, Bailey’s merit in 
relation to Ricardo was that he abandoned the problem of the constant meas-
ure of value essential to Ricardo’s labor theory of value (Marx 1971: 133–4). In 
Marx’s opinion, Bailey was right in presuming that it is not necessary to sup-
pose that the value of the particular commodity in which all other commodities 
are measured is a constant entity such as absolute labor time. Bailey was wrong, 
however, in denying that two commodities must have a common quality or 
substance to be exchanged, which is different from their existence as useful 
objects. (As useful things, they are always naturally and qualitatively different.) 
Bailey reiterates that the value of the commodity is based on the exchange rela-
tion of commodities and, consequently, it is nothing separate or independent 
from this relation (Gronow 2015: 258).
Bailey justified his argument by pointing out that the quantitative relations 
of commodities in exchange; consequently, their prices are not constant but 
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vary from one act of exchange to another. Therefore it is logical to presume 
that the actual relation of two commodities in exchange exclusively determines 
their respective values. To Bailey, the concept of value was only a fictional and 
metaphysical entity, wrongly deduced from the existence of money and objec-
tive prices (Marx 1971: 145–6). As Marx thought, Bailey was indeed right in 
stating that the value of a commodity can only be expressed in its relation to 
another commodity—or more correctly, they must present their value in that 
of a third commodity (money) (Marx 1971: 259). On the other hand, Bailey 
did not understand that in order to present themselves in money, commodi-
ties must share a common substance; their quantitative relation presupposes 
a common denominator or a ‘homogeneity.’ This basic truth can, according to 
Marx, be learnt from David Ricardo’s classical treatise:
A homogeneity which makes them the same—makes them values—
which as values makes them qualitatively equal, is already presupposed 
in order that their value and their differences in value can be represented 
in this way. Otherwise, it would be impossible to solve the problem of 
expressing the value of each commodity in gold, if commodity and gold 
or any two commodities as values were not representations of the same 
substance, capable of being expressed in one another (Marx 1971:134).
Following David Ricardo, Marx thought that this common substance was 
human labor used in producing the commodities and their value could there-
fore be measured in units of labor time. Marx justified his conclusion by 
excluding other alternatives by arguing that that there cannot possibly be any 
other ‘homogeneity’ that would be common to all the different commodities; as 
useful objects they always differ from one another qualitatively. Furthermore, 
if they were not qualitatively different from each other, there would be no idea 
exchanging them with each other.
Marx’s conception differed from Ricardo’s in that to him, the common sub-
stance was not just any kind of concrete labor, not even general, or average, 
labor, but abstract labor. The concrete labor of the workers takes the form of 
abstract labor only when their products are exchanged in the market of anony-
mous individuals. Therefore it does not precede the exchange of commodities 
but is constituted by it. In other words, it is a social construct and not their 
natural substance. Human labor offers itself as the best (or in Marx’s opinion, 
the only) possible alternative for the substance of value. But just as the products 
of labor take the form of value, and further, money, only under the specific 
social conditions of the capitalist market economy of the equal exchange of 
commodities, so does the labor materialized in them take the form or shape of 
abstract labor only under the capitalist relations of production.
Marx’s labor theory of value has been criticized extensively during the 150-
odd years since the publication of the Capital by showing how it faces several 
unsurmountable theoretical problems. In fact, Marx himself realized some of 
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its problematic consequences. First, it is not clear how the relation between 
the value of commodities, determined by the amount of abstract labor used in 
their production and their production prices, and real market prices is deter-
mined. As the critics have pointed out, what is the sense of the labor theory of 
value if it is of hardly any help in determining the prices of production, and, 
further, market prices, if they differ from their value?9 Following Menger’s and 
Weber’s usage, one could say that, even in Marx’s case, the empirical prices and 
theoretical prices do not correspond with each other. Furthermore, what is the 
relation between various concrete forms of labor and the general or abstract 
labor, which is said to determine the value of a commodity? What kind of labor 
creates value after all? How does one compare and calculate, for instance, the 
relation between the value of the products of qualified and non-qualified, sim-
ple labor or socially necessary and concretely used labor? Should we take into 
account only productive labor materialized in commodities, and not at all work 
done in trade, services, banks, or by the civil servants, etc.? In Marx’s theory, 
they do not participate in the creation of new value, but their wages and sala-
ries, as well as profits, are deduced from the value created by the work of the 
productive, industrial laborers—a presumption that is even more problematic 
now than in Marx’s times, in a society with the overwhelming majority of work-
ers are not employed in any kind of industrial production. One could continue 
this list of critical comments. However, one should keep in mind that Marx’s 
Capital did not primarily aim to explain the formation and determination of 
market prices, nor did it include any idea of a market equilibrium that in later 
neoclassical economics became associated with the effective use of economic 
resources. It was rather the origins of the surplus value and the accumulation 
of capital that Marx was after in his Capital, as well as the clarification of the 
principles governing the distribution of the national income between his three 
social classes, capitalists, wage laborers, and landowners. To this task, his labor 
theory of value was quite essential; the riches of the society were created by the 
labor of the wage workers, after all—and by the natural fertility of land—under 
the conditions of the capitalist production alienated from them.
Marx’s distinction of the value form from the substance of value implies that 
the result of his analysis of the constitution of money does not necessarily stand 
or fall with his own conviction of (abstract) labor as the substance of value.10 
We can join Lapavitsas (2005: 392) in his conclusion that, to Marx, ‘money’s 
emergence is associated with the development of the form of value. … it shows 
money to be the outcome of social relations among commodity owners. Fun-
damental to it is the assumption that commodity owners approach each other 
as “foreign” individuals.’ In the history of Marxism, there have been interesting 
theoreticians who have concentrated their interpretative endeavors in exempli-
fying Marx’s value form analysis. They have obviously not done this simply to 
avoid the problematic question of the substance of value and the labor theory of 
value. Instead, they have pointed out what they believe to be the most standing 
and original achievement of Marx’s thinking. Franz Petry’s German doctoral 
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dissertation from 1916 is perhaps the most systematic and consequential of 
these efforts. He called it, quite adequately, ‘The Social Contents of Marx’s Value 
Theory.’ Isaak Rubin’s (1973) work from the early 1920s is another and perhaps 
a better known attempt to rescue Marx’s value theory from its critics with the 
help of the value form analysis. The orthodox Marxists of the II International, 
Karl Kautsky (1936 [1887]) being the most prominent among them, as well as 
later Soviet Marxists, largely neglected this part of Marx’s Capital. They were all 
ardent adherents to the labor theory of value, because they believed that it alone 
could explain the origins of the surplus value and capitalist exploitation. They 
regarded it as the essence of the ‘authentic’ Marxism. Marx’s (1973a: 71–83) 
famous analysis of the fetish character of the commodity due to its dual role as a 
commodity and money is also closely related to his analysis of the value form of 
commodities. This was largely neglected by Kautsky and the Orthodox Marx-
ists-Leninists (see Gronow 2015). It ends in the reification thesis, according to 
which, in capitalism, the social relations of human beings take the form of the 
relations between things, expressed most clearly in the form of money. This 
claim is related to Marx’s even more demanding historical-philosophical thesis 
that under capitalism, human beings—the real acting subjects of history—lose 
their agency and sovereignty as creators of history and hand it over to the over-
individual social formations, markets of monetary exchange and capital.
There is an interesting resemblance between Georg Simmel’s theory of 
money and Marx’s analysis of the value and money form. This is hardly a pure 
coincidence. Simmel was obviously well read in Marx’s Capital even though he 
does not take any explicit critical stance to it. As Paul explicates it, Georg Sim-
mel’s theory of value and money does not pose the question of the substance 
of value, but emphasizes its relational character, and in this respect it comes 
close to what Marx put forth in his Theories of Surplus Value as the rational 
kernel in Bailey’s conception of economic value. However, Simmel does not 
systematically develop the deduction of the various value forms, money 
included, as Marx did (Paul 2012: 172). Like Bailey, Simmel emphasized that 
objects become intersubjectively comparable first in exchange: ‘They appear 
as something independent, as distanced from the valuing subject, first when 
they are related to each other. Before that they are still hidden in the inner 
of the subject’ (Paul 2012: 93). Expressed in a slightly different way, ‘only in 
exchange, in their being brought into relation with each other, do they detach 
themselves from particular, subjective valuations and reach an objective status’ 
(Cantó Milà 2005: 164). Consequently, values are constituted and objectified 
first in exchange, not prior to it (Cantó Milà 2005: 165). Because of its rela-
tional nature, Simmel does not explicitly pose the problem of the substance 
of value: ‘A value is rather a relation, a form, which has its origins in the inter-
action of a subject with the world of objects and at the same time hides its 
origins…’ (Paul 2012: 93). Money, as the general medium, or the means of the 
means, can realize any object. As such, money is ‘empowering’ (Dodd 1994: 
159). It is an incarnation of the relations of exchange, or the exchangeability of 
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objects, or of social intercourse (‘Wechselwirkung’) in general. The social and 
economic processes of the objectification of values, central to Simmel’s analyses 
of the cultural and life-philosophical consequences of the use of money and the 
general objectification of culture, remain hidden in Simmel’s theory of money. 
Simmel is right in presuming that comparing makes valuation relevant, but he 
did not explicitly address the question what makes objects of exchange inter-
subjectively comparable.
Orléan (2014) most emphatically defends the position that the value of a 
commodity or money cannot be reduced to any such pre-existing substance 
that they would share independently of the relations of exchange. Orléan could, 
in fact, be almost paraphrasing Bailey in stating that ‘market value is an autono-
mous phenomenon that cannot be reduced to any preexisting magnitude, such 
as utility, labor, or scarcity’ (Orléan 2014: 4). He calls his model mimetic. As he 
argues, the great advantage of such a model is ‘that monetary value can be seen 
to emerge from commercial transactions themselves, without there being any 
need to appeal to an external principle, whether fundamental value or some 
other presumptively objective condition of economic activity. What I call the 
autonomy of market conditions consists of just this’ (Orléan 2014: 6). Inter-
estingly, Orléan does refer approvingly to Rubin’s (1973) classical interpreta-
tion of Marx’s value form analysis in arguing that economic value cannot be 
identified with any independent entity or substance that preexists commodity 
exchange. On the contrary, in his opinion, ‘it must be considered as something 
that is uniquely the product of market relations, through which the commer-
cial sphere itself attains a separate existence, independent of other social activi-
ties’ (Orléan 2014: 5). Orléan’s critique is targeted equally to the labor theory 
of value of the classical political economy and the concept of utility and the 
theory of marginal utility in the neoclassical economy. He is undoubtedly right 
in emphasizing that ‘money … is a social institution of singular consequence, 
for it supplies the basis for prices and exchange’ (Orléan 2014: 4). From this it 
follows, as Backhaus (1981) already pointed out, that a premonetary exchange 
of commodities with objective values and prices is a contradictio in adjecto. 
Such an exchange would be closer to a barter, with unstable results and open 
to bargaining, than to the equal exchange of commodities. To Orléan, capitalist 
market relations and market economy are completely self-referential: ‘Actors 
no longer concern themselves with either utility or prestige but with the power 
of the market itself ’ (Orléan 2014: 199).
Even Orléan does refer to some ‘fundamentals,’ such as utilities, which lie 
behind the determination of economic values, even if the relation is in his opin-
ion rather vague. One gets the impression that he was not really able to make up 
his mind: ‘And yet I hesitate to take my leave of the substance hypothesis with-
out paying tribute, not only to its power, but to its audacity. There can be no 
doubt that it captures at least part of the reality of market relationships’ (Orléan 
2014: 35). Therefore, he admits that the demand for utility can also play a role 
in this connection, but if it does it does so only as one element among others. 
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In the end, value is the result of the social relations among the market actors 
who tend to follow each other’s reactions and imitate each other’s behavior and 
evaluations. He points out in particular the social mechanism of status com-
petition, understood in the spirit of Thorstein Veblen. The market value that 
results from status competition is, as he claims, of a ‘new kind,’ connected to 
prestige based essentially on the mimetic act, or the imitation of one’s superiors 
(Orléan 2014: 199). However, Orléan does not go into any details about the 
functioning of the status competition in the economic markets. He also does 
not show how it determines market values and, in the end, the prices of com-
modities. In this respect, Podolny’s (2005) and Aspers’s (2010) studies of status 
markets are more explicit and useful.
The problem of Orléan’s reasoning is that he, while he turns down the idea 
of any idea of ‘fundamentals of value,’ refers to a fundamental principle— 
commensurability—which ‘governs exchange in all its numerable instances, 
and thereby gives shape to economic life, is a result of applying a method of 
abstraction similar to the one employed by the natural sciences’ (Orléan 2014: 
35). He fails, however, to give any satisfactory answer to the question of what, 
in the lack of any substance of value, makes commodities comparable and com-
mensurate. To express it in another way: how are subjective values objectified 
and how do they become accepted in commodity exchange and market rela-
tions? As repeatedly pointed out in this study, the mere existence of money as 
a representative of universal purchasing power cannot explain the formation 
of objective values and prices of commodities sold and bought in the market. 
As Marx pointed out when criticizing Bailey, there must after all be some ‘sub-
stance’ to value that makes them comparable and commensurate. If one agrees 
with Karpik, Orléan, and others, that one cannot reduce these fundamentals 
to any inherent—not to mention material or natural—properties of the com-
modities exchanged, the only available explanation is that the comparability 
of commodities is, in one way or another, socially constructed. This does not 
make their values any less objective, in the sense of being shared and accepted 
by the market participants. The decisive question that remains is: what are the 
social processes, which constitute economic values, and how do they do it? 
Status competition is certainly one of them, but only one among several others.

CHAPTER 4
Sociological Theories of the Market
Market identities and status hierarchies
In today’s political discourse, politicians repeatedly refer to markets as a solu-
tions to all kinds of economic and social problems. As a consequence, markets 
get almost mythical dimensions: markets will do that, markets will decide, 
markets will react to this or that, and so on. They often seem to understand 
the reactions of the markets as resulting from the joint actions of a great 
multitude of individual but anonymous market actors turned into one single 
collective actor. The doctrine of consumer choice as well as the principle of 
consumer sovereignty are essential parts of this assumption. As Alan Warde 
summarized:
it supposes an autonomous individual confronting a potential situation 
of acquisition through purchases, who consciously wants a particular 
item or service, the means to satisfy which are available and where op-
tions exist, making a discrete and deliberate decision, without prejudice 
to future decisions, where no punishment or disadvantage will ensue 
and personal satisfaction will be enhanced (Warde 2017: 206).
The famous metaphor of the invisible hand adds to this the idea that somehow, 
out of all these individual actions that only strive after their own best following 
their individual and independent preferences, a market equilibrium emerges 
each time. If no external factors are allowed to interfere, this will end up in the 
optimal allocation of the resources. These economic actors operating on the 
market are isolated from each other, and the exchange of commodities is the 
only social tie between them. Their relationship to commodities is a private 
relation ‘in which socially isolated individuals seek by a process of introspec-
tion to estimate and compare the effects of consuming a variety of different 
goods. Note too that the results of this evaluation are wholly subjective’ (Orléan 
2014: 38). Their community is that of the objectivity of the market prices, taken 
for granted and shared by all. Somewhat amazingly, despite the central role 
often reserved to markets in economic discourse and policy, there is no general 
theory of the market (Esposito 2010: 91).
70 Deciphering Markets and Money
Both economic sociologists and institutional economists reiterate that eco-
nomic markets are always socially embedded, and therefore the market actors 
are not completely atomistic individuals but have different identities and play 
different roles. This is not the case in the standard models of the neoclassical 
economics. Alfred Marshall is a good example. He codified the neoclassical 
economy in the 1890s. His model of a perfect market is the stock exchange, 
where sellers and buyers are identical and exchangeable. A buyer today can 
be a seller tomorrow. This is, however, not usually the case in other markets, 
such as the consumer goods market, where the roles of the buyer and seller are 
strictly separated (see Aspers 2010 and 2011). What is even more remarkable in 
Marshall’s model of the pure market is that there is no direct contact between 
the buyers and sellers. The postulated auctioneer instead plays a central role 
in setting the prices. As Orléan (2014: 44) formulated it, ‘everything occurs 
instead through the offices of an auctioneer. The auctioneer does three things: 
he communicates prices to economic agents, modifies prices in response to 
observed imbalances between supply and demand and presides over trading 
once an equilibrium has been discovered.’ As a consequence, the formation 
of prices takes place wholly external to individuals: All economic agents are 
‘price takers.’
No one denies that through legislation, the state undoubtedly plays a crucial 
role in the constitution of economic markets, despite the fact that neoliberal 
economic politics has been eager to deregulate markets relying on their self-
regulation increasingly since the 1970s. At the same time, new forms and log-
ics of regulation have emerged instead. For instance, within the official rules 
of the European Union, Davies (2013) identified three separate logics, each of 
which offers the state a justification to suspend the competitive market order: 
exemptions, which allow respecting non-market values; externalities, in which 
markets are technically inefficient; and exceptions, in which the state saves the 
market against its internal logic. The reactions to the 2008 financial crisis are 
a good example of the last case. Markets can differ because of their different 
history and legal structure concerning the property rights, structure of govern-
ance and rules of exchange. Economic sociologists also claim that there are all 
kinds of informal rules, norms, and social expectations that constitute markets 
and make them different from one another. As they emphasize, markets are 
always socially embedded. The crucial question is then how economic sociol-
ogy understands economic markets; what does embeddedness mean on differ-
ent occasions and what are its consequences to the functioning of the markets? 
If sociologists are able to prove that they can make a serious contribution to a 
better understanding of economic markets as social institutions, this is a good 
criterion of their success in challenging standard economics.
In many social processes, ego’s actions depend on the actions of the alter, 
whose actions in their turn depend on ego’s, whose actions depend on alter’s, 
and so on, ad infinitum. This is the famous dilemma of double contingency: I 
will do something if only you will act first, and you will do something if only 
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I shall act first. My reaction depends on your choice, and yours on mine. As a 
result, no one is ready to make the first move. This is in fact often the starting 
point of economic action: people make investments based on their expecta-
tions about payoff, where payoffs are a function of the investments of others, 
and expectations are themselves based on the expectations of the expectations 
of others (DiMaggio 2002: 92; Esposito 2010). Without any safety nets or guid-
ance, people would live in a permanent state of uncertainty. Parsons, like Dur-
kheim before him, resolved this dilemma of the double contingency of social 
action by postulating the need for some social norms that first make it pos-
sible to presume and predict the response of others and react to the reactions 
of others on a more predictable basis. An alternative is to rely on some ‘rules 
of thumb’ based on tradition or, more generally, on the habituality of action 
presuming that, under normal conditions economic actors, such as investors, 
resort to old cultural solutions and habits of behavior, and therefore will go on 
conducting their ‘business as usual’ (Keynes 1964: 114–17; see Ilmonen 2011: 
18). In case these expectations become seriously challenged and people lose 
their faith in the ‘normal’ behavior of the other market actors, typically dur-
ing economic crises, their reactions can lead to a collective panic and market 
failure. In such cases, the market failure is the result of the perfectly rational 
behavior of the economic actors involved, who act to their best knowledge fol-
lowing their expectations about the other actors’ behavior and observing the 
following development of the market prices. People not only follow the behav-
ior but also observe the expectations and observations of other market actors, 
who again observe their observers, ad infinitum. Markets are, in other words, 
self-referential social systems (Esposito 2010). This becomes, most evident—
sometimes with drastic consequences—in the financial markets.
In one way or another, most economic sociologists rely on Talcot Parsons’s 
advice which, in a very general form, Granovetter (1985) repeated in his thesis 
of ‘social embeddedness’ of economic actions. Their advice is to look for rela-
tively stable social expectations and norms that guide the market actors. What 
kind of social expectations they have in mind varies in different theoretical 
approaches, from shared cultural values and norms to hierarchically ordered 
role expectations. For instance, Fligstein, in his programmatic statement about 
economic markets, refers both to shared rules—formal and informal—and 
conceptions of control. In his sociology of the markets, shared rules refer to 
general social rules that determine relations of competition, cooperation, and 
market-specific definitions of how firms are to be organized. They can take 
two forms: laws and informal institutional practices. Concepts of control, in 
their turn, ‘reflect market specific agreements between actors in firms on prin-
ciples of internal organization (i.e., norms of hierarchy), tactics for competi-
tion or cooperation, and the hierarchy or status ordering of firms in a given 
market’ (Fligstein 1996: 658; cf. Davis & Stout 1992)). According to Fligstein 
(2001: 32–33), they form a kind of ‘local knowledge.’ In his opinion, there are 
four basic types of rules relevant to the economic markets: property rights, 
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governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control. The 
social structure of a field of economy is a cultural construction whereby the 
dominant and dominated coexist under a set of understandings about the rules 
that makes one set of organization dominant.
As the above characterizations show, Fligstein’s concept of the institution of 
markets includes both formal and informal rules, which in one way or another 
regulate the identity and the relations between the market actors, both in 
between the firms and within a single firm. In his more concrete analyses, he 
emphasizes two main aspects or factors: the hierarchical structure among the 
firms in a market and the internal power relations within the firms (or gov-
ernance structures). More precisely, he divides the firms in a ‘normal’ market 
into a few large and dominant firms and several smaller followers. He calls 
them incumbent firms and challengers: ‘Incumbent firms are large, and actors 
in those firms know their major competitors and frame their actions on other 
large competitors. Challenger firms are smaller and frame their actions in 
terms of the largest firms. But, they will experience the world as given—one 
out of their control’ (Fligstein 1996: 663). The internal power relations within 
the firm, for instance between the shareholders and managers, are in their turn 
crucial in solving the results of power struggles over who can solve the problem 
how best to organize the firm to deal with competition (Fligstein 1996: 664).
Fligstein’s (2001: 21) starting point is that, if left on their own, in any market 
the ability to sell and buy freely creates a kind of social chaos as the supply and 
demand for a given good swings widely and produces pressure on suppliers, 
producers and competitors. Only control and hierarchy can end the chaos and 
create stability on the market. More precisely:
a given market becomes a ‘stable market’ (i.e., a field) when the product 
being exchanged has legitimacy with customers, and the suppliers of 
the goods and service are able to produce an internal status hierarchy 
in which the largest suppliers dominate the market and are able to re-
produce themselves on a period-to-period basis (Fligstein 2001: 30–31).
Fligstein (1996: 663) defines a stable market as a market ‘in which the identi-
ties and status hierarchy of firms (the incumbents and the challengers) are well 
known and a conception of control that guides actors who lead firms is shared.’ 
Since price competition would challenge the stability of the market, the general 
tendency is to preserve market stability, whereas price competition is an excep-
tion. This is Fligstein’s main theorem. The emergence of price challengers is 
always possible in principle, and they are hardly ever totally excluded, otherwise 
the result would be a pure monopoly. Nevertheless, competition with prices is 
an exception, and the firms take refuge to it only seldom and under pressure. 
Fligstein’s normal markets are monopolistic, after all. Other factors can create 
market instability in addition to the price competition. More precisely, three 
additional factors can pose a threat to a firm’s survival: 1) suppliers’ control of 
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inputs; 2) difficulties in gaining cooperation from managers and workers; and 
3) products may become obsolete (Fligstein 2001: 17). Fligstein’s theoretical 
construct is principally a combination of two factors, status and power, which 
makes it close to Max Weber’s idea about the market forces.
One of the merits of Fligstein’s conceptual apparatus is that he can draw 
concrete hypotheses about the behavior of firms operating under various con-
ditions and compilations of market competition. Stability can be challenged 
not only by increasing and hardening competition but also by internal power 
struggles. As Fligstein also claims, a successful solution of one of the problems 
usually solves them both. In his model, any ‘normal market’ consists of a small 
group of leading enterprises and a bigger group of smaller enterprises. In the 
first instance, enterprises follow the activities of other enterprises: big enter-
prises follow other big enterprises, small ones follow small as well as big ones. 
As a rule, firms keep to their old strategy unless a crises or state intervention 
forces them to change. Markets end up in a crisis whenever the strategy of the 
market leader(s) fails, but it can also be a result of new challenges that the old 
strategy is not ready to meet, either in the form of a radical change in demand 
or aggressive competition that starts cutting prices. The leading firms can face 
challengers from within their own market, but more often they come from out-
side, from markets that are close by (Fligstein 2001).
Fligstein’s work offers a developed conceptual framework that directs his 
empirical research of the different kinds of market institutions by drawing sys-
tematic attention to the factors that, in his opinion, are decisive in explaining 
market stability and change.1 It goes without saying that it is not so easy to get 
reliable and systematic empirical evidence about status hierarchies or inter-
nal power struggles over the market strategies of the firms or about inter-and 
intra-organizational politics and cultural frames that define the social relations 
between the economic actors. Nevertheless, Fligstein has conducted extensive 
and systematic empirical studies to test his hypotheses. His theory obviously 
helps to direct attention to the historical origins and the different historical tra-
jectories of various markets. His empirical and historical studies deal with, in 
addition to labor markets, the changes in the corporate control of big American 
firms and the global economy, in particular the increasing dominance of the 
shareholder value concept as well as the presumed increase in the financial con-
trol of the firms and its effect on the firms’ performance (Filgstein 1990). Many of 
his empirical cases concentrate more on the governance or intra-organizational 
side of the issue—culture of governance and the internal presumed rules—than 
the market structure (Fligstein 2001: 146).
Our second example of the sociology of market institutions is Patrik Aspers’s 
(2011) work on status and standard markets. Aspers’s conceptual developments 
are partly based on his empirical study of the global garment—more specifi-
cally, jeans—markets (Aspers 2010). He pays attention to the different identi-
ties and roles of the economic actors in different kinds of markets. According 
to Aspers, standard markets consist of a great number of anonymous producers 
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with standard products, easily substitutable for each other. In the status market, 
the producer identities differ and are based on their status. In other words, not 
the product but the social identity of the producer is important (cf. brands and 
branding). Obviously, the status of a producer can reflect his position either in 
the eyes of the other producers—as Fligstein emphasized—or consumers, or 
both, and even though they are often close to each other, they do not necessar-
ily have to coincide. The determination of the market prices in these two pure 
types of markets differs radically, as clearly shown by the fact that in the status 
markets, rising prices can lead to increasing demand and not vice versa, as is 
the case in standard markets and as presumed in standard economics. In status 
markets, the high price can act as a sign of high status of the producer and the 
high quality of his products. Therefore, the customers are ready to buy them 
despite the fact that they are expensive.
There is an obvious connection to the theories of monopolistic competi-
tion in Aspers’s theory, which he does not develop any further: in situations 
of monopolistic competition it is often presumed that the leading firms, or 
incumbents, can determine the price level of their products within some 
limits. This happens traditionally by keeping the supply under control and 
preventing competitors from cutting prices, which in its turn can demand 
the establishment of all kinds of hindrances—for instance high marketing 
costs—to new competitors in entering the markets. In the case of status mar-
kets, the leading firm or firms can charge higher prices because of the pre-
sumed higher quality of its products. Characteristically, in status markets the 
products of different producers are not perfectly, if at all, substitutable for each 
other; for example, Levy’s is regarded as superior than the practically similar 
and technically as good jeans of an anonymous Turkish producer. (The next 
subchapter takes up the question of the relation between the quality and status 
in more detail.)
The standard versus status markets is but one of the dimensions that open 
up the field of markets in Aspers’s analysis. The second is whether the market 
actors have fixed or switch roles. If their roles are fixed they always act either 
in the capacity of a seller or a buyer, but not in both. If they switch roles from 
buyer to seller and back, the market is characterized by switch roles. As already 
pointed out, Marshall’s classical model of economic markets took its model 
from the stock exchange. By cross-tabulating these two variables, status versus 
standard markets, and stable versus switch roles, we get the following table with 
four possible squares (see Table 1).
While the stock exchange is the ideal typical example of a standard market 
with switch roles, status markets with switch roles are quite exceptional, even 
though by no means without importance, in the modern economy. One could, 
however, think of examples of status markets with switch roles other than the 
archaic bazaar, such as investment banks, which both buy and sell shares and 
bonds of all kinds and which can have big distinctions of status between them. 
It is easy to find other examples of both standard and status markets with fixed 
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roles than the ones in the table because most modern commodity markets 
would fit into one or the other category.
These conceptual analyses of the market institutions distinguish between dif-
ferent types of markets and show how this can have an impact on price compe-
tition. The distinguishing features vary from one study to another. To Fligstein, 
they primarily reflect differences in power constellations between the produc-
ers, managers, and investors, or between the market incumbents and challeng-
ers. Aspers, in his turn, emphasizes whether the roles are fixed or switched in 
addition to the status of the firms and their products. Both models show how 
and why the standard markets of producers, which consist of a great number 
of independent and often anonymous producers selling homogenous products 
which are substitutable for each other, are only one alternative among theoreti-
cally possible as well as empirically existing markets.
Harrison C. White (1981) is often referred to as one of the first ones to point 
out the crucial role of the different social roles and identities of market actors 
in understanding their market behavior and the functioning of the markets. 
The assumption that firms can use only a limited amount of information about 
the performance of other producers in their market is central to his analysis. 
In many ways, this is the starting point in the contemporary sociology of the 
markets whose representatives, like Fligstein and Aspers, analyze differences 
in the social structures of the markets. One of the merits of White’s analyses 
is that they come close to economics in analyzing the impact of the different 
market constellation both on price formation and demand and supply curves, 
two topics that are typical in standard economic analyses. Thus, they challenge 
economists more directly on their own turf.
According to White (2002: 1), the market discipline centers on product 
quality, which to him is almost identical to the reputation of the firm (White 
2002: 10). The interaction of choices in the market presupposes comparability: 
Table 1: Patrik Aspers’s market typology.
Fixed roles Switch roles
Standard markets Wholesale market
of flowers
Stock exchange
Status markets Consumer market
for garments
Bazaar
Source: Aspers 2011: 89.
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‘The production market mechanism must guide and yet also emerge from the 
choices of market actors who pay attention to an array of signals. It derives 
from the social construction of a quality order that producers as well as buyers 
recognize and regularly reinforce by their commitments’ (White 2002: 13).
White starts by separating buyer’s demand into two distinctive factors: 
demand for volume and demand for quality. Similarly, producers’ costs are 
divided into two: costs per volume and costs by quality. The market situation 
and the character of competition of the firms differ radically depending on 
which aspects dominate in each case, volume or quality. White emphasizes the 
importance of and differences in quality of the products or services but does 
not relate them explicitly to the status of the producers. Figure 1 serves as a 
good introduction to his thinking. He identifies different markets depending 
on how they are situated in relation to these variables. The first variable (the 
vertical vector in the figure) is the relation of buyer demand for volume to sup-
plier cost per volume; the second variable (the horizontal vector in the figure) 
expresses the relation between the buyer demand for quality and supplier cost 
by quality. The further away from the zero point a firm is on the horizontal axis, 
the bigger the buyer demand for quality in relation to the cost of quality, and 
the farther away from the zero point a firm is on the vertical axis, the higher the 
demand for volume in relation to the cost of production per volume. If one fol-
lows the diagonal axis in the figure from the lower left corner to the upper right 
corner, one starts from the point where the production costs of both quality 
and quantity far exceed their demand and ends up with such commodities the 
demand of which for quality and quantity far exceeds their production costs. 
White’s idea is that one can draw conclusions about price variations as well as 
tendencies of growth, centralization, and competition from the figure (White 
2003: 135–136).
The quadrants in the figure are
constructed by crossing the two regions in which a/c (buyer demand for 
volume/supplier cost per volume) is less than 1 or greater than 1 with 
the two regions in which b/d (buyer demand for quality/supplier cost 
by quality) is less or greater than 1. In other words, a/c<1 is where, for 
any growth in volume, demand goes up more slowly than producers’ 
costs, whereas a/c>1 is the region where demand goes up more rapidly 
with volume than producers’ costs. On the other dimension, similarly, 
b/d<1, for any increase in quality, demand goes up more slowly than do 
producers’ costs by quality, whereas where b/d>1 is the region where 
demand goes up more rapidly with quality than do producers’ costs by 
quality (White 2003: 136).
According to White, quite different histories are characteristic for markets in 
the different quadrants. They also expose ‘different tendencies to turn into non-
market forms of one sort or another’ (White 2003: 136).
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Two of these quadrants tend toward symmetry: in the lower left, the upper 
hand is held by buyers as to both volume and quality increases. High-volume 
production is lower quality and lower cost. It is hard for producers to grow, 
and there are more of them in the market. White gives characteristic labels to 
the quadrants and triangles in the figure. The producers placed in the differ-
ent quadrants and triangles react differently to the changes in the demand for 
 quality and volume:
Thus the lower left quadrant contains the ORDINARY triangle, 
where producers vie for buyers who are relatively limited in their 
demand for volume and quality relative to what they cost producers. 
The upper left quadrant contains TRUST, an asymmetrical region, 
where there is high demand per volume cost (favoring mass produc-
tion) but lagging demand for quality relative to its cost of production 
(White 2003: 137).













a = Buyer demand for volume
b = Buyer demand for quality
c = Supplier cost per volume
d = Supplier cost by quality Source: White 2003, p. 135.
Figure 1: White’s market place.
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It tends towards a non-market form in which firms either conglomerate or 
divide up markets by volume shares, reducing radically market competition.
The lower-right quadrant is another asymmetrical region. In this quadrant 
there is high demand for quality relative to cost, but the demand for volume 
relative to cost is low. The low-quality producers tend to undercut quality and 
drive out higher quality producers one after another, making the market unsus-
tainable. White calls this quadrant ‘Unravelling.’ As White concludes, ‘the ten-
dency is toward a guild arrangement, which fixes quality levels and restricts 
market entry’ (White 2003: 137).
The upper-right quadrant contains the triangle that White calls ‘Novel.’ It 
is split between ‘Explosive’ and ‘Crowded.’ This market is peculiar because it 
becomes more profitable the bigger it is because of the adjoining buyer enthu-
siasm. In White’s understanding, it could be compared to social movements 
active in the economic realm. He also refers to the bandwagon effects in the 
popularity of products. These features are most characteristic of novelties. Even 
though White does not mention it, fashion markets, if anything, should be 
placed in the ‘Novel’ triangle in the figure. In the beginning of the new fash-
ion cycle, ‘buyer enthusiasm grows faster than producer cost with quality,’ just 
as White describes it. For this quadrant, it is important to introduce a third 
dimension: the substitutability of one market’s producers for those of another. 
This third dimension divides the Novel region into two: ‘Crowded’ designates 
an area ‘where the optimum number of firms is rather small and the aggre-
gate market size decreases if more competitors are added. This fits the case of 
high-prestige novelties: imitators dry up demand’ (White 2003:138). Finally, in 
the ’Explosive’ subregion with somewhat less substitutability profitability grows 
along with market revenue and the number of firms (White 2003: 138).
The conceptions of these three sociologists of the economic markets pre-
sented above both share some basic ideas and differ from each other. Most 
important, they emphasize the quality and (non)substitutability of products. 
Both Fligstein and White pay attention to the structure of the markets in a 
way typical of economic theories of imperfect competition. Fligstein’s normal 
markets come close to what is often referred to as monopolistic competition. In 
addition, Fligstein emphasizes the importance of power constellations within 
the firm, whereas the quality of the products and the distinction between the 
demand for quality and quantity is central to White. Aspers’s main idea, with 
his distinction between standard and status markets, is close to White’s because 
status is one of the important factors that has an impact on the demand for 
quality. As Podolny (2005)—whose study will be presented in more detail in 
the following subchapter—has shown, it can often be difficult or almost impos-
sible to know whether status depends on quality or vice versa. If the quality 
depends on status, what determines it and how can it be studied and measured?
As Zuckerman has critically pointed out, White’s theoretical construc-
tion of a market order pays attention almost exclusively to the social relations 
between the producers and their internal status order. Its weakness is, therefore, 
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‘inattention to the audience responsible for conferring legitimacy on actors and 
objects’ (Zuckerman 1999: 1400). In other words, it does not take into account 
the role of the buyers and customers in determining the quality, or ‘legitimacy’, 
and value of the products. It is easy to admit that it is often not easy to study 
the social formation of the taste preferences and the following quality order 
of the consuming masses. To solve this problem in his own empirical study of 
stock markets, Zuckerman discusses what he calls the taste mediators or critics, 
who are the professional market analysts that ‘replace consumers as the pri-
mary audience that determines the fate of products’ (Zuckerman 1999: 1400; cf. 
Hirsch 1972 on taste mediators).
The next subchapter shall present and comment on some sociological theo-
ries that have seriously posed the question about product quality and taken 
the ‘audience,’ or the role of consumers and various mediators like critics and 
analysts, into account in determining the quality order. Thus they problematize 
what constitutes the quality of the products and services in the minds of the 
economic actors. By doing so, they pose a serious challenge to neoclassical eco-
nomics by undermining its basic postulate about perfect knowledge and unam-
bigious taste preferences among the consumers. They claim that the principal 
uncertainty concerning the quality of the goods and services sold and bought 
in the market is a normal condition rather than an exception.
Quality uncertainty and market devices
Carl Menger, one of the three founding fathers of the doctrine of marginal 
utilities in economics, argued that ‘the measure of value is entirely subjective 
in nature, and for this reason a good can have great value to one economizing 
individual, little value at all to a third, depending upon the differences in their 
requirements and available amounts’ (Menger 2007: 146). Menger’s program-
matic statement was directed against objectifying theories of value, above all 
the labor theory of value common in classical political economy. In fact, he did 
not present any solution to the problem of how an objective and binding mar-
ket value or price could emerge from these numerous distinctive and subjective 
valuations of individual goods. Menger, in the tradition of classical political 
economy, referred to the use values of goods and needs and not to utilities. (See 
also Mäki & Sappinen 2011 about the differences between the conceptions of 
the early Marginalists.) He even ranked the needs in order of their importance 
and, like Marx before him, he did not regard their definition as problematic. To 
Menger, all human beings obviously had the same needs in the same order of 
importance or expediency.
Menger’s theory has quite demanding presuppositions. As the editor of the 
English translation of his main work formulated it ‘a minimum model meet-
ing Menger’s discussion [of the determination of the value of goods] requires, 
therefore … that the economizing individual of the table [Menger’s numerical 
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tables] is able to rank his satisfactions but also assign indices to their relative 
degrees of importance. In other words, he is able to compare different satisfac-
tions in terms of a homogenous unit of satisfaction’ (Menger 2007: 128, note 
8). Neoclassical economic theorists, Menger among them, ‘assume that each 
individual is able to rank the various baskets of goods that are offered to him in 
ascending order of preference’ (Orléan 2014: 38). All other things being equal, 
the individual will attempt to acquire the basket of goods that brings him the 
greatest satisfaction; he will maximize his utilities. This obviously presumes 
that the worth of things is fixed and their qualitative differences are all clear 
in the minds of the consumers. Otherwise it would not make sense to speak 
about utilities or marginal utilities either, even less about their maximization 
or optimization.
Unfortunately, the candidate for the role of the substance of value, adopted as 
standard in neoclassical economics, utility (or in its modern variant, individual 
preferences) raises almost as many problems. It presumes that the preferences 
are independent of each other and related neither to the preferences of other 
economic actors nor to the other preferences of the same individual. As Ste-
phen D. Parsons (2014: 19–20) stated, ‘they [neoclassical economists] assume 
that the ends are constant, are known with certainty from the start, and that 
economic agents can discover how to select the best means to satisfy them. 
Economic agents are thus assumed to be rational because the problems raised 
by time and uncertainty are not considered.’ As Orléan (2014: 38, 44) pointed 
out, one should also keep in mind that the economic agents of neoclassical 
 economics are completely ahistorical and asocial members living in a mass 
society of anonymous individuals, connected with each other only through 
economic exchange.
The model is founded on the presumption of complete information, one of 
the basic assumptions of neoclassical economy. Consumers and other market 
actors are presumed to be fully informed about the quality of goods, their own 
preferences, and the increase in the relative amount of satisfaction or utility that 
one more unit of any one commodity will bring to its consumer. Their purely 
subjective and private preferences are based on introspection. It is obvious that 
these conditions are valid only exceptionally in the real world of economic 
actors. A whole school of economics has dedicated its efforts to clarifying what 
imperfect information in a market means to economic theory, how it modifies 
the analyses of the market prices and market equilibrium, and in what ways it 
impacts the optimal distribution of economic resources. Similarly, information 
can be asymmetrical in the sense that one partner, usually the seller, has access 
to better—or ‘perfect’—information than the buyer. As the argument proceeds, 
the buyer could in principle have access to perfect information too, but it would 
demand excessive use of time and/or money, increasing expenses. In some 
cases, they can also meet special obstacles which prevent the economic actors 
of acquiring reliable information. Economists tackle this problem by mak-
ing some adjustments to the theory by introducing, for instance, the concept 
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of transaction costs referring to the extra expenses required to become fully 
informed about the conditions of the deal. The state of imperfect information 
is therefore usually regarded as either an exception or a modifying factor in 
the theories of market equilibrium. In this respect, they resemble the challenge 
posed by imperfect competition facing a theory that takes the state of perfect 
competition as its normal starting point.
A good and classical example of the impact of asymmetric information is the 
market for secondhand cars (Akerlof 1970). In order to function at all, they 
demand some kind of a relation of trust between the car dealers and their cus-
tomers, which economists say explains, for instance, why people prefer to buy 
secondhand cars from people they know and not from professional car dealers 
or companies. ‘Perfect’ information about the technical quality of a car on sale 
could be available in principle but it is often very difficult, expensive, and time-
consuming to find out. This is a common problem of secondhand cars: one 
could—nowadays such service is in fact standard—order a more or less total 
mechanical check of the car and have a more or less complete list of its benefits 
and failures, which could then be used to determine its price relative to other 
cars of the same model and make. This causes some extra costs but usually the 
price of the check-up is rather small compared to the price of the car. This pre-
sumes, however, that there is a limited—it does not matter principally how long 
in individual cases—list of technical factors that are considered to be relevant 
to be checked and clear enough technical standards to be used in evaluating 
the quality of the car. However, it is equally important that these standards 
are shared and acknowledged as relevant by all those involved. They are, in 
other words, part of the common culture of secondhand car markets more or 
less well-known and shared at least by ‘regulars’ and ‘insiders.’ Quite obviously, 
one cannot control for everything within the reasonable limits of economic 
resources and time, but only for the most relevant factors.
In the case of the secondhand car markets, as well as in the markets of new 
cars, there are well-proved and regular value standards that are widely in use, 
based on technical and professional expertise and engineering science, and 
recognized and taken for granted by both buyers and sellers. These standards 
might change from time to time, as is the case, for instance, with the increas-
ing importance of the consumption of gas per mile, or emissions standards, 
or the addition of new technical devices to cars that have become a standard, 
such as air conditioning, automatic speed control, or a parking assistance, and 
the like. The same standards and criteria should be used in all or most reports 
or evaluations about all ordinary car models and brands. An interesting ques-
tion, as far as the following argumentation is concerned, is to what extent such 
standards and criteria are considered to be objective and to what extent they 
are subjective or ‘pure’ social constructions. However limited or extensive they 
are, they suffice to fulfill their task as long as they are taken for granted and not 
questioned by those involved, as long as they are social conventions. In more 
recent times, a legal system of guaranteeing the rights of the buyer has been 
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created with the right of return of the object—after a limited time—after the 
purchase in case it would prove to be deficient. This system of guarantees is a 
good example of the fact that the constitution of markets presumes some nor-
mative or legal regulation, or alternatively, they have to be firmly embedded in 
other, more informal social ties or relations, like personal trust, which is practi-
cally impossible in modern mass markets. As Akerlof (1970: 499) recognized, 
‘numerous social institutions arise to counteract the effects of quality uncer-
tainty.’ This is, in other words, a prime example of the need of social embedded-
ness, either formal or informal, of economic relations and transactions for the 
constitution of markets that has been a basic truth of economic sociology since 
Granovetter’s (1985) study—or as a matter of fact since the classics of sociology.
Economic sociologists who point out quality uncertainty to be typical of 
many, if not most, consumer goods, present a more serious challenge to the 
analysis of economic markets in neoclassical economics than the ‘normal’ 
economic theories of imperfect information. They claim that no amount of 
information can compensate for the quality uncertainty which ‘plagues’ prod-
ucts and services, and which makes their worth and value indeterminate and 
instable. Lucien Karpik (2010) and Joel M. Podolny (2005) are among the radi-
cal skeptics who do not postulate any natural connection between any ‘real’ or 
‘objective’ quality of the objects and their perceived quality. The real or objec-
tive quality remains necessarily hidden or, more to the point, it does not make 
any sense to speak about it at all.
Podolny starts his reasoning by questioning the basic assumptions of eco-
nomics: ‘in the standard general equilibrium model of economics, the mech-
anism for matching and setting prices is what has come to be called the 
“Walrasian auctioneer”.’ It is ‘simply an analytic convenience, an assumption 
that is necessary for the general equilibrium model to make predictions about 
prices. However, since the Walrasian auctioneer does not exist in real markets, 
basic questions about the market’s operation remain: What does determine 
who exchanges with whom? What are the determinants of the terms of trade?’ 
(Podolny 2005: 3). As Podolny argues, economic sociologists have not yet 
developed any parsimonious account of the matching mechanism to serve as 
an alternative to the Walrasian actioneer (Podolny 2005: 3). Therefore, he looks 
for an alternative ‘matching mechanism’ in the social status of economic actors, 
which are again ‘a consequence of the network of ties that are perceived to flow 
to the actor’ (Podolny 2005: 5). In this respect, his approach resembles Aspers’s 
and he does indeed develop his ideas following White’s (1981: 518) suggestion 
that markets can be best understood ‘as self producing social structures among 
specific cliques of firms and other actors who evolve roles from observations of 
each others’ behavior.’
Podolny’s impressive work consists of several empirical, historical case 
studies ranging from modern investment banking industry, Californian wine 
industry, and the spread of inventions, to the question of how the market lead-
er’s status has an impact on entry into a market. In addition, his work includes 
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a historical study of the conditions of exit from the primary securities market 
in 1920–1949. All these cases serve to test his basic claim that status matters in 
market competition in a wide variety of cases and historical conditions.
To Podolny, the reputation and the status of a firm are not the same. Repu-
tation stems from the firm’s past performance, and even though there might 
be a positive correlation between the firm’s reputation and its status on the 
one hand and its reputation and product quality, on the other hand, these do 
not necessarily coincide and correlate. As Podolny (2005: 18) formulated it, 
‘the existence of reputation for a valued quality does not necessarily eliminate 
the uncertainty that market participants have about the presence or extent of 
that valued quality.’ Even if status may thus be connected to a firm’s previous 
performance, it can be and often is an independent indicator, or determinant, 
of the relative quality and worth of its products. The products of a firm are 
regarded as possessing higher quality because the firm or enterprise enjoys a 
high status in the market, and not vice versa. Similarly, a brand (a conception 
used widely in marketing) may be connected both to a firm’s status and its rep-
utation, but they are not reducible to it, nor vice versa. A Podolny (2005: 16) 
claimed, the concept of status is more fundamental than brand, because brand 
does not pay attention to any more fundamental social mechanisms behind 
them as, in contrast, status and reputation do. One could also add that brands 
are created by marketing, and actively promoted and kept up by it, whereas 
the firm as well as its products can have a high status and/or a good reputation 
independently of it.
To Podolny, status acts as a means—or has the function—of reducing market 
uncertainty. His basic axiom is as follows: the greater the market participants’ 
uncertainty about the underlying quality of a producer and the producer’s 
product, the more the market participants will rely on the producers’ status to 
make inference about that quality’ (Podolny 2005: 18). Consequently,
the conception of status as a signal of quality rests on the following un-
derstanding: 1) Quality is not perfectly observable; 2) there is a loose, 
positive link between past manifestations of quality and present status; 
3) status leaks through exchange and deference relations; and 4) poten-
tial exchange partners look to status to make inference about quality 
(Podolny 2005: 35).
How then is status determined if it is, in principle, at least partly  independent 
of quality and precedes it, and if the market actors make inferences about 
 quality via status and not vice versa? According to Podolny, it is a result of 
social ties and is thus related to or dependent on the status of other relevant 
market actors. Status can leak through social ties so that one’s own status 
on the market can increase due to contacts to other actors who enjoy a high 
 status. What in their turn determines their status remains, however, somewhat 
unclear in Podolny’s impressive study. They can understandably vary from one 
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market to another but one could nevertheless identify some general principles 
of status formation.
In his empirical case studies, Podolny makes use of various indicators in 
determining the status of the market actors in order to analyze its impact on 
their economic performance as well as the performance of the markets. Podolny 
begins with the central point that there are cases when the quality of the goods 
or services is unknown and in which other factors, in this case the status of 
the producer or seller, becomes a decisive factor in drawing conclusions about 
the quality of the product or service. In a sense, one could even say that status 
can interfere with or even hide the real quality of the product. A more radical 
interpretation would be that status is not only a substitute for the ‘real’ quality 
but is in fact equal to quality. In other words, that is all there is to quality. Status 
is therefore not simply any indicator or reflection of any ‘real’ quality of goods 
but identical with it and its sole determinant.
Lucien Karpik’s (2010: 10–12) concept of singularities is even more radical in 
its emphasis on quality uncertainty. He claims that in the market of singulari-
ties, purchases are made under principal quality uncertainty out of necessity. 
The quality of singularities remains principally ambiguous even for experts, 
and there are no technics to determine or measure them. Therefore, they do not 
satisfy the basic presumption of the neoclassical economy according to which, 
in a standard market, products are known, or at least knowable, before their 
purchase and the only problem that can possibly arise is the lack of informa-
tion. However, the lack of information is only a practical, even though at times 
unavoidable or irreparable, restriction, and not a principal one. In some cases, 
it can be remedied by legal regulation of the markets, like in the case of second-
hand cars, or by using some technical instruments of measurement. In the case 
of ‘real’ singularities, this can never be the cure because they suffer from a much 
more principal quality uncertainty. It cannot be remedied with any such tech-
nical or legal means. Their markets are in need of completely different social 
mechanisms and guarantees of quality and its ‘certification’ (of which the pro-
ducer’s status can be one, but only one among several possible mechanisms).
What then are typical singularities, according to Karpik? Works of art, or 
more generally all kinds of cultural products, are singularities, but so are per-
sonalized services. Contrary to what is common, Karpik (2010: 17–18) counts 
not only unique works or performances of art, like original paintings, draw-
ings, and sculptures, or such singular events as unique artistic performances, 
dinners in fine restaurants, and the like as singularities; he also includes all 
kinds of reproduced and reproducible cultural goods, such as movies, books, 
discs, and so on. Therefore, he prefers to call them singularities and not unique, 
or authentic, objects (of art). He does not follow the more common distinction 
between authentic and unique objects of art on the one hand and (‘mechani-
cally’) reproduced objects of art on the other hand, a distinction well-known 
from Walter Benjamin’s (1968 [1935]) classic essay about the loss of the ‘aura’ 
of art that has become a regular point of reference in later critical studies of 
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commercial, mass culture. To Karpik, not only are such consumer goods as 
vintage wines—which are arguably in between these two types, authentic works 
of art and reproduced works of art—good examples of singularities but so are 
printed books, movies, and CDs. In Karpik’s understanding, it does not matter 
whether they are unique or how many copies they are made, as long as their 
symbolic quality and, consequently, their capacity to accommodate a princi-
pally indefinite number of equally relevant and valid interpretations, is pre-
served. This is the case with all kinds of cultural objects and personal services. 
One can also reasonably raise the question as to what extent most, if not all, 
consumer goods and personal services share at least some of the characteristics 
of singularity in a developed economy of consumer goods that abounds in nov-
elties and where design, fashion, advertising, and marketing are all an integral 
part of almost any market.
Even though Olav Velthuis’s empirical study of art markets in the Nether-
lands and USA (2005), to which also Karpik (2010: 222) refers, deals explicitly 
with ‘authentic’ art in the narrow sense of the term, its results have relevance 
to Karpik’s argumentation in showing what consequences quality uncertainty 
can have to the markets and market actors. Velthuis’s (2005: 80) research ques-
tion is a concrete one: Why are contemporary and new works of art not sold on 
auction, as presumed by economic theory, which predicts that unique, high-
value goods like art, for which clear standards of value are lacking, tend to be 
priced by means of auctions? This is not the case normally. Instead, art galleries 
and gallerists set and regulate their prices by using mostly non-explicit pricing 
scripts, which pay attention to the previous price history of the artist’s works 
and the prices paid for ‘similar works in size and style of similar artists with 
comparable résume, credential, and background’ (Velthuis 2005: 124–125).2 
The gallerists tend to follow a rule according to which one should begin pric-
ing the works of a previously unknown artist as low as is reasonable and then, 
slowly, increase them with the increasing credentials and résumé of the artist 
who belongs to their ‘stable.’ Even though demand has, according to Velthuis, an 
impact on pricing as well, the essential rule is never to have to lower the prices 
paid for the latest works of an artist compared to his or her previous products. 
In determining the prices, the gallerist does not try to maximize their sales or 
their short-term profits, but rather creates a career path for the artist, which 
will presumably produce a steadier flow of long-term profits for the gallerist by 
keeping the production and the amount of the supply of the artist’s works under 
control. In addition, the regular price increases from one exhibition to the next 
should be quite modest. (Velthuis 2005: 124–126). Velthuis summarized his 
results as follows: ‘For price increases, three different rules exist: a rule based 
on demand, on time, and on reputation. For all three rules, the amount of the 
increases varies, but usually equals 10 to 20 per cent of the most recent price 
level’ (Velthuis 2005: 127).
The situation is completely different in the secondary market of art, in sell-
ing and buying older and classical works of art. Their quality uncertainty has 
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already been reduced and their ‘economic and artistic value is already estab-
lished when works appear on the secondary market since their art historical 
standing and economic worth have been partially decided upon’ (Velthuis 
2005: 82). Contrary to what one could learn from economic theory, auctions 
are the primary mechanism of price setting on secondary art market. Conse-
quently, their prices and price-setting follow different mechanisms compared 
to primary art markets. Art works that are unique and in principle incompara-
ble, as Jevons readily admitted, ‘do not admit of the conception of more or less’ 
(cit. in Velthuis 2005: 98). All economists from Ricardo to Jevons came to the 
conclusion that the prices of rare and irreproducible goods such as pieces of 
authentic art have no real explanation. They are an exception and beyond ordi-
nary economic theory (Velthuis 2005: 98).3 Their price determination most 
definitely does not follow the standard rules of marginal utility. This is shown 
concretely in Velthuis’s extensive study of the art markets. This does not mean 
that the determination of their prices would be completely arbitrary or  prevent 
their prices to be explored by carefully analyzing the social structure of 
their market.
The determination of the prices of unique works of art is not such a seri-
ous practical problem to economics because their markets are obviously not 
very extensive compared with many ‘standard’ consumer goods, other cultural 
goods included. The question reaches quite different proportions in practice 
if, following Karpik, we widen the concept of singularities to cover a much 
broader range of cultural objects or personal services, thus extending the same 
problem of principal quality uncertainty and incommensurability to a much 
wider range of objects than authentic works of art. Then the dividing line 
between standard goods and cultural goods both drastically narrows the scope 
of standard goods as well as becomes more blurred.4
What makes then an object singular, after all? According to Karpik (2010: 
13), the three main criteria of the singularity of any product or service are their 
1) quality uncertainty, 2) multi-dimensionality, and 3) incommensurability. 
Their quality uncertainty is a consequence of their multidimensionality, which 
makes them difficult to compare. His basic claim is that any market of singu-
larities would end up in a market failure without the help of market devices and 
regimes of coordination, which allow for, at least, some kind evaluation of their 
quality in making them commensurable. The peculiarity of any market of sin-
gularities is that the goals of economic action cannot be set in advance because 
the consumer constructs them first along with his commitment. (Karpik 2010: 
71–71). In this sense, it comes close to the idea presented in the studies of mod-
ern consumption, according to which the consumers are always co-producers 
because consumer goods achieve their real meaning and final value first in 
their process of consumption (Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010). One and the same 
commodity can thus have or achieve multiple meanings and values. Such a 
market cannot possibly fulfill the basic axiom of fixed and known preferences 
central to standard economic theory.5
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As Karpik argues, due to their multidimensionality and incommensurabil-
ity the determination of the relative worth of singularities demands the use 
of judgment power. According to Karpik (2010:42), a judgment, in contrast 
to a decision, is ‘a synthetic act which combines a plurality of heterogenous 
and variably weighted criteria.’ As such, it takes the multidimensionality of its 
objects into account and acknowledges that the whole is more than its parts. 
In contrast to decisions that can be based on definite criteria or refer to some 
generalized value standards, a judgment is always a qualitative choice and open 
to re-evaluation and further reflections. It is not necessarily stable, either. Fur-
thermore, it can combine both aesthetic and ethical evaluations and knowl-
edge. Art critics provide a clear and good example of the exercise of aesthetic 
taste in judging the beauty of an object of art. Karpik is essentially claiming that 
all singularities are like objects of art and, in the sense that their ‘beauty,’ worth 
or value can at best be appreciated by using aesthetic judgments, which in their 
turn are subjective and can never be unambiguously measured or ‘weighted’ on 
the same scale.
Lucien Karpik’s characterization of the operation of the judgment of taste 
brings to one’s mind Immanuel Kant’s famous concept of the ‘pure’ aesthetic 
taste and judgment power in his third Critique, the Critique of Judgement (1914 
[1790]). In his analysis of singularities, Karpik faced and was presumably well 
aware of the same dilemma as Kant in formulating his famous antinomy of 
taste. As Kant argued, it is right to presume that aesthetic taste and sensual taste 
resemble each other in being subjective. They are both based on the exercise of 
one’s own taste alone. They do not—and cannot possibly—refer to any univer-
sal rules or standards of beauty but rely instead on the judgment power of every 
individual person. At the same time, the real aesthetic judgment of taste differs 
principally from purely sensual and subjective judgments of taste by always 
claiming universal validity. Otherwise it would not be, according to Kant, a real 
judgment of aesthetic taste at all, but concern only sensual pleasure. However, 
a problem arises because these two equally legitimate criteria, subjectivity and 
universal validity, cannot be realized at the same time. A judgment cannot pos-
sibly claim to be both subjective and objectively binding or universally valid. 
This is Kant’s famous antinomy of taste, in his reasoning inbuilt into the very 
aesthetic judgment of taste.
To Kant, this conceptually or logically unsolvable antinomy was important 
above all because it concretely showed the principal divide between pure sen-
sual perceptions and conceptual knowledge by placing aesthetic judgments 
as a necessary, even if highly unstable, bridge between them. By characteriz-
ing beautiful objects as having a form of purposiveness without any purpose 
(zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck), Kant introduced his aesthetic judgment as an 
intermediate epistemological operation that creates non-conceptual first-hand 
order among the (in principle) always chaotic multitude of our sensory percep-
tions. It probes its way through making preliminary suggestions how to give 
some kind of contours to the object of our perception (see Gruyer 1997).
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In purporting to bridge the divide between economic theory and concrete 
reality, Karpik’s markets of the singularities face a problem similar to the one 
facing Kant in his third Critique: how can one judge the relative merits of an 
object and compare it with others without submitting it to some general rule or 
reducing it to some one-dimensional standard? As Frank (1992: 15) formulated 
it concisely, in appreciating something aesthetically it is as if one applied a rule 
that one cannot possibly instantiate. At first glance, it would seem that is exactly 
what the economic theory claims that the ‘invisible hand’ of the market does. 
It creates out of a multitude of subjective preferences of the individual market 
actors, as if crystallizing, at each time to each product an objective, commonly 
shared value in the form of a valid market price. However, the same question 
of the character or validity of the individual judgments as in the case of Kant’s 
‘real’ judgments of beauty is actualized in this case, even if in a modified form. 
The operation of the invisible hand presumes that the market actors know or 
can evaluate, before each market transaction, the relative worth or utility of the 
goods on offer to them in the market. This raises a more basic question: how 
does an individual consumer know the relative worth or value of an object 
or a service—and how can he or she have a fixed set of preferences? How do 
they know that they made the right choice? Even in such simple cases where 
one definitely prefers an apple to an orange, the conditions of the acts of their 
consumption would only rarely, or hardly ever, be the same. This is reminiscent 
of the problem also recognized in economics that one and the same object can 
have different values depending on the ‘basket’ or set of consumer goods it is a 
part of, as well as on the order of their enjoyment. Objects of consumption also 
often have multiple meanings due to all kinds of circumstances, and therefore 
the problem of quality uncertainty is even more serious.
Karpik’s (2010: 44–52) solution to this dilemma of quality uncertainty plagu-
ing the markets of singularities are market devices and regimes of coordina-
tion. Without them the market of singularities would not function at all, and 
they would collapse. Depending on the particular devices, the markets can be 
more or less stable. Good and typical examples of such devices are restaurant or 
wine guides (the best known among them are Michelin’s red restaurant guide-
books and Harper’s wine guide), top ten or top twenty lists in popular music, 
or literary prizes and art awards. Despite their obvious dissimilarities—they 
vary from published sales figures to highly qualified expert judgments—they 
all contribute in their own way to the formation of a collective taste. In judging 
the value of an object or a service, one can also rely on or get support from the 
knowledge of experts in the particular field, such as art and movie critics. These 
and similar devices help the consumer to choose from among several alterna-
tives even under the conditions of principal quality uncertainty. Due to the spe-
cific nature of such singularities, a consumer would otherwise have to rely on 
his or her own taste alone and could never be sure whether he or she had made 
the best choice. Increase in available information would not solve the prob-
lem. Quite on the contrary, it can make the situation even more complicated. 
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Without any such judgment devices to act as guarantees of right or ‘good taste’ 
the consumer would be in a permanent state of uncertainty and markets of sin-
gularities could stop functioning. It is essential to understand that even many 
such seemingly objective market devices and taste guides as rankings and lists 
are in the end the result of individual or collective judgments of taste. Several 
of Karpik’s devices are based on the judgment of taste mediators, critics, and 
analysts (cf. Zuckerman 1999); others rely more directly on the more or less 
spontaneous judgments of the consuming masses.
Grant Blank’s (2007) detailed, empirical study of two different systems of 
reviews, restaurant guides on the one hand and reviews of statistical software 
on the other hand, illuminates the difference between aesthetic judgments and, 
at least seemingly, more objective technical evaluations. Grant names the first 
ones connoisseurial reviews and the second ones procedural reviews. Whereas 
procedural reviews use performance testing with the help of some techni-
cal instruments of measurement and compile quality indices, connoisseurial 
reviewers use their own qualified judgment. There is no doubt that even many 
technical reviews are social constructs in the sense that the set of dimensions 
or factors tested is always to some extent arbitrary and socially ‘agreed upon.’ 
It would, in principle, always be possible to think of other criteria that might 
be equally important and good in the opinion of some market actors. However, 
as long as they are recognized as valid, authorized by experts, and shared by 
all or at least by the majority of the market actors, they fulfill their function as 
technical or procedural market devices. Even though the reviews in restaurant 
guides are standardized too—the reviewers are asked to evaluate their eating 
experience using a predetermined set of dimensions with a common scale—
the reviewers are expected to rely on their own subjective observations and 
evaluations. In both cases, restaurant guides and reviews of statistical software, 
the reviewers can be specialized experts who have at least some qualifications 
and training in their field of expertise. In the latter case, their technical expert 
knowledge serves the interests of potential customers by producing and com-
piling objective information that is to some extent independent of the indi-
vidual tester and available in principle to others, but the achievement of which 
would often be very time-consuming and expensive, or practically impossible 
for a lay consumer.
The difference between subjective reviews based on judgments of taste and 
objective reviews based on technical instruments of testing is, of course, a grad-
ual one and historically fleeting as shown, for instance, by the attempts to make 
wine reviews more standardized and scientific. The process of the ‘scientifica-
tion’ of wine tasting started in California in the 1950s as an important step in 
creating a new kind of a market to its then internationally little-known and less 
valued wines (see Shapin 2016 and Phillips 2016). The fact that oenology, or the 
science of winemaking, became part of the university curriculum in California 
as well as in France and in many other wine-producing countries, including 
Australia and New Zealand, certainly also helped to legitimize this new, more 
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scientific and standardized judgment device. Wine guides, according to Karpik 
are ‘devoted to the celebration of incommensurable individualities and to the 
demarcation of incomparable universes of taste turn into one-dimensional 
arrangements’ (2011: 139) by giving points or stars to wines. It is not to be 
denied that they employ also substantial devices in the—often highly poetic 
and metaphorical—commentaries accompanying each selected and recom-
mended wine which cannot [or should not] be separated from ratings. The 
more restrictive—or ‘one-dimensional’—a guide’s evaluations, the better suited 
it is to laypersons, whereas the more ‘extensive’ it is, the better suited to con-
noisseurs (Karpik 2010: 140).
One could imagine that simply tasting different wines would allow one to 
make the right choice among them and to develop a list of preferences of one’s 
own but, as Karpik points out,
the layman is usually not looking for the wine he likes but for the wine 
that experts say he is supposed to like. With time, practice and experi-
ence, some do manage to acquire a sufficient repertory of ‘good’ wines 
and, from then on, are no longer game for the adventure they know to 
be costly and whose outcome is unpredictable. That outcome accounts 
for the often observed but largely unexplained fact that, for fine wines, 
purchases are often guided by habit (2010: 142).
This does not dismiss the ever-present possibility of doubt. Who knows, some 
wines might be even better. In addition, the market abounds with new wine 
varieties and brands all the time. How can I know that I have not missed some-
thing valuable? As Beckert et al. (2017) argue, wine drinkers have great difficul-
ties in distinguishing wines and their quality based on their objective sensory 
characteristics.
Increasing one’s knowledge of new wines does not necessarily solve the prob-
lem either, since ‘rapid production of new knowledge, when not balanced by 
equivalent training, endangers a cognitive pauperization of those [wine] buy-
ers whose competence is the most fragile’ (Karpik 2010: 144). This is the same 
dilemma that, according to Bourdieu (1984), people with relatively little cul-
tural capital regularly face in other fields of art and culture too. As soon as 
they have, with great effort and often with some expense, reached a certain 
higher level of cultural knowledge and competence the standards of the taste 
of the cultural elite have escaped beyond their reach. In other words, there is 
no other way out of this dilemma than to become a real connoisseur and dedi-
cate one’s whole life, and often money too, for tasting wines—one should not 
start too late in life—a solution that is obviously open only to a selected few 
and accompanied certainly with other kinds of problems. The other options are 
following the advice of a wine guides and ‘wine critics’ or being a traditional 
consumer and sticking to one’s old habit and drinking the same old ‘good’ wine 
over and over again. This basic uncertainty plaguing our aesthetic judgments 
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and freedom of choice has contributed to the weakening position of French 
wine industry in the global market with a lot of new wine lovers. The practice 
of branding and offering a limited number of wines with a predictable outcome 
and little surprise more typical of the wine producers of the New World seems 
to be the winning concept in wine markets, especially with new consumers 
in the increasingly global wine market (with the exception of very high-status 
wines; Karpik 2010: 145).
This same dilemma which plagues Karpik’s wine drinkers and which he 
describes so elegantly does not leave other consumers in peace either, at least 
if we are to believe other theoreticians of modern consumption. In the words 
of Colin Campbell (1987), the modern consumer is a hedonist who can never 
be satisfied, always expecting eagerly and impatiently for something new and 
better to come. Gerhard Schulze’s (1992) characterization of the modern soci-
ety as ‘Erlebnisgesellschaft,’ a society of inner experiences, captures the same 
dilemma of principal quality uncertainty. If consumption is not about the sat-
isfaction of one’s simple needs as much as about the search for new exciting 
experiences, it becomes difficult, if not almost impossible, to judge whether one 
has succeeded in making the optimal choices.
Critics and guides are by no means the only market devices identified and 
analyzed by Karpik. According to him (Karpik 2010: 44–49), there are five 
principal judgment devices, which cover a wide variety of cases:
1. personal networks;
2. appellations like quality labels, professional titles, product brands;
3. cicerones, critics or guides that offer evaluations of singularities;
4. rankings;
5. confluences or techniques that channel buyers to make the “right” choices 
(cf. organization of shelves etc. in a shopping mall.)
Strictly speaking, one can question whether Karpik’s last device, confluences, 
really counts as a judgment device; these are all based on judgments of taste 
of either a bigger and anonymous group of laymen or the narrower circle of 
experts. Confluences are, on the contrary, an external technique, arrangement, 
or technical procedure that guides—as if naturally and almost unnoticed—the 
customer to select the right way through a supermarket and bring him or her to 
the right objects to buy. People are not really asked to use their own judgment 
but rather expected, like a mouse in a maze, to follow the route constructed in 
advance by the marketing experts. Such technical devices have become more 
recently one of the favorite objects of study in behavioral economics, referred to 
as nudging, in its well-intended efforts to help people choose wisely but without 
too much effort, for instance, in terms of sustainability or health (see Sunstein 
& Thaler 2008). There is no doubt that, as their advocates claim, confluences 
can be of service to other than purely commercial purposes. Personal net-
works, or more concretely advice and recommendations from one’s personal 
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associates, peers or acquaintances, are in a sense at the other end of devices 
compared to confluences. They are particularly common in evaluating and 
selecting personal services, such as legal advice or medical help, but can also 
guide one’s decisions in what to buy. They are a traditional—one could say an 
ancient—market device. Karpik does not develop his idea of personal networks 
further into the direction of more refined network analysis, but Podolny’s status 
markets could very well be regarded as an example of such regimes of coordi-
nation, which can be based on personal as well as impersonal networks. They 
can include also organizations such as other firms.
Karpik’s second device in the list, appellations, such as quality labels, profes-
sional titles, or product brands, are signs and guarantees of quality, and effec-
tive as such, if taken seriously by those concerned. In the last instance, they 
are based on the more or less professional judgments of experts of one kind 
or another and, in this sense, they come close to cicerones, critics, or guide-
books that offer their evaluations of singularities. Compared to these, however, 
they give more straightforward and simplified advice regarding what to buy 
by compressing the complicated quality review into one easily read symbol or 
number. Rankings, in their turn, can also be compiled by professional or semi-
professional critics, but in Karpik’s examples, they are typically based either 
directly on sales statistics or customers’ opinions.
All these devices, even in the case when the result is condensed into a simple 
chart like the top ten or twenty lists of music or an award like ‘the book of the 
year’ or ‘Nobel Prize Winner,’ are based on the consumers’, critics’, or other kind 
of experts’ judgments of taste. As such, they cannot be justified by referring 
to some objective standards or criteria of the relative goodness of the goods 
or services. As Velthuis has shown in his analysis of the primary art market, 
some rules of thumb or, as he calls them, standard scripts are regularly used 
in simplifying the process of reducing the multidimensionality of the object 
and unifying the process of evaluation. In their study of the Dutch book mar-
kets, Franssen and Velthuis (2016: 366) discovered that the publishers rely on 
genre as a judgment device in pricing their products. The books in higher and 
more prestigious genres are as a rule published in a bigger format. They can be 
priced higher because consumers expect bigger books to be more expensive. 
The presumed higher quality of some genres is reflected in higher prices but 
interestingly, this takes place via the quite concrete and visible materiality of the 
products (Franssen and Velthuis 2016: 378).
In some cases, which we shall discuss in more detail later on, the devices 
undoubtedly leave quite limited autonomy to the consumer, for instance, the 
reader of books or the viewer of movies, and it looks as though they have, in 
fact, delegated their judgment power to experts, critics, or the like, or even mar-
keting offices. But even in such cases, they do not oblige anyone to follow their 
advice or example. Rankings, in their turn, are based on the choices of the taste 
of numerous anonymous equals. Therefore, they seem to crystallize, almost 
mystically, the myriad of individual tastes into a single, common, or, if you like, 
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mass taste, reminiscent of the cultural power of the anonymous masses that 
worried many aristocratic critics of modern culture. The ‘tyranny of fashion,’ 
which many cultivated citizens feared, is typically such a mass phenomenon.
Quality labels differ from the labels of environmentally friendly products 
(green or sustainable). In both cases, the individual consumer is plagued by a 
principal quality uncertainty but whereas the environmentally friendly or sus-
tainable products can, at least in principle, be distinguished using some objec-
tive technical criteria, the first ones, quality labels, usually presume the exercise 
of judgment of taste.6 Judgment is an art of doing that which one learns by 
practice and not decision making following a logical process of reasoning using 
definite criteria of goodness. The subjective nature of judgments does not, how-
ever, mean that one could not give good reasons for one’s choices or challenge 
others’. After all, one does dispute over matters of taste quite often. But just as 
importantly, judgment devices do guide, and to some degree even bind, the 
individual’s choices if they are taken seriously by smaller of bigger groups of 
people. The degree of freedom left to the individual actor, say reader or viewer, 
or wine or music lover, varies from one field of consumption to another, one 
group of consumers to another. The recommendations of guidebooks or best-
seller lists can be taken more seriously, with a greater degree of a critical dis-
tance, or with a skeptical attitude. Not everyone has to take them for granted or 
seriously. It is enough if at least some do. In this respect, they can be compared 
with art or literary reviews published in journals or newspapers.
Citation indexes of scientific articles and impact factors widely used in the 
world of universities today are a good example of market devices (Karpik 2011). 
They regularly count citations and impact points of scientific publications in 
ranking scientific papers, academic researchers, and scientific institutions; 
these offer a good example of the functioning and use of market devices as 
well as some of the problems involved. As Espeland and Sauder (2007) showed 
in their interesting empirical study on the ranking of American law schools 
by quantifying the distinctions, which are always principally qualitative, the 
rankings and indexes often tend to magnify rather minor and as such rather 
unimportant differences. This is typical in such pseudo-markets as research 
and education where rankings of universities and citation indexes have become 
standard tools of operation. It gives quite a different impression to say, for 
instance, according to such and such criteria, the research output of a univer-
sity is slightly better than that of another university’s than to claim that they 
occupy, say, the 7th versus the 15th position in the list of the national or inter-
national university ranking. It is equally problematic that such rankings tend to 
direct the market actors, producers as well as consumers, into certain, predes-
tined paths, thus standardizing their products. This can often be dysfunctional 
from the point of view of some other, more important or fundamental goals 
of the institutions or organizations in question, like creativity and freedom of 
thought in the academia. As Karpik pointed out, it is almost paradoxical that 
devices used in evaluating scientific output and academic performance tend 
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to be less advanced than, for instance, Michelin restaurant guides or Harper’s 
Wine Trade Guide, which give a more nuanced and sensitive evaluation of the 
quality of their goods and services, taking their multidimensionality and qual-
ity uncertainty more seriously into account.
The relatively new devices of evaluating academic performance concretely 
prove how they constitute a new kind of a market for science and research. 
The new academic pseudo-markets offer a radically different mechanism than 
the old collegial bodies at the universities and scientific institutions which 
consisted of one’s peers with their primarily ‘connoisseurial’ evaluations. As 
the evaluation of research and universities shows, market devices can also be 
highly disputed and not at all recognized by all actors involved in the market. 
If this were the case in a private market of consumer goods, it would either be 
dysfunctional and threaten the stability of the market or lead to the voluntary 
exclusion of some dissidents or market segments out of the particular market 
and possibly to the establishment of new kind of markets. The segmentation 
of movie markets into art films and popular entertainment offers a classical 
example. Since the market of scientific papers or academic teaching is in most 
countries dominated by one financial actor, the ministry of education, it can 
dictate any market device it prefers to use in evaluating the productivity of its 
input. This can lead to a situation in which some market actors, in this case 
individual researchers or university teachers, do not recognize the legitimacy of 
this institution and can try to preserve or create other, competing devices. The 
at least partially successful attempt at making the quality assessment of wines 
more scientific and objective, initiated after the Second World War in the Cali-
fornian wine industry and which quite explicitly aimed at standardizing wine 
tasting and judgments of quality by demanding that they should take place 
under strictly controlled, laboratory-like conditions—the standardization of 
the vocabulary for describing the experience of tasting was an essential part of 
this process—is a good example of a similar development of standardization 
in a market dominated by private economic actors (Shapin 2016 and Phillips 
2016). The scientification of wine tasting was successful partly because the wine 
producers had an interest in better regulating their mutual market relations and 
coping with international competition.
As one can easily see, Anand’s and Peterson’s (2000: 270) market informa-
tion regimes are similar to Karpik’s market devices. They have the same func-
tion in reducing quality uncertainty and creating order in a market. They do 
not, however, refer to the singularity of the products—musical recordings in 
their case—nor to their principal quality uncertainty. They also do not prob-
lematize the nature and role of the judgments of quality. In addition, they look 
at the markets more from the point of view of suppliers who are in need of 
market information in order to refine their market strategies and coordinate 
their actions; they studied musical recordings recorded historically in two dif-
ferent ways. Without explicitly referring to the problem of the constitution of 
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markets, Anand and Peterson pose the question about the processes through 
which an aggregation of organizations comes ‘to constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life.’ According to them,
competitive organizations need to reduce uncertainty about market. 
… In order to reduce market uncertainty, organizations make sense of 
their markets not only by generalizing from their direct experience of it, 
but also by relying on information on ‘market’ activity. While it is often 
convenient for field participants to presume that the field is given by 
nature …We assume that cognition of markets occurs through the gen-
eration, distribution, and interpretation of a web of information about 
activity in the market (Anand & Peterson 2000: 271).
To Anand and Peterson, market information is the prime source by which 
producers in competitive fields make sense of their actions and those of their 
consumers, rivals, and suppliers that make up the market (Anand & Peter-
son 2000: 271). In their opinion, all information regimes have three basic 
characteristics: ‘First, they provide the attention focus for an organizational 
field. Second, they essentially serve to help participants make sense of market 
activity within the field. Finally, market information regimes are socially and 
politically constructed and are hence fraught with biases and assumptions that 
are largely taken for granted’ (Anand & Peterson 2000: 271). They are social 
constructions, and could as such, in principle, be otherwise. Therefore Anand 
and Peterson refer to the process of the constitution of information regimes 
as political.
In their empirical study, they analyze an interesting and well-established 
market information regime that has been decisive for a long time in organiz-
ing the market for musical recordings. More precisely, their historical example 
concerns the development of charts about top-selling recorded music. Whereas 
Billboard’s charts combined, in one ranking, several independent components 
including radio airplay, jukebox plays, and recorded sales, the new SoundScan 
charts (introduced in the 1980s) are counted directly from cash register sales 
(Anand & Peterson 2000: 275). Therefore, these two charts differ radically in 
their source and type of information: whereas the respondents to the old panel 
survey were asked to check ‘top,’ ‘strong,’ and ‘good’ sellers, ‘SoundScan gathers 
absolute figures on sales, that is, a precise count of actual number of units sold 
at retail outlets linked to the system. SoundScan could provide a wider range of 
detailed information’ (Anand & Peterson 2000: 279). Nevertheless, they fulfill 
essentially the same function. However, the difference between these charts was 
not only technical because they did in fact produce slightly different results, for 
instance as far as the popularity of country music and the career of new albums 
in the lists was concerned, and had a visible impact on the strategies of the 
market actors, producers, and sellers of recordings.
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Regimes of market coordination
Karpik’s analysis of the constitution of the markets of singularities is quite 
advanced. He distinguishes four regimes of market coordination, which in their 
turn are founded on one or several market devices presented before (Karpik 
2010: 131–179). These market coordínation regimes are 1) the authenticity 
regime; 2) the mega regime; 3) the expert opinion regime; and 4) the common 
opinion regime.
The following six quite extensive and detailed characteristics define the 
authenticity regime:
1) a large diversity of product names and tastes as well as of consumers’ 
tastes or logics of action, along with the threats rising from an opaque 
market; 2) the central position occupied by substantial impersonal judg-
ment devices acting through competitive struggles and whose credible 
knowledge will orient consumers’ action all the more because they pos-
sess a high degree of symbolic authority; 3) the active presence of trust/
belief, which is all the more necessary for consumer choice and market 
continuity because knowledge should be credible; 4) varied forms of 
adjustment, which express the various forms of encounter between the 
tastes proposed by the devices, the tastes of the products, and the forms 
of consumer commitment; 5) a pervasive model of originality that reveals 
its presence, within financial constraints, mainly by the primacy of qual-
ity competition over price competition and by the relative adequacy of 
the regime components; 6) the diversity of the efficiency of the coordina-
tion regime according to the effectiveness of the judgment devices, con-
sumer competence, and forms of commitment (Karpik 2010: 146–147).
The markets of art films and vintage wines are typical examples of the authen-
ticity regime. The classical case of authentic and unique art works falls under 
this regime too, but it is one example among others. Some of the goods sold can 
be rare, some reproduced in greater numbers, and some can be quite unique, 
such as individual paintings or other works of art (Karpik 2010: 135). In all 
cases, ‘concrete markets in the authenticity regime are defined by the exacting 
encounter of the products’ and clients’ tastes, mediated by the tastes conveyed 
by the judgement devices’ (Karpik 2010: 135). The market of fine wines, with 
its highly developed and established wine guides and critics—which had a real 
boom in the 1970s and 1980s—is a textbook example of a market in authen-
ticity regime. At the same time this market, as well as the parallel market of 
fine dining, reveals the paradoxical nature of such guides. Because of being 
an extreme example, the fine-wine guides, in Karpik’s opinion, in addition to 
being rather well-known in their basic features, clearly show the characteristics 
and problems typical of authenticity regimes even more generally. They can, in 
fact, be seen in other regimes too.
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Mega regimes are next on Karpik’s list. They differ from authenticity regimes 
in many respects. Films with expensive production value with wide distribution 
and bestsellers of all kinds—books, discs, etc.—are typical in mega regimes. 
Cultural prizes and nominations, like the best book of the year or this year’s 
newcomer, or simply the top sales figures, ‘everyone has seen or read it,’ help 
to create order of quality in them. In common opinion regimes, in many ways 
similar to mega regimes, top 10 or top 20 record charts or book lists direct the 
ordinary listener’s or reader’s taste towards the same choices and preferences.
The different regimes can operate effectively in markets that differ radically 
from each other as far as the target of evaluation, the size of the market, its 
profit orientation, and the main or basic principle of action are concerned. 
Markets with authenticity regimes operate with specific products; they are as 
a rule relatively small, aim at moderate profits, and are inspired by the logic of 
originality. Quality competition dominates over price competition, as we have 
seen in the case of primary art markets. Mega regimes also operate with specific 
products and are elevated by the logic of originality. Their markets are large and 
aim at high and fast profits. Furthermore, massive use of market tools, massive 
budgets of marketing, and advertising leave little room for viewer or reader 
autonomy. The expert opinion regime operates with rankings of products of the 
same kind and not simply by evaluating specific, individual products; markets 
tend to be small and they aim at moderate profit. The spirit of these markets is 
expert logic. Typically in these markets, very small differences are magnified by 
being transformed into differences in rank. A part—often a large part—of the 
budget is targeted to financing the competition itself.
Finally, the common opinion regime operates with rankings (typically best-
seller lists) in large markets, meaning high profits, and it is elevated by the 
logic of conformity. It is the most simple of all the four coordination regimes: 
one man—or rather: one purchase—one vote. Popular music or TV program 
competitions where listeners or viewers can ‘vote’ for their favorite by calling 
a number are only a slightly less direct or commercial way or expressing one’s 
opinion than simply buying the product (one has often to pay for one’s call 
and vote).
As these examples show, coordination regimes operate with their market 
devices in a wide variety of markets, both small and big. They constitute these 
markets, which could hardly operate at all without them. In practice, many mar-
kets of singularities are hybrids consisting of two or more coordination regimes. 
In some cases it can also be a question of two or more separate markets in the 
same field of art or culture, each of which operates with its one coordination 
regime. Such is the case, for instance, in film industry where the art film market 
largely follows the authenticity and expert regimes, whereas the popular movie 
markets follow the mega regime. The introduction and wide spread of the inter-
net in the world of consumption offers new technical devices, for example in 
creating a common opinion among laypersons, experts, or both in no time at 
all. They include much wider potential audiences and other customers than ever 
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before, but in principle, they operate with the same market devices as before. 
A restaurant evaluation based on the professional judgment of experts on the 
internet or the points of quality (or stars) given by thousands of customers in, 
say, a trip advisor can complete and compete with each other, but they are both 
variants of well-tested and historically firmly established judgment devices. 
Nevertheless, they do give an instantaneous ‘voice’ to ordinary consumers as 
is most clearly the case with blogs that, by offering advice and opinions of taste 
on a wide variety of topics, sometimes compete successfully with professional 
critics and trendsetters and can challenge their ‘verdicts.’
Although the regimes of coordination discussed briefly above all operate 
with impersonal devices, personal devices play an important role in many 
markets, as Karpik (2010: 181–202) has also shown. They are typical in the 
markets of professional services. Karpik divides these each into two groups: 
network regimes and professional coordination regimes. Personal networks, 
which spread information and opinions of taste by word of mouth are an old 
type of regime that has operated as long as some markets of goods or services 
have existed. In the age of the internet, however, they tend to become bigger 
and more anonymous. Personal networks are quite essential in more compli-
cated and professional personal services, such as those of lawyers,7 medical 
doctors, and dentists, among others. A patient or a client cannot possibly be 
certain about the difference in the quality of the services of two equally quali-
fied medical doctors or attorneys of law. The best alternative is often to follow 
the advice of one’s personal networks or make the choice by paying attention 
to such rather secondary factors as the pleasant appearance, the nice office in 
a good location, or the kind behavior of the person who sells these services. 
The other alternative to coordinate personal services, the opinion of the profes-
sional experts, results from the unequal distribution of knowledge and power 
between professionals and lay consumers. The role of the professionals is in 
the last instance based on trust in their superior knowledge and the presumed 
impartiality of their professional opinion that has traditionally stemmed from 
their dedication to the common good and guaranteed by the control of their 
peers (cf. the Hippocratic oath in the medical profession). As Karpik points out, 
an institution of professional opinion has both a public and a private variant. 
The public variant follows from the legally regulated position of a civil serv-
ant or their organizations, such as the public and professional administration 
of health care. The second, private instance, non-governmental professional 
organizations, such as the union of advocates or the society of the doctors of 
medicine, can also exercise quality control and distribute information about 
the services of their members.
By no means belittling the importance of these kinds of coordination regimes 
based on personal networks and the practical economic and theoretical impor-
tance of these economic markets, for the sake of simplifying the task, the fol-
lowing chapter will concentrate on the social mechanisms behind the regimes 
in the markets coordinated by impersonal devices. As we have seen, Karpik 
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describes in detail the character and functioning of his market devices and 
regimes of coordination and, in addition, draws interesting conclusions about 
their effects on the market performance or orientation of the economic actors. 
He does not, however, extensively discuss and analyze the social mechanisms 
that lie behind these devices and regimes and that first make them possible at 
all. After all, what are the social mechanisms that make the buyers and custom-
ers ready to orient their actions according to the advice or opinion offered by 
the devices that constitute the coordination regimes and make the economic 
markets of singularities possible, as if presumed to be ‘natural facts’? Or how do 
the opinion leaders and trendsetters come to share a common taste? In the end, 
this question amounts to how a common taste is distilled in a modern society 
from the myriad of individual tastes.
Market regimes and the price formation
The market regimes and formations of taste obviously have an impact on the 
formation of prices. For instance, contrary to standard markets, in status mar-
kets increasing prices can lead to increasing demand, and not vice versa. The 
high price can, for instance, become a sign of higher status and quality, but 
not vice versa. The peculiar structure of monetary rewards observable in the 
entertainment business and professional sports, such as football and ice hockey, 
in which some top actors or players can earn a hundred times more than their 
less fortunate colleagues, offer another good example of the effect of the qual-
ity uncertainty on prices (Karpik 2010: 221; Adler 1985). It is indeed difficult 
to think that the differences in their talents and the quality of their perfor-
mances would be a direct match to their exceptionally high salaries or rewards. 
Their quality is thought to be high because they earn a lot, and not vice versa. 
These preliminary conclusions concerning price formation to be drawn from 
the analyses of the specific markets are interesting and important; one can also 
draw some more general conclusions or formulate some theorems of the impact 
on price formation of the market devices in various market regimes. In general, 
one could claim that the markets characterized by one or another type of quality 
uncertainty tend to be monopolistic. The application of market devices makes 
their products to a lesser or greater degree non-substitutable or at least restricts 
or limits their substitution. If only one single firm had the exclusive right to sell 
their products, it would have a complete monopoly on the market. However, 
even then some customers could perhaps switch to competitors’ somewhat dif-
ferent but ‘close enough’ products. It depends on how similar and substitutable 
the products are in the minds of the consumers and on their relative prices.
In some cases, a producer or a couple of them may enjoy an almost perfect 
monopolistic position in the markets of singularities, when, for instance, only 
their goods happen to be in fashion. In the case of the fashion industry, the 
exclusive position does not usually last long and comes to an end once the 
100 Deciphering Markets and Money
competitors learn to imitate the new fashion, gradually turning the market into 
something resembling a standard market, until a new fashion emerges. The 
demand for fashionable clothes, as well as their prices, tend to be constantly 
fluctuating. In the market of fine wines in France, the same producers can keep 
up their leading position for a long time, partly guaranteed by formal and in 
some cases legal regulations. However, even they face potential competition 
from those below them on the quality scale, and they cannot raise their prices 
indefinitely. Typically, in many markets of singularities, their price structure 
is skewed, with a limited amount of ‘best’ or high-quality—according to the 
standards of taste prevalent in the market—products sold for prices that are 
remarkably higher than those of other products. Small differences in quality 
can lead to big price differences.
In the mega or popular taste regimes, the market share of the most popular or 
‘best’ products is very big, and the great majority of firms sell only a few or no 
items at all. This is typical in book and film markets as well as in the markets of 
recorded music, or in general in the markets of relatively cheaply reproducible 
cultural products. These markets tend to have ‘long-tails’ (Anderson 2007); fol-
lowing an increasing variety of products, the great majority of the goods sells 
very little or hardly anything at all, creating a loss for their producers, who must 
have, in order to gain profits, at least some bestsellers among their products 
or popular artists or authors in their stable. Even though the search machines 
of the internet have made it possible for their potential buyers better to find 
previously unknown products or small producers, and in some cases they can 
even raise them from their almost total anonymity into fame and commercial 
success, this presumes the operation of market devices, as in any market of 
singularities, in creating a common taste. It does not necessarily flatten out the 
peaks and shorten the tail of these markets in any remarkable degree, either. 
New winners can emerge more rapidly and old ones ‘die out’, but the ‘winner 
takes it all.’
A modern standard textbook on microeconomics formulates in general 
terms, without referring to the kind of reasoning presented in this work, the 
situation that can be interpreted to face a firm in a typical market of singulari-
ties or, for that matter, in status markets (cf. Fligstein 2001 and Podolny 2005) 
with their quality differences and consequent tendency to product differentia-
tion as monopolistic competition:
If a firm is making a profit selling a product in an industry, and other 
firms are not allowed to perfectly reproduce that product, they still may 
find it profitable to enter that industry and produce a similar but distinc-
tive product. Economists refer to this phenomenon as product differen-
tiation—each firm attempts to differentiate its product from other firms 
in the industry. The more successful it is at differentiating its product 
from other firms selling similar products, the more monopoly power 
it has—that is, less elastic is the demand curve for the product. … An 
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industry structure such as that described above shares elements of both 
competition and monopoly; it is therefore referred to as monopolistic 
competition (Varian 2002: 454).
According to the author,
the industry structure is monopolistic in that each firm faces a down-
ward-sloping demand curve for its product. It therefore has some market 
power in the sense that it can set its own price, rather than passively ac-
cept the market price as does a competitive firm. On the other hand the 
firms must compete for customers in terms of both price and the kinds 
of products they sell. Furthermore, there are no restrictions against new 
firms entering into a monopolistically competitive industry. In these as-
pects the industry is like a competitive industry (Varian 2002: 454).
Technically one can say that the steepness of the demand curve facing a firm 
depends on its elasticity. Typically, the demand curves of the market of singulari-
ties in general are less elastic than in the standard markets, but it is difficult to say 
anything more general regarding their price formation that would be common 
to them all or even most of them (Varian 2002: 454). Markets of singularities 
should therefore be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and distinguished accord-
ing to, in addition to their size and degree of centralization, the market devices 
and market regimes that are constitutive to each of them. Thus, economic mar-
kets can and should be studied not only as concrete historical cases, which differ 
from one case to another, nor as instances of the same market. Economic soci-
ology can, by finding important common features in their constitution, apply 
theoretical concepts and draw some more general conclusions about their price 
formation as well. In many markets it is not primarily or exclusively the relative 
market position of the firm that decides its prices but the social mechanism of 
the formation of the collective taste. The market position of a firm, the substitut-
ability of its products, and the elasticity of its demand curve depends directly 
on the market devices in use. If, for some reason, these devices or the market 
regimes are transformed into others (for instance from the authenticity regime 
to the common opinion regime), they can alter the relative market position of 
the firms. The case of wine guides and the evaluation of quality of wines offers 
again an illuminating example. The ‘scientification’ of the Californian qual-
ity system after the Second World War constituted, for the first time, a quality 
market of North American wines, just as the regionalization and the follow-
ing system of chateau and vintage wines had done some decades ago in France, 
changing their pricing.8 To take another earlier example, the change from the 
Billboard charts to the new system based directly on record sales, altered the 
market competition—even if not drastically—in the American music business.
Taking into account the importance of the market devices and market 
regimes, one could imagine that firms would often actively try to influence the 
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construction and use of these devices. A detailed historical study of their estab-
lishment and transformation is therefore very important. On the other hand, 
not all markets of singularities rely on such market devices; they do not explain 
how they succeed in guiding the formation of a common taste. They also rely 
on social formations, fashion, social worlds, and fields of culture, which are not 
as organized as some devices are. Individual fashion markets differ greatly from 
each other, for instance, as far as the length of the fashion cycles or the number 
and relative share of the fashion leaders in the respective markets is concerned. 
Social worlds and social fields can be more or less hierarchically ordered, and 
their expert groups and ‘taste setters’ can be smaller or bigger, which can have 
an impact on the price structure in the related market. One could easily go 
on with these examples about the specificity of the markets of singularities. 
One can agree with Varian that ‘monopolistic competition is probably the most 
prevalent form of industry structure’ as well as with his conclusion that ‘it is 
also the most difficult to analyze. … It is unreasonable to model a monopo-
listically competitive industry in the abstract, as we have done in the simple 
cases of pure competition and pure monopoly’ (Varian 2002: 454). He recom-
mends, therefore, that one should always examine the institutional details of 
the particular industry under consideration. Varian sees, in a way common to 
economics, the decisive institutional factors causing variation in the models of 
the monopolistic competitive industry in terms of ‘the specific details of the 
products and technology, as well as on the nature of the strategic choices avail-
able to the firms’ (Varian 2002: 454). His advice to analyze different kinds of 
market institutions in detail is certainly worth following. However, one should 
add, following the example set by the sociologists of markets, that one should 
not take into account only the natural or technical properties of the goods or 
analyze the strategic choices available to the firm, but also emphasize the role 
of the social mechanisms of the formation of consumers’ taste and preferences.
As the above discussion has shown, one does not necessarily have to face the 
opposite alternatives of either relying on abstract economic theory—with its 
models often alien to reality—or on concrete historical descriptions of different 
kinds of markets and their historical development in the spirit of the German 
historical school of economics. Just as Max Weber suggested, there is a third 
way open to economic sociology to conceptualize and classify systematically 
various kinds of markets, thereby making both the peculiarities and the com-
monalities of their functioning better understood. In doing this, the system-
atic institutional analyses of markets should pay attention both to the relative 
weight of the producers in the market as well as to the social constitution of 
taste as well as the quality and relative worth of its products and services.
In neoclassical economics, individual preferences are usually taken for 
granted. For the purposes of economic analysis, the social processes that give 
shape and transform the taste of the consumers and their individual prefer-
ences are often regarded as irrelevant or as less important. They are exogenous 
factors, not in need of analysis and explanation. In his Accounting for Tastes, 
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Gary S. Becker (1996) develops, as an alternative to standard economics, a 
utility function that takes seriously into account the endogeneity of the pref-
erences. Becker’s main postulate is that ‘economy also affects tastes regarding 
goods, leisure, and other activities. In other words, preference both influence 
economic outcomes and are in turn influenced by the economy’ (Becker 1996: 
18). His new utility function takes into account a person’s ‘total stock of human 
capital,’ consisting of both personal and social capital, that both influence the 
economic processes and are affected by them. Preferences are not stable and 
independent but change with time (personal capital). A person’s social con-
tacts and relations (social capital) can have a decisive impact on them. To put it 
simply, both the historical trajectory of consumption of all kinds of goods and 
services, cultural and educational included, as well as the social networks of the 
consumers are important in understanding their preferences. Becker’s idea of 
the different types of capital resembles Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) less formalized 
but sociologically more advanced theory of the interplay of the cultural distinc-
tions of taste and social differences, as well as Bourdieu’s idea of the accumu-
lation of the three forms of capital, cultural, economic, and social, in which 
status competition plays an important role. In contrast to the approach of this 
work, Becker pays attention primarily to the social determination of individual 
taste and not to the formation of a socially shared, common taste as well as the 
distinctions of taste in between social groups, which is the basic question in 
understanding the social constitution of economic markets.

CHAPTER 5
The Three Social Formations of Taste in 
Economic Markets
Fashion
One can claim that there are, in addition to traditions, three main social mech-
anisms of the formation of common—socially shared—tastes. These mecha-
nisms or social formations are 1) fashion, 2) social worlds, and 3) fields of 
culture. Using the terminology common in economic sociology, one could say 
that they are concrete examples of the social embeddedness of markets, each 
of them having their own dynamics and more or less extensive coverage. In 
each case, we have also access to a rather developed sociological theory, which 
explains its basic mechanism and functions. The sociology of fashion was devel-
oped by Georg Simmel (1957), the social worlds by Howard Becker (1982), 
David Unruh (1979, 1980) and Anselm Strauss (1972, 1982, and 1983). Pierre 
Bourdieu (1984) presented a comprehensive theory of cultural fields. They all 
share with Karpik—more explicitly in the case of Simmel and Bourdieu and 
more implicitly in the case of Becker and others—the fundamental idea that 
the judgment of taste is the key to understanding these kinds of social forma-
tions. Following Lyotard’s (1988) famous metaphor, they can be characterized, 
in contrast to traditional and normatively stronger regulated communities, as 
‘a cloud of community.’ The idea of social worlds and cultural fields resemble 
each other in many respects, but theoretically, as far as their basic presumptions 
are concerned, their perspectives also differ from each other. Before discussing 
in more detail which mechanism of taste formation is active in which market 
regime, let us first present the basic concepts and characteristics of these three 
social mechanisms.
Fashion comes to one’s mind easily in this context since the ‘mystery’—the 
sudden emergence and disappearance of new models and designs—of fashion 
consists of the creation of a common taste, which, however fleeting, ephem-
eral, and changing over time it ever might be, offers a common standard of 
taste that guides and binds the individual consumers at any one time, at least 
to some degree. Thus it solves the problem of quality uncertainty in its own 
way. It is generally known that fashion is functional to capitalist economy by 
creating and keeping up demand for ever new commodities by ‘artificially’ age-
ing them. Its economic function, of ‘artificially’ ageing otherwise quite useful 
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clothes, does not really explain the social mechanism that makes it possible and 
keeps it going. A fashion does not serve any practical purpose. It stands beyond 
practical reason (Tokarzewska 2010: 143). Something else could just as well be 
in fashion. There is no particular reason why this or that style or design should 
be in fashion instead of another one. It just happens to be in fashion. In other 
words, fashion is not instrumental. It is a pure question of taste, and as such an 
aesthetic phenomenon (Gronow 1996).
The world of fashion is like a play world (Gofman 2015: 39–41). There are no 
objective criteria or standards why some design is better than something else. 
The breadth of the trousers’ legs, the size of buttons, the color of a shirt, shoes 
with a short or long point, do not after all make any ‘real’ difference. The only 
reason why something feels like the right and, often only, alternative is simply 
that it happens to be in fashion right now. Its novelty is what makes it appeal-
ing to consumers. It is simply experienced to be beautiful and stylish, until it 
becomes outdated and something different and completely new takes its place. 
Furthermore, there is no natural continuity from one fashion to another: the 
fashion of tomorrow does not follow according to some rules from the fashion 
of today. They cannot be deduced from one another, nor can their transforma-
tion and development be predicted. Despite its frivolous nature, fashion obliges 
us to behave in a certain way, just as one’s peers or everyone else does. As such, 
it is more or less socially binding but less compulsory than normative regula-
tion still creating order in social life.
The economic functionality of fashion does not explain how it comes into 
being and which social forces keep it going. According to Simmel, fashion is 
the result of two simultaneous and mutually opposing socio-psychological 
forces that alternate with one another: the human drive to be one with one’s 
social group, or part of a social whole, by imitating others, and the need to be 
different and unique, to distinguish oneself from others. In fashion these two 
instincts alternate eternally with each other. Fashion operates predominantly 
in the modern differentiated and individualized society where stronger tradi-
tional ties that bind people with their social groups have lost much of their hold 
on their members. Fashion is a relatively harmless way of both distinguishing 
oneself from others and merging with one’s social group. With its help, mod-
ern men and women can both express their individuality, in however modest 
a way, as well as be at one with others without having to choose either one or 
the other, A fully fledged fashion is also an essential companion to the modern 
world and an important part of the world of the exchange of commodities in a 
developed, market economy.1 It is a phenomenon of modernity par excellence 
and teaches us, as Simmel thought, in a relatively harmless manner how to live 
in the modern world where nothing is stable and eternal but everything is in a 
state of constant change (cf. Esposito 2011).
The social mechanism of fashion does not, by any means, limit itself to the 
garment industry and clothing markets, even though clothing fashion is a pri-
mary example of fashion, with its long history, firm institutions, and regularly 
The Three Social Formations of  Taste in Economic Markets 107
repeating fashion cycles. These fashion markets consist of a huge amount of 
fashion professionals, from designers and trendsetters to fashion journalists 
and marketing experts. They have their own market devices and trendsetters. 
Fashion cycles can be identified in a wide variety of markets of consumption 
goods, from private cars and PCs to food and drinks (Djelic & Airamo 2005). 
Car producers, for instance, regularly introduce their new models in interna-
tional car shows each year. The novelties concern the car design just as much as 
technical inventions. However, despite serious attempts, it has been difficult to 
introduce seasonal or annual fashion cycles and planned obsolescence in many 
consumer goods markets, such as home electronics and other durables. Some 
novelties represent not only changes of fashion but real innovations. They are 
here to stay, becoming firmly established components of all the goods in their 
market (Gronow 2009).
According to Simmel’s classical formulation, fashion can operate in any field 
of culture where things could just as well be thought to be otherwise, in other 
words, where there are no technical or objective standards or reasons of good-
ness. This shows its close proximity to Karpik’s markets of singularities. As Sim-
mel (1957) claimed, holy things and rituals cannot become fashionable, since 
the believers cannot possibly think that they could be radically different. Their 
quality uncertainty is therefore less accentuated or almost nonexistent. Objec-
tive standards of goodness, with or without procedural devices, can effectively 
restrict the operation of fashion in a market of goods. However, more or less 
highlighted and regular, as well as more or less rapid, fashion cycles can be 
identified in all kinds of consumer goods markets, their differences depending 
on their nature: In some markets nothing restricts the free and rapid change of 
fashion, in others technical standards of goodness—or technical testing—can 
dominate the preferences. In some markets, again, choices are made following 
well-established customs or traditions, in a habitual manner, which leaves little 
place for novelties. In such markets, the value of the goods traded can be tradi-
tionally established and relatively stable leaving little place for abrupt changes 
and, consequently, for the ‘frivolousness’ of fashion. In their turn, some mar-
kets consist of mass-produced goods with relatively simple standards of evalu-
ation that do not usually face any significant problems. Also in these markets, 
cyclical fluctuations of fashion can take place, even though often in a more 
moderate and less accentuated manner.
It is an interesting question: To what extent is fashion operative in Karpik’s 
market regimes, and in which regimes in particular? What is its relation to 
market devices? Or should one rather claim that fashion is a market coordina-
tion regime on its own? It is obvious that as a mechanism forming or promot-
ing the formation of a collective taste, it fulfills the same function of market 
coordination as Karpik’s market devices by establishing an order of relative 
worth of singular objects that are plagued by their principal quality uncertainty. 
Although Karpik’s regimes always operate with specific market devices, which 
in some cases resemble technical instruments with their tools of measurement 
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(sales statistics, charts, etc.), fashion presents a pure case of the spontaneous 
formation of a ‘common sense’ without the help of any such ‘technical,’ or for 
that matter connoisseurial, devices and in that sense offers another perspective 
on the constitution of the markets of singularities. Fashion is a pure mass phe-
nomenon and in many ways, fashion markets resemble Karpik’s public opinion 
regime. The mega regime of mass movies is also a typical fashion regime with 
its own system of fashion promoters. The movie seen at its premiere or dur-
ing the first week of its release offers a different experience and is a different 
product from the one seen several weeks later, not to mention its release on TV 
(Surdam 2015: 230). Many fields of regularly operating fashion, most notably 
clothing, take refuge to all kinds of devices too. For instance, fashion magazines 
and TV programs, with their journalists and commentators or critics, give reg-
ular advice regarding how to dress fashionably, contributing to the formation of 
a collective taste. Big producers and distributors of fashion are good at aggres-
sive marketing and advertising. Even if important or powerful economic actors 
can manipulate the consumers and leave them very little space for effective 
choice, they have no other reason to promote a particular design over another 
other than that they, or their own fashion experts and promoters, have chosen 
it as the fashion of the year or season. Before the decision to start its production 
was made, it could just as well have been otherwise because there is no objec-
tive way of deciding its goodness and worth. A good example of the fact that 
common taste can also take shape—at least partially—without any devices are 
the annual novelties and regular fashion cycles in the first names given to new-
born babies, which mostly lacks guides, critics, or any real marketing devices 
(Lieberson & Bell 1992; Gerhards 2003).2 It is a field of culture but not a market 
of its own.
Social worlds
Social worlds are the second candidate for the social formation of a common 
taste. The idea of social worlds was developed among social interactionists in 
the 1970s. It is best known from Howard Becker’s Art Worlds (1982). Becker’s 
seminal work offers a very broad concept of the social world of art that com-
prises, or conceptualizes, the whole social and cultural institute of art—in its 
various levels and forms and with its various actors, producers, middle-men, 
critics, art historians, public, and consumers. In its extensiveness, Becker’s social 
world of art comes in fact quite close to Bourdieu’s idea of the field of art (Bot-
tero & Crossley 2011). However, the social world perspective developed by 
Unruh and others is more limited. The main idea behind this perspective of cul-
tural study, both in its broader and narrower versions, is the following: A social 
world, whatever it might be in any concrete case, is a separate part of social 
reality, relatively autonomous from other social worlds or institutions and the 
rest of the society. It has its own rules of conduct as well as standards of worth 
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and goodness or taste. As with fashion, it does not serve any external goals. 
In other words, it is a play world, like a game. Although the original theoreti-
cians of the social worlds did not explicitly refer to their aesthetic nature, they 
resemble fashion in the sense of not being instrumental or fulfilling any external 
goals. These worlds operate according to their own rules, but these rules cannot 
normally—at least not completely—be explicated in the form of any definite 
standards of conduct in a guidebook, nor can their performance be objectively 
measured. In other words, they rely on the judgment power and tacit knowledge 
of their participants. A game of sports is a typical example of a social world the 
rules and standards of which are valid and relevant only in the game for those 
who voluntarily agree to follow them. Once the game is over, and the players 
‘return to reality,’ they become completely meaningless. A game of sports has 
formal rules determining how to win the game. But despite the fact that the 
winner can often be chosen simply by counting points or goals, the best player 
is not necessarily the one who scores best. The graceful and skillful performance 
factors in as well. This is always something that is up to the judgment of taste. In 
this sense, children’s play worlds or fantasy games are an even better example of 
social worlds. They do not usually follow any strict rules and exist only as long 
as the players of the game take their roles in the play for granted and play along. 
Any player can stand up and remind others that this is not ‘really real,’—thus 
spoiling the fun of the play for all the others or at least for themselves. As long as 
they all play along, the world is real enough.
Paraphrasing Kant, one can say that social worlds share the form of pur-
posefulness without serving any purpose. They are typical examples of a self- 
purposive social activity having an end in themselves. Good examples of social 
worlds are, in addition to sports, easily found among all kinds of hobbies or 
other kinds of voluntary free time activities. A social world is always constituted 
by a core activity, which determines what belongs to and is relevant in the par-
ticular world. In addition, there exists a set of mostly implicit or, at times, explicit 
rules that tell what is the right way of ‘playing the game’ as well as who is best in 
reaching its goals, the winner of the game, or the best performer. A social world 
does not have to be competitive but still shares some good performance. Con-
sequently, by intensive training and exercise, one can become more competent 
or qualified in the world. Some worlds can be extremely complicated, allowing 
for a lot of virtuosity and mastery; others can be more simple (Gronow 2004).
Sport fishing is a good example of a social world in its own right (see Ditton 
et al. 1992).3 Not just any kind of fishing is recognized in a particular sport fish-
ing community; however, consider fly-fishing, for example, in a particular type 
of natural stream or rapids, which demands a lot of skill and exercise with a 
special kind of equipment. One can develop one’s skills by practice and repeti-
tion. The relative worth of the catch can vary and does not exclusively depend 
on the size and type of the fish caught but also on the ‘beauty’ of the catch, 
where and how it was caught, such as after a long and heavy fight. Some sport 
fishing social worlds follow the rule of catch and release, which emphasizes its 
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non-instrumentality as a pure hobby, an activity that has an end in itself and 
does not serve any external purpose. It is not submitted to any other social 
world, like gourmet cooking and dining either. It is of course possible that there 
are persons who are members in both social worlds, fishing and cooking, in 
which case their activities may overlap or exist peacefully side by side. Con-
ceptually they should, however, be kept separate. All kinds of collectors’ worlds 
(stamps, irons, paintings, old cars, hockey player cards, coins, etc.; cf. Belk 
1995) are good examples of social worlds. They have both their own socially 
constructed standards of goodness and worth as well as a core activity of their 
own that can be completely irrelevant, or even ridiculous, to outsiders. Lovers 
of pets of all kinds can also constitute a social world whenever they share the 
same ideals of breeding and training the animals or concentrate their interest 
in the cultivation of a peculiar breed. Many cultural activities that unite some 
group, be it small or big, of people, such as amateur painting or theatre, card or 
computer games, can also be conceptualized and analyzed along the lines of a 
social world.
A social world always has three types of participants, the absolute and rela-
tive size of which can vary from one case to another:
1. insiders or experts who by their more advanced example and knowledge 
determine and keep up the ‘rules of the game’ and its standards of worth;
2. regulars who participate in the social world repeatedly following the 
example of the insiders and by doing so legitimate the world and keep it 
going; and
3. tourists, or occasional visitors, who mostly come out of curiosity, stay a 
while, and then leave the world, from among whom the regulars and, in 
the end, insiders are recruited.
As already stated, a social world can be big or small; it can have a long history or 
disappear quite soon after its establishment. They are non-profit organizations 
and their members are either not rewarded for their services with money, or at 
least monetary awards do not play a decisive motivating role. They are expected 
voluntarily to give their input to the world—in some cases demanding a lot of 
effort and time, in others just minimal. A certain degree of serious involvement 
is also expected from the participants. In some cases, all kinds of economic 
activities can develop around the core activities of a social world, and they can 
even come to represent remarkable financial assets and interests. Many big-
ger and well-established social worlds can, for instance, have a special journal 
or guidebooks dedicated to their own hobby. Daily newspapers can regularly 
report on their activities. Special shops and service centers can serve the rather 
specific needs of their members. As a consequence, some insiders can make 
their hobby into a profession by becoming coaches, trainers, critics, or guides, 
or open a special boutique or workshop, exercise handicraft, and so on. As long 
as these economic activities remain on the sidelines, only serve or assist the 
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main activity, and do not interfere with it by changing the main orientation or 
play-like nature of the activity, they do not threaten the principal character of 
the hobby world as a social world (cf. the often rather thin and obscure line that 
separates amateur from professional sports). It is also likely that the bigger the 
attraction of a social world and the more tourists it attracts, the more likely is it 
that it gives rise to commercial activities inspired and closely associated with it.
Social worlds are obviously relevant to the question of the constitution of eco-
nomic markets only in case they give rise to economic activities, services, and 
goods to be sold and bought, but they can also serve as an interesting case of the 
importance of taste formation to the coordination of social activities in general. 
The same question can be asked about the social worlds as about fashion: are 
they regimes of coordination or are they also in need of or dependent on market 
devices? As formations of collective taste, they make a market regime possible, 
but at the same time, they are not simply market devices that are instrumental in 
producing a socially shared taste. They are themselves constituted by a common 
taste, based on imitation and competition. Each social world does have a specific 
and autonomous order of worth, which typically both determines what belongs 
to it and what does not, as well as reduces or even abolishes uncertainty concern-
ing the quality of its objects and services. Although the same objects or services 
might have an economic value and a price outside the social world, this is no 
substitute for their quality and value inside the social world. Many collectors’ 
worlds offer good examples of this. A specific, first-day stamp or a misprint does 
not make a stamp any better or more valuable from the point of view of its offi-
cial use as a stamp on an envelope to be sent by mail. Quite on the contrary, the 
stamp could be invalid because it is already used or a misprint. Among a specific 
social collectors’ world—which appreciates such rare stamps and misprints—
they can be priced extremely high. They are rare and valuable only among the 
particular social world which determines—explicitly or implicitly—its own 
standards of worth. Such objects may sometimes have a high price and be attrac-
tive to outsiders, ordinary investors, if they have a rather extensive, stable market 
as well as more or less objective prices that are expected to go up in the future. 
This presumes, however, that the social world is, like the many art worlds ana-
lyzed by Howard Becker (1982), well established, firmly institutionalized, and 
quite stable, with many insiders and open to outsiders. To take a completely 
different kind of an example from a social world that can have remarkably high 
economic value as well, an owner of a rapid with wild trout might charge high 
prices to fishermen fishing in it. The fish and the rapid is highly valuable only 
because this particular social world values it highly. Although the fish might 
have some economic value when sold on the market for food, and this would be 
an alternative way of realizing the economic investments in the water and land, 
it would probably be less profitable than sport fishing, which seldom seriously 
taxes the fish stock of the river. One and the same product can therefore live a 
double life in two separate worlds, as ordinary objects of consumption and as 
rare and highly specific objects of collection or admiration.
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Many smaller, less attractive, or more closed social worlds have very little 
or no economic relevance at all, and consequently their core activity and the 
objects and services related to them have no real, fixed market price. Their eco-
nomic value and price could also be higher in their simultaneous capacity as 
ordinary objects of use. For instance, old cars can be members in two separate 
markets at the same time, the market of ordinary secondhand cars and the 
collectors’ market of vintage cars. The price of the same good changes when it 
makes a move from one market into the other. As soon as a vintage car becomes 
clearly more sought after and expensive in the collectors’ market, it tends to dis-
appears from the standard market. This explains the fact that at one point of its 
history the price of a secondhand car can start to rise again, after falling steadily 
for years or even decades. This can be connected to it getting rare—most of its 
‘contemporaries’ have faced the natural fate of extermination—but it enjoys a 
new demand and a higher value only because it is a specific item appreciated in 
a specific collectors’ hobby world.
Social worlds can be bigger and smaller, local and global, loosely organized 
or closer to formal organizations. They die out and come into being. They can 
also be differentiated and form new social worlds, even sub-worlds, when some 
members choose from among the core items valued in a world some smaller 
sub-category or develop a new variation of the old, for example start collect-
ing and appreciating all stamps of a certain state printed before World War I, 
or stamps with some specific topic, like warships, or invent some separate but 
related and in some respects similar collectors’ item, like matchboxes, labels of 
beer bottles, candy boxes, and so on.
Social worlds can operate both in the authenticity regime, with its relatively 
small markets, specific core products and logic of originality or authenticity, 
and in the expert opinion regimes, when the insiders of a social world act either 
as informal and anonymous or as formal trendsetters. As in the social forma-
tion of fashion, social worlds often make use of the market devices described 
by Karpik, such as reviews, ratings, and prizes. Since tastes in the world of fash-
ion and in the social worlds can only be internalized and spread though learn-
ing, imitation, and socialization in general, they are, out of necessity, always 
dependent on personal, familiar, or anonymous networks even when they do 
not rely—or rely only to a smaller degree—on formal or impersonal devices. 
Understood in this broad sense, these social networks are not a substitute for 
Karpik’s devices but rather help to clarify the process of the collective taste 
formation and what the various kinds of social mechanism are that mediate it.
Fields of culture
The third and last candidate for the explanation of the social formations and 
mechanism that gives rise to a common taste, thus reducing quality uncer-
tainty, are social fields of art and culture analyzed by Pierre Bourdieu in several 
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of his extensive empirical and historical studies, most notably in the Distinc-
tion (1984). Bourdieu’s Rules of Art (1995a) is particularly relevant work for 
our purposes because it describes in detail the birth and constitution of a field 
of art, that of classical French novels. Cultural fields are united with the other 
two candidates, as well as with Karpik’s market devices and regimes, through 
the question of taste. As Bourdieu (1984: 56) explicitly stated, taste—judgment 
of taste, which makes distinctions—is all that we are, in relation to others, to 
the world of goods and services and to ourselves. Taste is to Bourdieu, just as 
it is to Karpik and Simmel, an aesthetic phenomenon. He adopts his concept 
of aesthetic taste, as opposed to sensual taste, directly from Immanuel Kant’s 
Third Critique, at the same time revealing its ‘real’ nature, which, in Bourdieu’s 
mind, only hides behind its seeming disinterestedness the interests of a social 
class, that of the ruling class of the society. In order for it to work effectively in a 
field of culture legitimating good taste, the persons involved must be convinced 
that they do not by any means act for any selfish motives but for the sake of 
pure art alone, only promoting good taste in the best interests of humankind, 
for the common good. The conscious imitation of the taste of one’s superiors in 
order to achieve higher esteem and elevate one’s social status never works and 
only shows the real character or vulgarity of the person in question, as is the 
case typically among the nouveau riche or the parvenus. How one can explain 
that something, or some actions, are at the same time totally disinterested while 
serving the particular interests of the power of a social class is an intriguing 
question that Bourdieu (1984) explicitly raised. However, his answer was not 
very convincing.
Bourdieu’s fields of culture (1983) share with the social worlds the idea that 
they are constituted by a core activity, be it writing and reading novels or poems, 
painting and appreciating paintings, or composing, performing, and listening 
to a certain kind of music. To Bourdieu, the academic world is also typically a 
field of culture of its own, with its own standards of goodness, types of capital, 
and status hierarchies (Bourdieu 1988). He postulates a homological relation-
ship between the tastes of the producers and consumers, those active and inter-
ested on popular or commercial art on the one hand and those in high-brow 
culture on the other. A field emerges when a domain of culture gains autonomy 
from the general public by developing and educating its own experts of taste 
(Fourcade 2007: 1023). Furthermore, just like social worlds, these fields always 
share a set of—mostly tacit—rules that define what is authentic and original in 
the field, what belongs to it, what does not, what the standards of goodness are, 
and the worth applied in it. It is essential both to Bourdieu’s and Karpik’s rea-
soning that judgments of taste cannot be reduced to any explicit standards or 
rules, typical of classical aesthetics, such as the harmony of the form, the colors 
or sounds, or the golden ratio, but result from the exercise of the aesthetic sense 
of beauty alone, claiming universal validity and, in Bourdieu’s case, legitimacy. 
That which is good and worthwhile in any particular field of art or social world 
is learned by practice and by imitating others, one’s peers or more experienced 
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art lovers, until it turns into tacit knowledge, a natural and habitual part of the 
behavior of its practitioners.
Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural fields is distinguished from that of social 
worlds by his belief that all judgments of taste are only tokens in the game 
of status and power. The cultural elite or upper class of society cultivates and 
maintains the standards of beauty. With their authority and self-confidence, 
made possible by their superior cultural capital and social background, they 
set the rules in the game of cultural distinctions, which, again, guarantees that 
they keep up their higher status and will continue to stay in power. Their power 
consists essentially of the fact that they are in a privileged position to deter-
mine the rules of the game and the valid assets of cultural capital. But they are 
also dependent on the fact that other groups of society, those directly under 
them on the hierarchy in particular, recognize the legitimacy of their taste. The 
members of the elite know how to behave and appreciate culture in a proper 
way without effort. The other classes or groups of society can, at best, emulate 
them in order to raise their own social standing, but the taste of the cultural 
elite always tends to escape further by making ever more and finer distinctions. 
Alternatively, a new cultural vanguard or the aspiring middle classes can chal-
lenge them and set their own standards instead as the new legitimate standards 
of taste.
The superior position of the cultural elite comes from their higher cultural 
capital, which again can result from higher formal education or be inherited, 
learned at home, and accumulated during primary socialization. It often cor-
relates with economic capital but it is essential to Bourdieu’s reasoning that 
these two capital forms are separate from each other and can accordingly vary 
relatively independently from each other. In principle, it is always possible that 
some individuals or groups succeed in accumulating cultural capital of their 
own and can thereby become members of the cultural elite or that new aspiring 
social groups challenge the existing hierarchy of taste with their legitimate taste 
distinctions and establish their own taste as the new legitimate taste instead. 
The old elite can in its turn try to avoid or escape such competition by develop-
ing ever finer distinctions and cultivate their taste ever more, which can protect 
them from the threat that the emulation of the culturally lower groups poses 
to them. The social competition over legitimate taste can play a decisive role in 
the history of art and science, transforming the styles and standards of beauty 
and worth. It can also lead to radical changes in the social constitution of the 
cultural elites and ruling classes. However, it can never revolutionize the whole 
social order as such, which is as if doomed to stay hierarchical and competi-
tive, consisting always of a cultural elite, a middle class or classes, and a lower 
class, or the proletariat. The struggle over good or legitimate tastes comes to 
an end only in a completely egalitarian society where every member possesses 
as much cultural and economic capital as anyone else. Such a society is theo-
retically possible but hardly realizable in practice because it would also make 
all—or at least all hierarchical or status-related—cultural distinctions obsolete. 
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Bourdieu seemed to share with Nietzsche the idea that the struggle for power 
belongs to human nature and is an inherent and unavoidable constituent of any 
society (Rahkonen 2011). This idea resembles Simmel’s worry that leveling out 
of social and cultural differences would lead to the disappearance of spiritual 
nobility, or ‘Vornehmheit’ (Lichtblau 1984).
The fields of culture differ from social worlds at least in one important 
respect. Although a person can enjoy high status and exercise power within a 
particular social world, his or her power resource is not as a rule generalizable 
and valid outside this world. A collector of stamps may enjoy high esteem and 
reputation within his or her collective of stamp collectors, or at least within the 
specific group of the stamp collectors who share his or her taste, but he does 
not normally enjoy any extra status in the society at large. Most people could 
not care less about his or her peculiar hobby and remarkable achievements in 
cultivating it. The other members of his social world could, in their turn, very 
well keep them in extremely high esteem. It is certainly true that some well-
established and popular hobbies are more generally recognized also among the 
society at large, and sometimes even outsiders can admire the achievements of 
their experts and insiders. This is most probable in such cases which are active 
and open in demonstrating their activities and performances to the ‘world out-
side’ by publishing and sharing information, organizing exhibitions or shows, 
and the like. They can also have rather big economic markets attached to them, 
making them economically interesting even to non-members. Bourdieu’s 
cultural capital and higher status enjoyed within a particular field is, on the 
contrary, always generalizable in principle as symbolic capital, at least to some 
degree, thus guaranteeing a higher social status to its owner in the ‘bigger’ soci-
ety too. In Bourdieu’s theory, cultural capital and economic capital can usu-
ally be exchanged, as if following their own and constantly changing rate of 
exchange. High cultural capital, educational diplomas, cultural possessions, 
and other achievements as well as practical skills can be sold on the labor mar-
ket or commodity market for money. With enough economic capital, one can 
achieve, for instance, higher educational degrees and valued cultural posses-
sions, thus accumulating one’s own cultural capital. In some cases the ‘cultural 
capital’ accumulated within a social world can also be transferred into eco-
nomic assets, but this is not necessarily the case. Many social worlds are com-
pletely or almost completely non-commercial or even openly anti-commercial. 
What differentiates these two social formations, which otherwise resemble 
each other, is that Bourdieu’s cultural fields are typically well-established social 
institutions, such as art, literature, fashion, or sport. They have their own for-
mal educational and other cultural organizations and cultural mediators legiti-
mating them, often financed by the state, and they play an important role in 
the socialization of the cultural values of the citizens in general. As Bottero and 
Crossley (2011: 105) argued, resource and power inequalities are, just like in 
Bourdieu’s Distinction, crucial to Howard Becker’s account in his Art Worlds, 
the most extensive and in many ways exemplary work on modern culture from 
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the social world perspective. However, as they conclude, ‘he draws back from 
a “structural” analysis of them, preferring instead a looser focus on how social 
networks distribute such resources in social worlds.’ Another way of formulat-
ing it would be to say that Becker does not more systematically analyze how 
the status, achieved and accumulated in a social world of art, is transferrable 
to other social worlds or cultural institutions and valued in the society at large.
How does the concept of fields of culture, á la Bourdieu, relate to Karpik’s 
coordination regimes? At first glance, it would look like they are similar to the 
social worlds in helping to understand the workings of the authenticity and 
the expert opinion regimes. The cultural elite and the numerous cultural inter-
mediaries act as trendsetters, regularly using such cultural devices as reviews, 
diplomas, competitions, and prizes. This leaves Karpik’s two other regimes 
intact. As the public opinion regime is the regime of mass products and audi-
ence, it does not really fall into the frame of any hierarchically ordered cultural 
field. In it, the social mechanism of fashion can operate instead. Because eco-
nomic capital dominates the mega regime (in Bourdieu’s terminology they are 
not autonomous), leaving rather little room for genuine or spontaneous taste 
formation, this regime also falls largely outside the reach of the fields where 
cultural capital dominates.
If we take into account not only the more narrow view of autonomous cul-
tural fields and extend our analyses to comprise, in addition to cultural capital, 
heteronomous fields in which economic capital has a bigger or even dominat-
ing role, and if we pay attention to the following social differentiation and cul-
tural distinctions, the working of the mega regime becomes understandable 
too. It can be seen as a cultural market where economic factors dominate, both 
on the production side in the form of massive investments in marketing and 
advertising, and even more significantly, on the consumers’ side, making the 
sales figures the guarantee of the quality and success in the eyes of the ordinary 
consumers. In it, collective taste is dictated more or less directly by economic 
input and output, or commercial success in sales figures. Karpik’s (2010: 153–4) 
prime example of the functioning of a mega regime is the global marketing of 
such blockbusters, like Titanic, released on the very same day all over the world. 
Hundreds of thousands of people saw it during the very first weekend, before 
any reviews had been published in the press and before any word of mouth 
could be spread about its value. Its success was a self-fulfilling dynamic process, 
its popularity during the first weekend on release leading to ever more sales, 
convincing people that the movie is a ‘must’ because ‘everyone else has seen it.’ 
This does not mean that every film that is launched with a gigantic budget and 
as effective marketing as the film Titanic—the tactic has become standard in big 
and expensive Hollywood movies—succeeds in making profits. It is not all that 
easy to manipulate mass taste.
Many markets of culture are differentiated into ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ 
markets. For instance, the art film market is separate from popular movies, 
opera from musicals, belles-lettres from romance, detective stories, and other 
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popular genres, ‘haute couture’ from mass fashion, and so on. Their market 
devices and regimes of coordination differ and, even more importantly, so does 
their position in relation to the struggle over good and legitimate taste. In fact, 
the very differences in the social processes of the formation of their taste dis-
tinctions and common taste explain why the market regimes can differ quite 
radically and why there are two or more separate markets in most fields of 
culture instead of just one standard market.
Bourdieu has rather little to say about popular culture, and he concentrates 
his efforts in analyzing the taste distinctions and hierarchies as well cultural 
competition among the cultural elites as well as their potential challengers, the 
new middle class, the taste of which is always subordinate to the taste of the 
higher echelons of society. His theoretical framework can best be applied in 
analyzing markets of luxuries and ‘highbrow’ art, where objects signify high 
social status guaranteed by the legitimate taste of the cultural elites and experts 
of taste. In contrast to the old world of luxuries, typical of conspicuous con-
sumption best represented in the life style of the ‘nouveau riche’ (Veblen 1918), 
Bourdieu’s signs of status consist often of small and quite refined distinctions, 
often almost unrecognizable to an uninitiated observer and consumer. It looks 
like the members of the working class were not at all involved in the struggle 
for cultural distinctions and social status that goes on eternally elsewhere in 
the society. In other words, if this were the case, the members of the working 
class would not exercise any real judgment of aesthetic taste at all. Their taste 
is, according to Bourdieu, ‘natural,’ dictated by necessity. If we are to believe 
Bourdieu, the distinctions it makes are more quantitative than qualitative, more 
sensual than aesthetic: to them, more is better—heavy food, more wines, simple 
entertainment, and appreciation of realistic or romantic art, and the like. In eat-
ing and drinking, they satisfy simply their hunger and thirst, not reflecting on 
any more refined taste distinctions. However, it would be more reasonable to 
interpret Bourdieu’s analyses of the lower classes as pointing out that their taste 
is traditional and conventional with rather stable and less-refined distinctions. 
The analyses of the role and taste of the lower class is one of the less- developed 
sides of the picture of distinctions of taste, which Bourdieu other wise paints 
with such dedication, detail, and finesse. Therefore, he does not have much 
to offer in analyzing the workings of the common opinion regime either. This 
leaves fashion as the best candidate for the social formation backing the popu-
lar opinion regime if it is understood not as a part of the status struggle in a 
hierarchical society (cf. the trickle-down mechanism) but rather as a process of 
emulation taking place among anonymous and relatively homogeneous indi-
viduals, members of the broad middle class (cf. Tokarzewska 2010: 145).
It goes without saying that, for instance the social structure of a well- 
established world of fashion such as clothes fashion, with a long history and 
well-established organizations and institutions of its own, is hierarchical in the 
sense that it has both its own fashion gurus and leaders as well as professional 
experts, critiques, journalists, and promoters. They compete with each other 
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about the nominations of the best designs of the season as well as about their 
own status within the fashion world. As Bourdieu (1995b; see also Rocamora 
2002) has shown, the world of fashion design can successfully be analyzed as 
a cultural field of art just like any other, with all the mechanisms typical to it, 
and its sometimes quite radical stylistic changes and rivalries of taste resulting 
from the challenge posed by cultural vanguards. The purpose of pointing out 
the specificity of Karpik’s popular opinion regime and Simmel’s mass fashion 
alongside Bourdieu’s analyzes of the ‘haute couture’ is that the rapid and unpre-
dictable changes of taste of fashion, just like, for instance, the top ten records 
in the sales charts, cannot easily be understood resulting from more and finer 
distinctions due to the taste competition among aristocratic aesthetics, nor as 
radical cultural inventions of an artistic vanguard challenging the old legiti-
mate cultural taste. In emphasizing the central role of status struggles in the 
fields of culture, Bourdieu’s theory can obviously best be applied in analyzing 
the status markets discussed earlier in this study. As a matter of fact, it can be 
understood as the necessary bridge between the sociology of status markets 
and the sociology of market regimes in showing how they all are examples of 
social orders that rely on the judgment of taste.
Karpik extended the scope of singularities from their more classical under-
standing of the unique and authentic objects of art, recognized in the econom-
ics as an anomaly, to consist of all kinds of cultural products and services, as 
such extending them to cover wide enough economic markets. However, his 
approach covers a more limited amount of cultural products and fields than 
the one that begins with the various social formations of taste, fields of culture, 
fashion, and social worlds. As we have argued, social formations can function 
both behind market regimes and at the same time rely on various devices or 
exist on their own right, coordinating the taste of the market actors without the 
help of organized devices. This raises the question of the extension of the mar-
ket of singularities as well as its historical origins and future prospects. What 
is the relative size and economic importance of the markets of singularities 
understood in a broader sense? Obviously, there cannot be any straightforward, 
simple answer to this question. One cannot easily make any quantitative esti-
mates about their economic weight in general, either. What makes the question 
quite urgent is that one can wonder whether almost all modern economic mar-
kets of consumer goods—investment goods are a question of their own and are 
left outside the following discussion—do not, to a lesser or greater extent, share 
at least some of the characteristics of the market of singularities and, therefore, 
are in need of market devices or rely on some coordination regimes through 
one or several of the collective taste formations.
CHAPTER 6
The Aesthetization of Everyday 
Consumption
If we are to believe recent Zeitdiagnoses, the diagnoses of the modern culture 
of consumption, one could claim that quality uncertainty is the general rule 
rather than the exception. The following is a short outline of the basic ideas of 
three interesting and important Zeitdiagnoses, which all support the interpre-
tation that quality uncertainty—and the following need for the judgments of 
taste—is an essential feature of economic markets and modern consumption in 
general. Colin Campbell argued in his Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern 
Consumerism (1987) that the modern consumer is essentially a daydreamer, or 
a modern hedonist, who is mostly driven by his or her desires, which can never 
be satisfied, and who is after new, previously unexperienced and undiscovered 
pleasures. Gerhard Schulze (1992) suggested, closely resembling Campbell’s 
idea, that we live in a ‘Erlebnisgesellschaft,’ a society of inner experiences in 
which an individual consumer is permanently at odds with the interpretation 
and understanding of his or her own choices and experiences, never being cer-
tain whether his or her choices have been the optimal ones. In many ways, 
Schulze’s analyses comes very close to Karpik’s: they both share the basic pre-
sumption that modern consumption is always plagued by a principal quality 
uncertainty. Finally, the idea of the aesthetization of the world of consumption, 
here exemplified by Reckwitz’s (2013; cf. Welsch 1993) contribution, generally 
emphasizes the centrality of the aesthetic judgments of taste as the mechanism 
that increasingly helps orient the choices of the modern consumer.
Campbell traces the historical roots of his modern hedonistic consumer back 
to the history of ideas of the Romantic ethic, which developed gradually and 
at stages since the late Medieval and Early Modern times in Europe. However, 
Campbell’s real clue is the discovery that in its pure—or if you like ideal-typical 
form—the figure of the modern hedonist can be traced back to the religious doc-
trines of the Protestant sects, with their eternal and rather indeterminate longing 
for the heavenly bliss unreachable in their worldly existence. Campbell’s great 
achievement was to show how the very same Protestant ethic gave rise to two 
parallel and contrary ideational developments, both having an, as Weber would 
put it, elective affectivity, or ‘Wahlverwandschaft,’ with the spirit of modern capi-
talism; the one was related to the orientation of the modern capitalist, the other 
to that of the modern consumer. These two seemingly opposed dispositions are 
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Max Weber’s economic, instrumental rationality and the irrational and highly 
emotional Romantic spirit. From the very beginning, the modern individual had 
not one but two souls, one of the consumer, the other of the capitalist. From the 
point of view of this study, Campbell’s characterization of the modern consumer 
is interesting. In his opinion, they can never be satisfied, because they can never 
know for certain what they really desire, nor whether they have reached what 
they wanted. Compared to the previous analyses, Campbell locates the aesthe-
tization of consumption in the emerging mentality of the modern consumer 
more than in the amorphous or indeterminate character of the world of goods 
with its ever-increasing novelties. It is easy to see that these views are just the 
two sides of the same coin; without the first, the second would not exist, and vice 
versa. Campbell comes to identify the fundamental disposition of the modern 
consumer, without which modern capitalism would not be able to function. He 
is above all interested in explaining the dynamics of modern consumption, the 
eternal quest for novelties for the sake of novelties: Why are modern consumers 
willing and ready to consume always something new, unexperienced, the desire 
for which they cannot really even articulate?
Whereas Campbell’s modern consumer-hedonist can never be satisfied, 
Schulze’s (1992) can never be sure whether he or she has made the optimal 
choice among all the alternatives on offer. However, Schulze’s characterization 
of the orientation, the ‘Sinn’ or meaning of action, of the modern consumer 
living in the ‘Erlebnisgesellschaft’ is reminiscent of that of Campbell’s modern 
hedonist. As modern consumers, people long for genuine and authentic experi-
ences. The problem is that there is no way for an individual consumer to know 
if his or her experience is the real and authentic one and as good as anyone 
else’s. There is, after all, no external criteria or standards for how to evaluate 
the quality of one’s subjective experiences. In the end, the remedy that Schulze 
offers comes very close to Karpik’s idea of judgment devices. Almost paradoxi-
cally, a modern society of highly individualized consumers who are more or 
less free to make their own choices without any strong external restrictions 
or normative control exercised by the ballast of traditions (economic limita-
tions caused by the unequal distribution of wealth admitted) turns out to be 
populated by conformists. The spirit of conformism, and not of individualism, 
reigns in Schulze’s consumer society. The society of inner experiences is a mass 
society, after all.1
The reason for this inevitable ‘massification’ of the society is that the consum-
ers, left on their own, cannot possibly know how to judge the relative worth or 
value of the numerous goods, commodities, or services at their disposal in any 
market. To be on the safe side, they prefer to follow the example of their fellow 
consumers. This way they will at least know that they have not missed anything 
interesting and gratifying that others have enjoyed. A good example of this 
kind of behavior is that out of two—at least seemingly—quite similar restau-
rants on the same street, one can stay almost empty all evening while people 
are queuing constantly at the other. This comes close to the idea of Karpik’s 
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mega or popular regimes, where the fact that something is popular, preferred, 
and bought by millions is the best guarantee of its goodness, proving that it is 
absolutely worth buying and consuming. Orléan, inspired by the thinking of 
René Girard, characterizes the basic mechanism at work here as the mimetic 
principle of desire, which turns out to be cumulative:
Competition therefore exhibits a cumulative dynamic that is typical of 
mimetic behavior: the greater the attraction exerted by a given prod-
uct, the greater the number of buyers, with the result that the desire to 
acquire it is strengthened further and its popularity becomes still more 
widespread. … Once each member of a group imitates the majority 
preference, the sum of individual decisions ends up converging on a sin-
gle choice. In this case the system as a whole is both highly constrained 
and stable (Orléan 2014: 55).
The quest for novelties is an equally essential part of the soul of the modern 
consumer as imitation, but instead of being radically new, these novelties are 
often just variations of the old. Social conformism can explain why people often 
prefer to buy more of the same rather than experimenting with completely new 
items. This principle is apparent most notably in the popularity of TV series, 
film sequels, series magazines, and the like. Fashion cycles offer also a good 
example of the principle of safe novelties and their eternal return. In Schulze’s 
interpretation, seriality makes ideal objects of modern consumption: while 
being repetitive they simultaneously satisfy the desire for something new, even 
if the difference between the old and the new can be very small or almost unde-
tectable. This kind of experimenting with novelties is very cautious and takes 
place under restricted and controlled circumstances that do not allow for any 
real surprises. The winner of The X-Factor is a surprise, but the format of the 
competition stays reassuringly the same. There is absolutely no risk of facing 
suddenly something totally strange and ‘never-seen-before’ that one would not 
really know what to think about or how to relate.
It is easy to see that Schulze’s analyses of the market mechanisms that orient 
the modern consumer and guide the demand for consumption goods fulfill 
exactly the same function as Karpik’s market devices. One could in fact add the 
principle of seriality as a separate device to Karpik’s list of market devices. What 
makes Schulze’s analyses especially interesting is that he analyses the consumer, 
or demand, side with the devices widely used in marketing and compares them 
with the mechanism at work on the supply side. For instance, standardization, 
as well as diversification, is one of the instruments used by the producers to 
create a relatively stable market for their products. However, it is important to 
notice that modern consumers’ orientation or strategies (demand side) differ 
from those of the producers’, or sellers’ (supply side). Therefore, even though 
they have clear parallels, they are not completely reducible to each other (see 
Table 2).
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It is easy to see how the supply of novelties (producers) and the demand 
for variety (consumers) meet and presume each other on the consumer goods 
markets and how suggestion must turn into autosuggestion. Schematisa-
tion and profiling, typical strategies used on the supplier side, are met with 
abstraction and correspondence on the buyer’s side, helping both to identify 
and compare qualitatively different products and classifying them into distinc-
tive products groups or ‘genres.’ The success of the producer’s orientation—
‘suppliers’  satisfaction’—is easier to measure in quantitative terms (the amount 
of sales and profits), as is regularly done. Consumers’ success, or satisfaction, is 
much more difficult, if not almost impossible, to evaluate and measure, unless 
one takes the sales figures as the starting point here too.2
Both Campbell and Schulze presume that the modern hedonistic consumer 
differs radically from his or her predecessor, the traditional consumer. They 
seem to think, at least implicitly, that the traditional consumer oriented his 
behavior according to the simple formula of the satisfaction of their basic needs, 
such as hunger or sexual desire, which can in a normal case be gratified until 
they become saturated. Campbell’s traditional consumer just wanted more of 
the same, or in some cases simply hoarded more of the same, like a king’s treas-
ure cabin or a sultan’s harem. The modern consumer, on the contrary, is looking 
for and permanently faced with something new and previously unexperienced, 
on alert for the ‘authentic’ experience, just as they are for real love. This distinc-
tion between rather straightforward need satisfaction and the eternal quest for 
fulfillment of one’s inarticulate desires is reminiscent of Bourdieu’s distinction 
between the aesthetic taste, typical of the upper classes, and sensual taste or, as 
he calls it, the taste of necessity, typical of the working class.
It is typical of these Zeitdiagnoses that they postulate a rather strict difference 
either between historical periods or between social groups or classes represent-
ing the two basic types of orientations or dispositions in consumption habits, 
be it between the traditional versus the modern consumer, the society of needs 
versus the society of inner experiences, or the pure aesthetic versus sensual 









Source: Schulze 1992: 445.
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disposition of taste. There are, however, good reasons to question whether this 
kind of a traditional consumer society—or the working class, with its presum-
ably purely sensual needs—ever really existed and whether people have ever—
except perhaps under some extreme conditions of hardship—oriented their 
needs simply for food and nutrition in order to satisfy their hunger, and not, 
for instance, preferred certain kinds of food or dreamed of some kind of delica-
cies or rare ‘luxuries.’ Instead of historical stages or socioeconomic opposites, 
such conceptual distinctions should be understood as conceptual abstractions 
or ideal types. It would be more reasonable to argue that what differentiates 
societies or social groups from each other is their degree of traditionalism ver-
sus individualism, or the degree to which common norms and traditions, or 
even taboos, direct their taste dispositions and consumption patterns and to 
what degree they have become individualized facing the challenge of individ-
ual choice. In the course of increasing social differentiation, traditional norms 
and restrictions are often presumed to have become looser and more flexible 
alongside the gradual processes of detraditionalization and individualization 
or modernization (cf. Heelas et al. 1996; Wouters 2007). However, it cannot be 
denied that the limited assortment of the goods available in less developed, tra-
ditional markets or a life spent in a rather stable or only relatively slowly devel-
oping, natural economy effectively restricted the symbolic space of desires.
David Riesmann’s The Lonely Crowd (1950), which became a bestseller in the 
1950s in the United States and was soon translated into several languages, can 
be seen as an early version of these more recent diagnoses of cultural change. 
Riesmann discovered that the inner directed personality, exemplified by Max 
Weber’s rational capitalist or a worker dedicated to his profession, whose 
actions were directed as if by an inner compass pointing steadily towards the 
same direction or goal, had been replaced by the other directed personality, 
who was sensitive to the opinion of his peers and others and navigated as if 
guided by a radar, among his or her fellow citizens, sensitive to their expecta-
tions. Riesmann emphasized the changes that took place in work orientation 
and business life and less the role of modern consumerism in these develop-
ments, but he did not neglect them either. Both Riesmann and Schulze—not so 
clearly Campbell—localize the birth of the other directed and detraditional (or, 
as Campbell named them, modern hedonist) consumer in the consumer revo-
lution that started in the USA in the time between the great wars and spread to 
the more prosperous countries of Western Europe after the Second World War 
and, in a modified form, even to the Eastern European socialist countries. It 
is questionable whether it is at all possible to identify some kind of qualitative 
stages or clear ruptures in the development of the market economies since their 
establishment in the world centers after the opening up of world trade centu-
ries ago (Trentmann 2016) or whether it would make more sense to speak of 
a more gradual development towards increasing opulence and greater assort-
ment of consumer goods and services, creating room for previously unknown 
social practices, tastes, and pleasures. Increasing efforts in marketing, design, 
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and advertisement after the Second World War certainly helped to speed up 
the process, both by tempting the consumers with promises of happiness and 
good life and by the image building of goods and services, thus helping them 
find and even create a place of their own both in the everyday or more festive 
practices of the consumers.3
In his analyses, Reckwitz (2013), one of the more recent representatives of 
the mostly German discussion of the aesthetization of social and economic life, 
follows two parallel processes; the first characterizes the work and production 
process, the second the consumption. According to Reckwitz, the new spirit, 
or ideal orientation of modern work life, is creativity, which penetrates and 
permeates many professions as well as whole work organizations (cf. Florida’s 
2002 thesis of the creative cities and the creative class). The other side of the 
coin is the quest for authenticity (cf. Karpik’s authenticity regime) or authen-
tic experiences. These two trends run parallel to and support each other: the 
increasing efforts of the creative professionals aim at creating new, ever more 
authentic experiences. All kinds of cultural workers and their products belong 
to this group, without a doubt, but for Reckwitz, the new spirit extends it to a 
much broader impact (cf. Menger 2014). The borders between the products of 
culture in a more narrow sense and other, traditionally more straightforward 
or functional consumer goods, both durables and others, become blurred due 
to the increasing role of design and marketing in almost all branches of econ-
omy and consumption today. From the point of view of the present discussion, 
this means that almost all consumer goods and services become singularities 
and are ‘plagued’ by some degree of quality uncertainty, accompanied with an 
almost overwhelming flow of information and supply of alternatives. Lacking 
any objective standards of goodness or worth, one has either to rely on one’s 
subjective and therefore uncertain judgment of taste or to take refuge to some 
market devices offering at least some common guidelines in order to choose 
the best alternatives. This is as much the case in the markets of cars or cell 
phones as in the market of, say, milk, yogurt, bread, and potatoes, which all 
introduce novelties and numerous almost identical alternatives, with relatively 
small technical or substantive differences but with big promises.
Reckwitz (2013), as well as some other cultural diagnosticians, refer to these 
processes in general as the aesthetization of the society. In Reckwitz’s under-
standing, the aesthetically oriented action is opposed both to goal rational and 
normative action. He identifies the very same features of aesthetization in mod-
ern consumption, as opposed to instrumental and normative orientations, as 
Karpik, Campbell, Schulze, and others before him. Reckwitz, however, broad-
ens the scope of their cultural consequences. In the aesthetic orientation, ‘it is 
not important that the signs do not refer now to anything “real,” rather the play 
of signifiers (Signifikante), the fictionality of the production of meanings and 
the alternative worlds of narratives are in the foreground’ (Reckwitz 2013: 27). 
The artistic form of production has become the general model answering to the 
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demand for novelties, which are expected to be both interesting and surpris-
ing, both original and authentic. Aesthetization has gradually permeated the 
whole of society by spreading from the narrow field of art into the whole of the 
capitalist economy during the latter part of the 20th century, transforming it in 
fact into an aesthetic economy (Reckwitz 2013: 320). As Reckwitz hastens to 
add, however, these are ‘ideal typical’ concepts; in reality most situations and 
markets are a mix of all kinds of orientations and dispositions, including the 
ritualistic, religious, or artisanal.
Reckwitz (2013: 34–38) identifies five main agents that promote the aesthe-
tization of the modern economy: 1) the expansion of art; 2) the media revolu-
tion; 3) the aesthetization of the world of commodities (‘Capitalisation’); 4) the 
expansion of all kinds of objects through innovation, production and spread of 
artifacts; and 5) the subject-centered orientation. Innovative, in this context, 
means something more than the creation of technical novelties or more effec-
tive and functional artifacts. It refers to the innovation of something that is 
aesthetically new, or to the production of new kinds of signs, stimulating new 
sensual impressions and affects. The artistic activity has become the standard 
model for such creativity (Reckwitz 2013: 40). As Reckwitz summarizes it, ‘the 
objects on the market are mainly interesting as aesthetic objects. The regime of 
novelties becomes a regime of aesthetic innovation’ (Reckwitz 2013: 337).
In the same way as Karpik and Bourdieu, Reckwitz directly takes over the 
aesthetic taste as the third type of disposition that differs from and is opposite 
both to instrumental goal orientation and rule-governed, normative action. 
Even if Reckwitz does not take his analyses so far, his aesthetic realm is, in fact, 
the realm of the judgment power in between pure reason and practical reason, 
or science and moral, as analyzed in Kant’s third Critique. It stands for a ‘third 
realm,’ in contrast to the natural world of pure reason, and the normatively 
regulated world of social relations, in which practical reason reigns. This kind 
of Kantian conceptualization of the social relations has both its benefits and 
problems. The problematic side is that the aesthetic disposition easily becomes 
a residual category, something—and everything—that is not instrumentally 
oriented or normatively regulated. As such, the aesthetic world of consumption 
stands beyond natural needs and normative or traditional rules of conduct. 
The discourse of aesthetization runs parallel to that of individualization and 
detraditionalization (cf. Giddens 1991; Heelas et al. 1996; Beck 1992). Instead 
of a world of individual freedom and choice postulated in the economic theory 
exemplified by the ideal type of Homo oeconomicus, such aesthetic consum-
ers are by no means isolated individuals left on their own. They are socially 
oriented in their own way, as Karpik’s analyses of the constitution of the dif-
ferent market regimes concretely show. The guidelines offered by the various 
market devices or, for instance, by the social formation of fashion or social 
worlds, help to orient one’s actions and choices but also invites one to exercise 
one’s own judgment power. As such, they are at the same time socially binding 
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and freely give way to individual variation and diversity. They operate, just 
like Kant’s antinomy of taste, in the interplay between subjective judgments of 
taste and ‘common sense.’ Thus, it does really look like two parallel tendencies 
are observable in the social relations of modern capitalist societies: calculat-
ing rationalization, or scientification, and aesthetization, competing about the 
souls of modern men and women.
CHAPTER 7
Finance Capital and the New Financial 
Markets
Financialization of almost everything
Today, consumer goods markets are hardly ever standard markets consisting 
of homogenous, completely substitutable products and their producers from 
among which the consumers and buyers have no problem evaluating and 
choosing the one that best fits their needs, tastes, and other preferences. If 
we are to take the signs of the aesthetization of economy seriously, one has to 
analyze the constitution of economic markets, and not only those of cultural 
goods. Zuckerman’s study (1999) of the stock exchange offers an illuminating 
example of the use of judgment devices in a market that one would not at first 
glance think to be plagued by serious quality uncertainty. Zuckermann shows 
the important role of the securities analysts in a market that, according to the 
dominant academic perspective on the value of financial assets or shares, which 
take their price as the best estimate of their value, should be quite certain and 
unambiguous, according to the theory. Therefore, the stock market should 
not display the same problems as the markets of culture plagued by principal 
value uncertainty. In the financial markets, the market actors should be fully 
informed of the price of the product that is obvious and well-known to every-
one. The objects of trade in these markets are entitlements to future dividends 
of the underlying assets, the values of which can differ only quantitatively in 
monetary terms. However, as Zuckerman shows, this is far from the reality. 
Financial products are, if anything, affected by quality uncertainty typical of 
status consumer goods and singularities. Therefore, their markets are just as 
badly in need of market devices in the shape of the market analysts who, as 
a rule, do not base their judgments on any straightforward statistical calcula-
tions but more often use their own expert knowledge about the firms and their 
markets and, in the end, rely on their own informed judgment (cf. Davis 2009).
Financial markets admittedly differ from the markets of consumer goods in 
many ways as far as their sellers and buyers are concerned. They are investors’ 
markets, where the explicit goal of all the market actors is to make a profit, 
thus accumulating more capital. In Max Weber’s terminology, the meaning of 
the action of the economic actors in these markets is formal rationality under-
stood in terms of monetary accounting, and its goal measured as a quantitative 
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increase using capital accounting (‘Kapitalrechnung’), which is to Weber a spe-
cial case of money accounting typical of commodity markets in general. Dou-
ble bookkeeping of capitalist firms is the ideal typical case of capital accounting 
with its separate columns of debits and credits and the sum that remains ‘under 
the line.’ Because the objects of trade sold and bought in the financial markets 
are bonds or securities, and as such similar to one another, one could imagine 
that all that is expected from the participants is, in addition to having some 
initial capital at their disposal, that they have internalized the abstract logic and 
dynamics of the self-accumulation of capital.
The constitution of the capital markets, as well as modern capitalism in gen-
eral, was undoubtedly the result of a long and complex historical process, as 
Marx and Weber were well aware of. As we know, investors in financial markets 
do not simply trade money. The investors of financial, or as some would prefer 
call it ‘fictive,’ capital do not invest their capital in buying various means of 
production, labor power, raw materials, or machines. Instead, they buy and 
sell specific financial commodities, starting from loan contracts and bonds to 
all kinds of derivatives, options, and futures. A derivative is a financial secu-
rity, the value of which is derived from an underlying asset or group of assets, 
such as stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, and even market 
indexes. A future is a contract that allows its holder the right to buy a set of 
assets or raw materials at a pre-determined time in the future for a fixed price. 
Futures can normally be resold in the market and the capital invested in them 
realized at any time. These are social constructs, constructed with the help of 
specific mathematical models and market devices, effective as long as their con-
structed value is taken for granted by the market actors. What makes financial 
markets interesting is, in addition to their increasing importance in the global 
economy, the fact that hardly any of the rather newly established financial 
markets could exist and function at all without their specific and often highly 
technically elaborate market devices. Perhaps more than in any other kind of 
markets, cultural products analyzed by Karpik included, it makes sense to say 
that first market devices, judgmental or connoisseurial, as well as procedural or 
technical, constitute financial markets.
In 2007 Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift published an article with a char-
acteristic title: ‘The Capitalization of Almost Everything: The Future of Finance 
and Capitalism.’ They argued, using recent examples from the British economy, 
that financialization is essentially about capitalization through ‘securitization.’ 
Securitization is nothing new, but starting in the 1980s, almost everything 
could be used as a security, such as the future income of rent from council 
houses in UK. According to these authors, securitization is equal to the exercise 
of bundling up assets so that they will yield clear and defined income streams. 
In their example of council houses, this meant that the future income that con-
sisted of the rents that the inhabitants of these houses paid to the owners were 
used, after the privatization of the houses, as a security to raise capital with 
which the houses were bought. Or rather, they were bundled into bonds, which 
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were made attractive to the investors by an appeal to the guaranteed and steady 
flow of future income. By freeing the capital originally invested, they allowed 
the owners to buy ever more privatized apartment houses. Their source of prof-
its was ‘a system of aggregating ground rent into a mass’ (Leyshon & Thrift 
2007: 106). Initially, the assets produced through securitization were usually 
backed by protected future incomes and revenues from large corporations and 
governments. Now financial companies were chasing
new more closely defined asset classes of infrastructure including high-
ways, streets, roads, and bridges; mass transit, airports and airways; 
water supply and water resources; solid waste treatment and disposal; 
electric power generation and transmission; telecommunications; and 
hazardous waste management—and the combined systems that these 
elements comprise (Leyshon & Thrift 2007: 101).
An extreme example of securitization was the pop star David Bowie’s issu-
ance of 10-year bonds, to be paid from his anticipated future royalties (Davis 
2009: 56). Selling the bundled payoff policies from AIDS sufferers and elderly 
to investors can be mentioned as another creative, and in the opinion of many 
quite appalling, invention in financial markets (Davis 2009: 73). Financializa-
tion has not left the institutions of higher education intact either (Easton et al. 
2016). Leyshon and Thrift (2007: 104) talk, not without good reasons, about 
‘hypercapitalization’ in action.
According to Davis, another analyst of the rapidly growing financial markets, 
the basic function of financial intermediation changed fundamentally due to 
securitization, turning loans and other obligations into securities:
Mortgages, commercial loans, receivables, insurance payouts, and law-
suit settlements could all be turned into securities relatively cheaply; 
financial firms had a strong incentive to maintain the flow of new issu-
ances of these securities; and institutional investors around the world 
created a demand for them. A result was that the debt securities far out-
stripped the stock market in value (Davis 2009: 126–127).
Another recent and more notorious example of mass-scale securitization are 
the subprime mortgage-backed loans, which in 2007 caused the outbreak of 
the most severe financial crises since the Second World War. The specificity 
of these subprime loans was that they were high-risk loans with questionable 
securities backing them, launched by American financial institutions. The fed-
eral government supported them partly for political reasons in order to pro-
mote private home ownership among vulnerable and less well-to-do groups of 
the North American population. The novelty of these loans, and the cause of 
their vulnerability and final collapse, was that they were bundled together and 
sold as bonds in secondary financial markets with a promise of high dividends. 
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The complexity of these bonds, or bundled together assets in widely different 
categories of risks, meant that investors were not able to evaluate and measure 
their exposure to a particular asset. They were unable to analyze the ‘correlation 
structure’ of their portfolio (cf. Carruthers 2013: 541–242). According to Lang 
and Jagtliani (2010: 139), complex portfolios made it impossible to determine 
its subprime exposure in the CDO [collateral debt obligation] portfolio ‘with-
out looking through each of the bonds.’ Therefore, the complexity and the risk 
of the products was widely underestimated. However, according to the authors, 
some more cautious investors were not tempted by them and ‘some firms 
abstained from the mortgage-related CDO market precisely because it was 
impossible to reach back to the underlying assets’ (Lang & Jagtliani 2010: 141).
As Esposito (2010) explained it, the idea behind these new types of secu-
ritization was to subject bank loans and other assets to the ‘common law of 
liquidity’ by transforming them into negotiable instruments and then apply-
ing the principle of fair value (Esposito 2010). The ‘liquidification’ of capital 
through freeing it from any concrete asset categories allowed its owners more 
freedom to dispose of it and reinvest it. According to Esposito, the procedure is 
as follows: First, the originating bank bundles together a large number of loans, 
often several thousand, even up to tens of thousands, in the form of a pool that 
is transferred to a third party, a legal entity known as a special purpose vehi-
cle (SPV). The SPV then issues an asset-backed security (ABS), or a financial 
security having many of the same properties as a traditional bond. The SPV 
centrally processes the flows from the initial loans (interest and repayment a 
principal) and redirects them to the owners of the ABS. Any type of loan can 
be securitized in this way: mortgage loans, business loans, leveraged-buyout 
debt, consumer loans, credit-card overdrafts, and so on. Once repackaged, such 
assets are as a rule bought and sold by pension funds, insurance companies, and 
large corporations. They have ceased to be illiquid. (Esposito 2010: 260–261). 
However, this is only possible with the help of often quite complicated legal 
arrangements and mathematical-statistical instruments of calculation.
The extent of financialization, its forms and regulation by the state and the 
central banks, differs from country to country. For instance, USA and Germany 
are often presented as countries where the relations between banks and indus-
try are organized in different ways. However, many methods and instruments 
have quite rapidly spread throughout the world, making the financial markets 
global.1 In the USA, the growth and extent of financial capital during the last 
couple of decades before the last financial crisis 2007–2008 was quite spectacu-
lar. According to Johnson and Kwak (2010: 60), from 1980 to 2005, the financial 
sector grew from 3.5% to 5.9% of the US economy, measured by its contribu-
tion to GNP. Global financial assets grew from 12 trillion dollars, 120% of the 
global GDP in 1980, to 219 trillion dollars, 316 % of the global GDP in 2010 
(Dulta 2018: 2). Most of this growth was due to the increasing financialization 
of economy and not to the growth of traditional bank loans to firms. Corre-
spondingly, from 1980 to 2005, the financial sector profits grew by 800% while 
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non-financial sector profits grew by only 250% (both figures adjusted for infla-
tion; Johnson & Kwak 2010: 60). Although they plummeted again during the 
financial crisis, they recovered quickly afterwards.
There are several reasons that financialization, with new economic, technical, 
and legal innovations making it possible to securitize and financialize almost 
anything, has reached such new and high records in recent decades. Leyshon 
and Thrift (2007: 100–101) point out the following four reasons on the supply 
and demand sides: First, it is often cheaper for large borrowers to raise capital 
directly from the capital markets through securitization of their assets than to 
borrow from banks. Moreover, by securitizing their income streams by selling 
‘futures,’ the borrowers were able to realize these income streams early while at 
the same time externalizing at least some of risks (this was typically the case 
with subprime loans). In the capital markets, large institutional investors such 
as pension funds needed new investment targets and were able to diversify 
their portfolios by buying bonds based on securitized assets of various kinds. 
Finally, by facilitating securitization, banks were able to serve their clients while 
at the same time circumventing international banking regulations, such as cap-
ital adequacy requirements, that would otherwise limit the amount of money 
banks could advance in the form of loans. This was further encouraged by the 
slackening of the distinction that had previously separated commercial banks 
from savings banks.
Stockhammer’s extensive list of the causes that promoted financialization is, 
in many ways, similar to Leyshon’s and Thrift’s but includes several additional 
elements. According to him, financialization
covers a wide range of phenomena: the deregulation of the financial sec-
tor and the proliferation of new financial instruments, the liberalization 
of international capital flows and increasing instability on exchange rate 
markets, a shift to market-based financial systems, the emergence of in-
stitutional investors as major players in financial markets and the boom 
(and bust) asset markets, shareholder value orientation and changes in 
corporate governance (of non-financial business), increased access to 
credit by previously ‘underbanked’ groups and changes in the level of 
(real) interest rates (Stockhammer 2008: 184).
Stockhammer also refers to psychological changes and new ideological struc-
tures. The globalization of capital markets, as well as the transactions with 
exchange rates, can be added to the list: ‘international exchange rate arrange-
ments seem to be the key to understanding the accumulation and growth 
dynamics in the finance-dominated accumulation regime’ (Stockhammer 
2008: 184). On a more general level of international economic politics, Kripp-
ner (2011) argued that the financialization of the capitalist economy was a con-
sequence of the post-Bretton Woods deregulation of financial markets, which 
was a response to the increasingly difficult political task of allocating scarce 
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resources of capital to competing demands. Krippner argued that the slacken-
ing of financial regulation in the 1970s was a political response to the problems 
caused by the high rates of both inflation and unemployment, together with the 
slowing down of economic growth. The widespread belief in the effectiveness of 
the self- regulation of capital allocation through the markets made it look legiti-
mate: ‘in eliminating interest rate controls in the U.S. economy, policymakers 
hoped to pass the politically difficult task of allocating capital between compet-
ing social priorities to the market. Instead, policymakers inadvertently freed the 
expansion of credit from institutional constraints, avoiding the need for alloca-
tion altogether’ (Krippner 2011: 106; cf. Sulkunen’s [2015] similar conclusion 
about the causes of de-regulation in Norway).
Financialization is certainly nothing new in capitalism. Rudolf Hilferding’s 
Finance Capital, published in 1910, made clear some of the basic mechanisms 
of what he called finance capital:
I call bank capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually 
transformed in this way into industrial capital, finance capital. So far 
as its owners are concerned, it always retains the money form; it is in-
vested by them in the form of money capital, interest-bearing capital, 
and can always be withdrawn by them as money capital. But in reality 
the greater part of the capital so invested with the banks is transformed 
into industrial, productive capital (means of production and labour 
power) and is invested in the productive process. An ever-increasing 
proportion of the capital used in industry is finance capital, capital at 
the disposition of the banks which is used by the industrialists (Hilferd-
ing 1981: 225).
In Hilferding’s times, finance capital was still mainly in the hands of big banks, 
but he clearly figured out the essential nature of finance capital and its role 
in the capitalist economy. In addition to using old capital assets as a security 
to raise new capital, it makes capital liquid, in all forms easy to be realized as 
money. Shares, as well as many later and often highly technically complicated 
financial assets, can change owners, be sold and bought, without the transfer of 
any underlying ‘real’ assets, whatever they might be. In other words, property 
owners can liquidate their holdings whenever the need arises (Orléan 2014: 
209–210). Derivatives are a clear example. As Esposito formulated it, ‘one 
does not trade in goods—or assets, shares, or other units of finance. … The 
trade with derivatives is independent of the ownership of the basic assets and 
their value’ (2010: 183).2 In the end, there is no difference between money and 
capital while everything becomes liquid: ‘Everything will be homogenized in 
an abstract stream of money’ (Esposito 2010: 177). As a matter of fact, one 
of the main arguments in favor of the new instruments of financialization of 
capital is that, by making the capital markets more flexible, they promote capi-
tal movements directing investments into targets where the use of capital is 
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economically most effective, a claim that can be seriously questioned not least 
due to the repeated and serious financial crises.
To Hilferding (1981: 107–118), in addition to the growth of bank capital and 
its increasing importance, financialization had its origins in the establishment 
of joint-stock companies and in the demand of bigger capital investments due 
to the increasing share of fixed capital, invested in machines and real estate 
in industrial production, which tied up investors’ capital for a long time. The 
industrial loans that banks mediated to productive investments were a natural 
answer to this demand. They differed from old commercial loans, which were 
basically targeted to finance the circulation of commodities and to cover the 
time it took for a merchant to sell the commodities he had bought from a man-
ufacturer, allowing his stock to grow bigger and transactions more long-term. 
Typically, in addition to having the original industrial or commercial assets as 
their securities, both such loans and capital invested in stocks promise their 
owners or investors a rent or a share with a dividend that is independent of, or 
not straightforwardly related to, the amount of profits accrued to the capital 
invested in the production. The rate of profits or interest of this kind of ‘fictive’ 
capital varies according to the supply and demand of capital in the financial 
markets and is thus, at least partly, independent of the changes in the pro-
ductivity and the rate of profit of industrial capital. This is the basic feature 
that makes financial markets self-referential; that is, the prices depend on the 
mutual expectations of the economic actors whose basic source of informa-
tion are the fluctuations in the prices of bonds and shares. Financial markets 
are therefore more open to speculation by capital investors who sell and buy 
bigger amounts of shares or bonds depending only on their own price expec-
tations, reflecting the expectations as well as the concrete behavior of other 
investors. Both by their own behavior and by anticipating the future behavior 
of their competitors, they come to influence the prices allowing the speculators 
to make profits—or lose their money—from the price fluctuations as if out of 
the air.
In analyzing finance capital, Hilferding had, quite understandably, in mind 
the state of the financial markets of his times, that is bank capital and the stock 
exchange or capital invested in shares which, even though it allowed investors 
to make profits out of financial operations, was in the end invested in produc-
tive, industrial capital. Today finance capital more poignantly lives a life of its 
own. By doing so, it has also changed the workings of industrial economy. In 
her article ‘Making Sense of Financialization,’ Natascha van der Zwan (2014), 
in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, referred to the new challeng-
ing research tasks posed by the new finance capital: ‘A shift from industrial to 
finance capitalism … is a view of finance beyond its traditional role as pro-
vider of capital for the productive economy. Instead, studies of financialization 
interrogate how an increasingly autonomous realm of global finance has altered 
the underlying logics of industrial economy and the inner workings of demo-
cratic society’ (Zwan 2014: 99–100). Finance capital has become even more 
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autonomous and no longer serves, at least not in any straightforward manner, 
the needs of industrial or other investments.
In addition to the new and multiple forms of securitization through deriva-
tives, futures, and options, one of the novelties of modern finance capital is 
that it contributes increasingly to the financialization of the everyday life and 
the private economy of ordinary citizens. Home mortgage, consumer credit 
(credit cards), capital-funded pension plans, and other mass-marketed financial 
products—all unheard of in Hilferding’s time—are all essential parts of this pro-
cess (Zwan 2014: 111). As a consequence, ordinary citizens and consumers have 
become more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the financial markets (see e.g., 
Langley 2008; Harrington 2008; Hodson et al. 2014; Dixon & Sorsa 2009; Poppe 
et al. 2016). They are involved in the ‘financialization of almost anything’ (cf. 
Aalbers 2008: 151; Langley 2008: 139). According to Engel ‘since the late 1980s, 
the focus of futures trading clearly shifted from the realm of commodities to the 
financial world. This went along with a changing audience’ (2013: 564).
The ‘loan paper’ or credit contract is, as Hilferding wrote, an ‘Ertragstitel,’ a 
certificate that gives its owner a right to a profit that can be, to a great extent, 
independent of the activity of the ‘real’ economy or productive capital and the 
surplus value it produces. Marx wrote in his Capital that loan or bank capital 
makes the fetish character of capital perfect: it represents money, which gives 
birth to money as if out of nothing, thus making ‘the pious wish of a treas-
ure hunter true.’ Capital can now celebrate its holy annunciation. Loan capital 
seems to give birth to new capital totally independently of the productive pro-
cess, or the ‘real economy,’ as it is customarily referred to in today’s political 
parlance. At the same time, Marx interestingly thought that a relation of debt 
is transparent, in contrast to the capital relation between the capitalist and the 
wage worker. It is personal and confidential and therefore seems to have more 
similarities to the feudal relationship than to a wage labor–capital relation that 
effectively covers its exploitative nature behind the exchange of equals (Marx 
1973b: 392). However, this is not necessarily any more true of the new forms of 
financial capital. Large-scale financial transactions do not take place between 
concrete persons, and the rent income from capital often hides as effectively its 
real origins, as Marx thought of the origins of surplus value. The new deriva-
tives are obviously not based on personal trust or on trust between clearly iden-
tifiable economic actors or organizations, as common bank loans were in the 
old capitalism. Their ‘trustworthiness’ is guaranteed by more complicated and 
impersonal methods of rating that are mostly performed by special rating agen-
cies. Many studies see this very depersonalization of credits as one of the causes 
of the subprime mortgage crisis: the final, often international, investors who 
bought the bonds had no means of evaluating the trustworthiness and finan-
cial sustainability of all those original loan takers whose loans were bonded 
or bundled together as securities of the assets. As Kädtler summarized it, this 
new ‘perspective on financial markets is the original one … enabling inves-
tors to make investments in the financial markets without having to look what 
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companies really do … Calculable risk did exactly not rely on understanding 
or even looking on business strategies but on interpreting statistics’ (2011: 175).
In Hilferding’s times it was common to speak of real estate developers as 
promoters, or ‘Gründers,’ who bought and sold real estate actively speculating 
on their prices and financing their investments using their initial acquisitions 
as a security in order to be able to raise new loan capital to be invested in new 
real estate targets. Leyshon’s and Thrift’s (2007) example of securitization of 
privatized council houses that started this chapter fits perfectly into what Hil-
ferding and his contemporaries had in mind when talking about promoters. 
They could, with a rather small initial capital, end up owning or controlling 
a huge amount of financial assets invested in real estate, a system that worked 
out all right as long as the housing prices were on the rise and the land prop-
erty used as security preserved or increased its value due to the very activity 
of the developers. In the opposite case, the whole pyramid structure of owner-
ship threatened to collapse, as it often did in times of economic crises, when 
the house prices started to fall rapidly and the investors were forced to realize 
their assets for whatever price available. The same basic mechanism operates in 
other kinds of financial markets that, as we have seen, have become more com-
mon, diversified, and extensive.
Not everyone has seen financial speculators in housing or financial markets 
in the same light as Hilferding and many of his contemporaries did. As Engel 
interestingly pointed out, ‘until the 1920s, most economists had hardly a doubt 
that speculation would improve the functioning of markets and decrease tur-
bulence in prices. They considered futures markets to be the most highly devel-
oped and perfect form of markets’ (2013: 560). The modern economic doctrine 
of the efficient market prices gives expression to the same belief. According to its 
basic hypothesis, in the long run, prices in financial markets reflect a security’s 
intrinsic value. Profit opportunities emerge from temporal fluctuations around 
the intrinsic value, what this theoretical model perceives as mispricing. Supply 
and demand will always take care that the prices will eventually approach the 
intrinsic or real value of any security, thus guaranteeing the economic effectiv-
ity of the market. This should make it impossible in the long-term to get any 
extra profit from the price fluctuations because losses and gains will balance 
each other in the end (Beckert 2011: 144).
Engel doubts if it is possible at all to distinguish between the hedger and the 
speculator, that is, an investor who offers securitization by taking over risks 
and an investor who speculates with such securities and their associated risks. 
Hedging and risk taking, as well as profiting from it, are quite natural in the 
financial markets and profit is of course one of their main motivations. As a 
matter of fact, ‘futures markets are thought to exist because of the need of hedg-
ers, that is, of persons who wish to eliminate exposure to market risks’ (Engel 
2013: 565). They are willing, fully aware of the risks involved, to bear them 
on the behalf of other investors in the anticipation of extra high profits. At 
the same time, ‘futures transactions are always a zero-sum game: Every profit 
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claimed by one party is the loss of its counter-party. The only motivation for 
speculators to participate in the futures market is to make profit, which has 
to come from other market participants, either speculators or hedgers’ (Engel 
2013: 566). Engel admits that it makes sense to speak of speculators as a spe-
cial category of capital investors and to make a distinction between a specula-
tor and a ‘pure’ investor or hedger depending whether they aim at reducing 
or increasing exposure to risk, respectively (Engel 2013: 570). However since 
such a distinction can only be based on the observation of the subjective moti-
vation of the investor it is difficult, if not totally impossible, to identify with 
any certainty in practice. Therefore, in Engel’s opinion, it ‘becomes clear that a 
position in the market can never be objectively classified as either a hedge or a 
speculation: that is a matter of intention’ (Engel 2013: 570). Stäheli (2007: 51), 
who analyzed the historical and conceptual similarities between gambling and 
financial markets, suggests a distinction between the speculators and ‘serious’ 
investors: the speculators are oriented towards the fluctuations of the market 
prices, selling and buying whenever they see a chance to make a quick profit, 
whereas the ‘real’ or more serious investors have the long-term productivity and 
growth of the firm in mind. Thus, the longevity of the investment offers more 
objective criteria to distinguish between an investor and a speculator than their 
subjective motivations. One of the reasons investors in financial markets often 
enjoy a bad reputation is that speculation is easily associated with gambling and 
deception. The line between speculation and deception is, like that between 
speculators and ‘serious’ investors, obviously often quite difficult to draw. One 
could even ‘speculate’ that with the rapidly increasing number of quite techni-
cally advanced and complex financial assets, it has become even more difficult. 
Therefore, there are very good reasons to agree with Harrington’s suggestion 
that ‘the theory of contemporary capitalist markets must include a theory of 
deception’ (2017: 246).3
Johnson and Kwak (2010: 65–73) list four new financial products as the main 
instruments actively promoting financialization: 1) mortgage-backed securi-
ties, 2) junk bonds or bonds that were rated below ‘investment grade,’ 3) quan-
titative arbitrage trading or buying one and selling the other security, waiting 
for prices to converge, and 4) modern derivatives market, which began with the 
interest rate swaps and credit default swaps made possible by the new methods 
of calculating the value of the securities and the hedges used to protect them. 
One could add other financial inventions, as well as the renewed or increasing 
use of old ones, to the list. However, what unites them all and has definitely 
changed the modern economy is that contemporary financial markets and 
instruments are all about risk management. Securitization has not diminished, 
even less abolished, economic risks but has instead turned risks into market-
able commodities: ‘In a risk economy, the economy, as it evolves from day to 
day, is fabricated to a much higher degree than before from expectations. Con-
sequently, it becomes not necessarily more or less stable; it just generates insta-
bility in a different way’ (Engel 2013: 574). Participants of futures markets or 
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hedgers, as well as the investors in other kinds of modern financial assets, are 
prepared to expose themselves to additional risks:
The introduction of futures markets leads to an increase of combined 
individual exposure to risk. … The average exposure to risk increased, 
but at the same time, the quality of exposure changed. Futures trading 
allows to a certain degree for a more active, deliberate composition of 
the exposure to risk, as a result less unwanted and more wanted risk can 
be borne’ (Engel 2013: 572).
Instead of making financial markets more predictable and controllable through 
securitization the markets ‘became more esoteric and related policy questions 
more technical’ (Johnson & Kwak 2010: 94; cf. Carruthers 2013: 539–540). This 
is accompanied by the globalization of financial markets and the deregulation 
of banking in the USA, the European Union, and elsewhere. (For a study of the 
national varieties of financialization, see Aalbers et al. 2011.) To put it simply, 
‘calculable risk did exactly not rely on understanding or even looking on busi-
ness strategies but on interpreting statistics’ (Kädtler 2011: 175). In the world 
of finance, new risk markets are constantly actively created and promoted with 
the help of new market devices: ‘promising risks are not only searched for but 
actively manufactured and even traded’ (Engel 2013: 564). Such devices are 
legal and economic innovations actively developed and promoted by econo-
mists and corporate lawyers. Moreover, their functioning depends on the 
degree of public regulation or deregulation of the markets by the state authori-
ties and the central banks. Therefore, they create almost laboratory-like condi-
tions for analyzing the establishment of new markets.
Market devices and the commodification of risk
From the point of view of the main argument of this study, it is important 
that the new financial markets are established with the help of specific market 
devices, risk ratings, and risk analysts that first create homogenous commodi-
ties out of the diversity of financial assets with principally quite indeterminate 
value and associated risks. They differ from one another as far as the degree 
of the involved risk and their future dividend is concerned, both in princi-
ple unknown to the investors. First, after solving the inherent uncertainty of 
their risk-related value and making them thus commensurate, they can be 
traded on the same market. When discussing the independence of financial 
markets, Engel comes to the conclusion that first the pricing mechanisms—or 
their specific market devices—constitute them: ‘Pricing in futures markets is 
not purely self-reflective and blind to the economic process, nor does it sim-
ply forecast the course of economic process; it governs the economic process’ 
(Engel 2013: 574).
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Derivatives are nothing but commodified risks. This risk is principally una-
voidable when binding oneself in the present to a future that is always prin-
cipally open and indeterminate. One can never know what it has to offer 
(Esposito 2010: 161). According to Esposito (Esposito 2010: 159), the selling 
of contingency begins with options; options give rise to the problem that one 
should be able to determine the specific price of the contract of derivatives, that 
is the price of the risk involved, and this risk depends on and is related to the 
future. In order for the markets of futures to be able to function at all, the prices 
must be determined. This is a necessary condition in making a contract into 
an object of selling and buying. The problem is not easy to solve because the 
decisive factor is not only the determination of the future prices, but the costs 
related to the risk.
The important role of market devices in pricing the objects exchanged in 
the market of financial derivatives becomes particularly clear when studying 
the emergence and history of the contemporary futures exchange. As Beckert 
points out, referring to Mac Kenzie and Millo (2003),
the market for financial derivatives was strictly limited until the early 
1970s, partly because of lack of knowledge on how to price derivatives 
traded on future markets. Only advances in options pricing theory, es-
pecially the development of the Black-Scholes model, and the emerg-
ing computer technologies that allowed traders to make the theoretical 
insights from finance theory operational in their trading practices, pro-
vided an intersubjectively shared understanding of the ‘correct’ calcula-
tion of prices (2011: 771–772).
As Beckert understands it, the developments of the finance theory allowed for 
the constitution of the market and ‘performed’ it at the same time (Beckert 
2011: 572).
By turning the very risk into a tradeable commodity, financial ‘risk economy’ 
is an integral part, if not the very core, of the highly individualized risk society 
as conceived by Anthony Giddens (1991), Ulrich Beck (1992), and other soci-
ologists in their Zeitdiagnoses at the turn of the new millennium. Investors are 
now buying and selling assets, the value of which are determined by ratings. 
They are socially constructed in a process that is principally not so different 
from the one used in rating restaurants in restaurant guides, wines in wine 
guides, or in counting impact factors in academia. By rating the risks of capital 
invested in futures or in bundled assets, the rating agencies, mostly with the 
help of the mathematical-statistical methods of calculation, homogenize them, 
making qualitatively and principally different assets comparable, as far as their 
securities, the risks involved, and their future dividends are concerned. All these 
ratings show a similar tension between qualitative—‘aesthetic’ or subjective — 
expert judgments of value and standardized, statistical methods that produce 
indexes using various kinds of calculative instruments. Rating agencies usually 
Finance Capital and the New Financial Markets 139
rely both on the qualitative judgments of their experts and on mathematical risk 
models.4 These are often technically more advanced instruments than the ones 
ordinarily used in rating cultural products. Following Karpik’s classification, 
the regimes of financial markets thus established are expert regimes that rely on 
the judgment of the experts, reached with or without the help of mathematical 
models, or popular opinion regimes, typical of the mass market of ordinary 
investors, who constantly imitate each other (cf. Orléan’s mimetic principle), 
or a combination of both. They can also share elements of mega regimes when 
the extremely big sales figures of some financial assets become, in the eyes of 
the players in the market, the best guarantee of their exceptionally high value.
The establishment of the new financial markets with the help of ratings can 
be compared with the historical emergence of the market of life insurances 
and the founding of insurance companies marketing them. They demanded 
an advanced system of risk assessments utilizing statistics of life expectancies. 
However, as Zelizer (1979; see also Baker & Simon 2002)) showed in her study 
of the emergence of the market of life insurances in the USA, they also pre-
sumed something more principal, a cultural innovation or a rather a profound 
moral transformation that first allowed the pricing of the priceless, the human 
life.5 The distinction made between gambling and investing in options was an 
equally important conceptual—political and ethical—innovation, which first 
legitimized the option exchange.
MacKenzie’s and Millo’s (2003) account for the historical origins and devel-
opment of the derivatives market in the North America is extremely interesting 
and illuminating from the point of view of the social processes constituting 
markets in general. The legalization and spread of the derivatives trade was a 
relatively long process in which legal experts, economists, the leading repre-
sentatives of the futures exchange, as well as politicians and state regulators 
took active part promoting their own ideas and interests. As the authors show, 
the mathematical-statistical Black-Scholes model played a decisive role in 
legitimating the derivatives market by proving that it was possible to calculate 
seemingly objective prices to the derivatives. Therefore, one could argue that 
the market differed principally from illegal gambling despite the fact, which 
raised serious suspicions, that no concrete objects changed hands in the process 
and the exchange did not terminate in the buyer’s possession of the underly-
ing objects traded. One could, admittedly with some reservations, compare the 
emergence of the options market—or modern financial markets in general—to 
any cultural field of modern art as analyzed by Bourdieu. In the field of modern 
finance, in the beginning, a relatively small group of experts played a role corre-
sponding to other cultural vanguards, making its own cultural construct—the 
Black-Scholes model in particular, with its specific value standards—the legiti-
mate one. In the field of finance, the participants, individuals and organiza-
tions, are not mainly accumulating their cultural capital, as they are, according 
to Bourdieu, in a typical field of art, which under  certain conditions can then 
be exchanged into economic capital following a specific, and mostly implicit, 
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rate of exchange. Actors in the field of culture do not simply and straightfor-
wardly accumulate economic capital. As MacKenzie and Millo (2003: 117) have 
shown, even in a highly competitive field like high finance where egoistic inter-
ests openly prevail, the participants develop a moral economy or etiquette of 
their own, with its own standards of goodness and social status as well as tacit 
rules of fair play that does not exclusively reflect their economic performance 
and success. Expert knowledge and competence seem to contribute to the 
 status—or the symbolic capital—in this specific field like in any other. The sta-
tus can be realized in economic profits too, but it can act also as an independent 
motivating force. Just as in any cultural field, the relative amounts of cultural 
and economic capital of an individual do not necessarily correlate strongly. The 
best broker, the one who enjoys high esteem among his colleagues, is not nec-
essarily the one who makes the most money faster than all others—although 
that certainly helps—but the one who plays the investment game best, master-
ing the rules of the game with grace and being able to improvise, turning it all 
almost into an art.
The social mechanisms of cultural and economic competition in the newly 
emerged field of finance differ from those of cultural fields—or social worlds—
at least in one important respect: economic action is openly instrumental and 
self-interested. It does not even have to hide behind its seeming disinterested-
ness; its real goal is to make more money. On the contrary, at least ideally, the 
principle of ‘l’art pour art’ rules in the cultural field of art, and its activities are 
typically characterized by a ‘disinterested intentionality.’ The economic gains 
and social status they might bring along are thus rewarded and enjoyed as an 
unintended by-product. Compared to cultural fields or social worlds, social 
movements are instrumental, organized, and goal-oriented. One could there-
fore argue that they could serve as a better model in analyzing the advent of 
such social formations as financial markets. In his study on the historical devel-
opment of the nouvelle cuisine in France, Rao (2008) contrasted social move-
ments with fashion, but he could just as well have contrasted them with cultural 
fields or social worlds. According to Rao (2008: 83), ‘as a motor of collective 
action, social movements differ from fads and fashions in that they are organ-
ized efforts to reorganize a social field and result in enduring social change.’ 
Studying the history and the ‘victory’ of the nouvelle cuisine over classical 
French cuisine, starting in the 1960s in France and its spreading later into the 
world of high-class restaurants all over Europe and North America, Rao found 
out how its advocates succeeded in creating a ‘new symbolic environment for 
chefs and a public to appreciate the new logic and identity’ (Rao 2008: 86). 
He conceptualized the cultural actors that radically transformed international 
haute cuisine as a social movement that had its own leaders, followers, and 
propagators. In many ways, however, it could just as well be interpreted in the 
spirit of Bourdieu as the artistic vanguard of the cultural field of haute cuisine. 
Their explicit aim was not to make money in the first place but to increase their 
creative space as restaurant chefs, turning them into real artists by liberating 
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them from their old role as reproducers and copiers of traditional recipes. 
Compared to this vanguard of French chefs, the social process that changed 
the trade in financial assets and options definitely comes even closer to a social 
movement, with its explicit goals of reorganizing financial markets. The new 
markets allowed the participants to make more money, but just like the French 
restaurant chefs, they did not legitimate their goals exclusively with their own 
economic interests but also claimed that the new financial instruments made 
the capital markets more effective and conducive to economic growth, and in 
the end, promoted the common good.
Economic sociologists have discussed whether financial markets could and 
should be understood as performative and whether, for instance, the statistical 
models, which first made the new option markets possible both legally and 
economically by predicting the prices in the markets, were self-fulfilling.6 If 
the market actors relied on these models and oriented their actions accord-
ingly, would not this in fact guarantee the success and empirical validity of the 
models, as well as make them functional? The conclusion of MacKenzie’s and 
Millo’s (2003; MacKenzie 2008) comprehensive, empirical study of the histori-
cal origins and functioning of the financial derivatives market in the USA since 
the 1970s proved that the development of the prices did follow, after the adop-
tion of the Black-Scholes model and the development of computer technologies 
that made the calculations possible, the model’s predictions quite closely. The 
model, ‘reduced the complexity of option trading (different stocks with dif-
ferent, changing, prices; puts and calls; different expiration and strike prices) 
to a simple common metric’ (MacKenzie 2008: 168). The model thus offered 
a ‘formula how to determine the price of risk in a seemingly objective way’ 
(Esposito 2010: 162). In the end, however, the actual market behavior departed 
quite drastically from the predictions—or ‘advice’—of the model. In the model, 
the prices depend on the observed historical volatility, or price turbulences, of 
the market (cf. Esposito 2010: 163). Technically, the model failed because its 
basic parameter, implied volatility, could not cope with abrupt changes that 
were remarkably bigger than statistically predicted. According to Esposito, this 
is a general feature of economic markets and financial markets in particular: 
statistical inferences from observed trends are not a reliable guide to the future. 
To her, financial markets are, in this sense, a primary example of an important 
general feature of the modern society: ‘the existence of several different observ-
ers’ perspectives which have an impact on each other, or, the decisive role of the 
observations of the second order’ (Esposito 2010: 111).
The importance of the adoption of the Black-Scholes model relies not on 
whether it was performative but rather whether the markets of derivatives 
would have been possible at all without its pricing of assets, which the market 
participants take as their point of reference. Pondering whether and to what 
extent economic models can be performative, MacKenzie distinguishes three 
levels of performativity: He calls the first, weakest level ‘generic performativ-
ity.’ According to MacKenzie, economics qualifies without a doubt for this role 
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because it presumes ‘only’ that ‘it is used, not just by academic economists, but 
in the “real world”: by market participants, policy makers, regulators, and so 
on’ (MacKenzie 2008: 17–18). Whether the use of economic models is effec-
tive or not does not matter. The next level, ‘effective performativity,’ is more 
demanding:
For the use of a theory, a model, a concept, a procedure, a data set, or 
some other aspect of economics to count as effective performativity, the 
use must make a difference. Perhaps it makes possible an economic pro-
cess that would otherwise be impossible, or perhaps a process involving 
use of the aspect of economics in question differs in some significant 
way (has different features, different outcomes, and so on) from what 
would take place if economics was no used (MacKenzie 2008: 18).
Another way to express the same idea, adopted in this study, is to say that theo-
ries or models of financial economics are an essential part of the constitution of 
the markets. In this sense, they could be compared to the market devices ana-
lyzed previously. Such devices can equally well be called ‘effectively performa-
tive.’ They ‘perform’ nothing less than making the objects of trade comparable 
and commensurate. MacKenzie points out also that some trading practices, by 
extending the limits of comparability, constitute markets:
Indeed arbitrage constitutes markets, for example helping to determine 
their scope and the extent to which they are global: that international 
gold arbitrage is possible creates a world market in gold with a ‘world 
price,’ rather than geographically separate markets with different prices 
(2008: 86).
MacKenzie names his last and most demanding level of performativity 
‘Barnesian’ (after Barry Barnes [1988]). An economic model would be per-
formative in the Barnesian sense if its use would alter the economic processes 
or their outcomes to better correspond to the model (MacKenzie 2008: 19). It 
is obvious that if this were the case, the performance of economic models used 
in financial markets far outsteps that of any other market devices in use, for 
instance, in the cultural markets, which do not as a rule predict the outcomes 
of economic processes, such as prices, more concretely. However, MacKenzie 
comes to the conclusion that the empirical evidence to support the conclusion 
that some economic models would be performative in this strong Barnesian 
sense is not very conclusive, partly because of the obvious difficulties in achiev-
ing reliable and independent data, as well as the related measuring problems. 
The most obvious examples that MacKenzie has identified are, in fact, exam-
ples of ‘counterperformativity.’ In these cases ‘the effect of the practical use of a 
theory or model may be to alter economic processes so that they conform less 
well to the theory or model,’ and therefore ‘the empirical accuracy of the aspect 
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of economics in question is undermined’ (MacKenzie 2008: 19). The following 
examples give a more concrete idea of what kind of processes MacKenzie has 
in mind in this case:
One instance … is the way in which the development of index funds—
an expression of the efficient-market view that systematic success in 
stock picking is unlikely—seems to have created an anomaly from the 
viewpoint of efficient-market theory: the increases in price that typi-
cally followed inclusion of a stock in a major index. However, by far 
the most significant possible instance of counterperformativity is the 
role of portfolio insurance (which was based, albeit loosely, on a Black-
Scholes-Merton, in other words a world in which the assumptions of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model were valid) in exacerbating the 1987 crash 
and thus undermining the Black-Scholes world (2008: 259).
The question of the performativity—and counterperformativity—of economic 
models, or any other judgmental devices, is no doubt important, not least of all 
from the point of economic policy. Some cases of the effects of the use of mar-
ket devices, analyzed by Karpik, come quite close to the Barnesian strong per-
formativity. If, for instance, the wine dealers determine the prices of their wines 
after reading the reviews published in Harper’s wine guide (Karpik 2010: 216) 
or if the publication of the ticket sales of blockbuster movies makes a major 
impact on its popularity and ticket sales, one could, with some reservations, 
speak about performativity even in the strongest ‘Barnesian’ sense. Isolating 
the specific impact of the device from other possible causes in order to draw 
definitive conclusions would, in most cases, be difficult or almost impossible 
in practice.7
To Hilferding, finance capital was equal to the emergence of a new kind of 
capitalism in which finance capitalists, via big banks, would gradually come to 
dominate the whole economy, eventually centralizing it all into a huge ‘general 
cartel’ that would, in the end, abolish all market competition and regulate the 
prices. The only antagonism left in capitalism would concern the distribution 
of income. Lenin, in his Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1967 
[1917]), adopted this basic insight about the future of capitalism from Hil-
ferding; however, he emphasized that cartels could never completely abolish 
economic competition and conflicts, only change their form and extension. 
Monopoly capitalists would compete with each other in the future too, but 
in a way that would allow them to earn extra monopoly profits at the cost 
of wage workers and other capitalists. Reminiscent of Hilferding and Lenin, 
the modern analysts of the causes and significance of finance capital have 
pointed out that ongoing financialization is accompanied by decisive changes 
in the power relations between different groups of capitalists and managers. 
The managerial principle of shareholder value can be seen as both one of 
the reasons and causes of financialization. According to this interpretation, the 
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principle of shareholder value has, since the 1980s, come to dominate the 
managerial thinking of firms. One of the important consequences of the recent 
developments is ‘that financial gains are not reinvested in the firm’s productive 
facilities but distributed to shareholders through dividend payouts and share 
buybacks’ (Zwan 2014: 107). The owners and directors do not have the long-
term interest and stability of their firm in mind but mainly the value of their 
shares. The question that the author poses is similar to the one that occupied 
Hilferding some hundred years ago: Are we witnessing the victory of the rent-
ier? (Zwan 2014: 105). The leading motivational force of the firm is to guar-
antee its shareholders as high and secure dividends as possible, distributing 
the highest profits possible to its shareholders and not, for instance, investing 
them in the future of the firm. Scholars of shareholder value shift their atten-
tion to the social classes within the corporation: managers, shareholders, and 
employees. To guarantee a high market value of the firm and to guarantee—
by  financialization—the fluent realization of the capital invested are the main 
responsibilities of a director of a modern corporation. All this demands that 
the assets of the invested capital are liquid. The professional executives and 
managers of big companies have benefitted from these developments in the 
form of higher salaries and bonuses, and so have investment banks, dealers, 
and brokers. It can be argued that financialization has been one of the main 
reasons that the distribution of wealth and income has become more skewed 
in the USA and Europe in favor of the big capital owners (Fligstein 2008). 
These studies reveal that financialization has particularly benefited managers 
of large corporations, as their remuneration is tied more directly to the corpo-
ration’s stock market performance.
Rudolf Hilferding came to the conclusion that what he was witnessing in 
his times was not the rule of bank capital alone but that of bank and industrial 
capitalists who had, through financialization, joined forces and capital in order 
to make the best of it all. Different persons and companies specialize and oper-
ate in different capital markets—industrial, bank, or finance—but in practice 
these functions are often closely intertwined and, for instance, big industrial 
companies and comglomerates, as well as other institutional investors like pen-
sion funds, operate actively in the financial markets, making a big part of their 
profits out of their investments in finance capital. Financialization has effec-
tively homogenized different kinds of capital assets and made them liquid. This 
has created a growing demand for new financial products and markets that 
could not be possible at all without an intensive development and effective use 
of both procedural and judgmental market devices. The stock exchange and 
stock market indexes were among the first, and the Black-Sholes is technically 
the most advanced. The increasing numbers of market analysts and economic 
experts prove that the markets are equally in need of the connoisseurial, basi-
cally aesthetic, judgment of taste of the market analysts.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
The basic truth of economic sociology is that all economic institutions, markets 
and money included, are socially embedded. Therefore, one cannot understand 
their functioning properly if one begins with the assumption that economic 
actors are private individuals related only through the exchange of their com-
modities and who act rationally, realizing their goals according to their private 
preferences. Sociologists instead emphasize that one must take into account 
their roles and social identities, their specific positions, and relations of inter-
action that they occupy in the economic institutions and the society at large. 
Their social positions, among other things, have a decisive impact on their pref-
erences that are not constant but change over time, depending on their social 
networks, previous, choices, and life histories. In other words, economic pref-
erences are not endogenous but exogenous. It is equally true, however, that 
in modern society—and in modern society alone—economy is differentiated 
from other social institutions and becomes a self-referential system that repro-
duces itself according to its own rules. Therefore, to understand it properly, 
one needs specific concepts and theories that are not necessarily valid in other 
social systems.
The science of economics, which has become increasingly separate from 
other social sciences, considers itself an adequate expression of the economy. 
In its confrontation with economics, classical sociology was inclined to admit, 
with some important reservations, that this was in fact the case. One could even 
think that the economic reality of the modern capitalist society approached, 
as if asymptotically, its theoretical expression, the science of economics. Fur-
thermore, the more developed the economic system becomes, the more it will 
stand on its own feet, leaving behind the crutches of traditions and customs 
that supported it from the start. To Marx, who wrote his Capital a couple of 
decades before the advent of sociology proper, the science that he called vul-
gar economics was an adequate reflection of the self-awareness of the eco-
nomic actors of a capitalist economy. As such, it allowed them to function 
adequately in the economic markets. Max Weber, who—more than many other 
sociologists—took an explicit stance on the economic thinking of his times, 
obviously presumed that with the maturing of capitalism, the economic action 
of the individuals would become rational to a greater extent, following mon-
etary accounting more closely and making the rational calculation and evalua-
tion of the means and ends possible. Therefore, formal rationality is the key to 
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understanding economic action in modern capitalism. At the same time, this 
was not the whole truth: understanding the deeper meaning of the capitalist 
markets presumed that one seriously took into account the historical and social 
conditions that made the capitalist market economy possible and analyzed its 
wider social and cultural consequences.
This is the task that the present study reserves for sociology, with the impor-
tant addition that recognizing this conditionality does not leave the analysis 
of the economic relations and the functioning of economic institutions intact 
either. It is therefore quite essential to develop a sociological theory of the basic 
economic institutions, markets, and money, which does not only comple-
ment economic thinking but also questions and modifies it in some important 
respects. As argued in this study, the key to understanding modern economic 
institutions, markets, and money is to pose the question: What, after all, makes 
economic objects of exchange comparable and, consequently, commensurate? 
This is the foundation of the capitalist economic relations, without which they 
could not exist at all. Precapitalist markets using money as means of exchange 
have undoubtedly existed before in history, but premonetary markets with the 
equal exchange of commodities would be a contradiction in adjecto. The equal 
exchange of commodities on the market of anonymous economic actors pre-
sumes that the goods produced and services provided have an objective value 
and a price.
As argued in this study, in order to be able to develop a theoretical under-
standing of the economic institutions, economic sociology must take the claim 
of their historical specificity seriously. The classical sociologists, most notably 
Max Weber and Georg Simmel, recognized this historical specificity of the 
economic relations in modern capitalism. In particular, money and monetary 
accounting offered Weber the key to understanding the cultural meaning and 
historical destiny of this specific economic order. To Simmel, money was a 
‘mean of the means,’ and as such an important concept in his relational sociol-
ogy, which took the various forms of social intercourse as its specific object of 
study. It was both a central symbol of and played a crucial role in the objec-
tification of culture that takes place in modern society, posing a threat to the 
subjective culture of individuals. Weber never explicitly posed the question, 
nor answered it more systematically, of what made the objective prices possible 
that allowed for the formal rational action, in the form of monetary and capital 
accounting, typical of capitalism. Weber obviously got the idea of the impor-
tance of accounting from Knapp’s state theory of money. In his Philosophy of 
Money, Simmel, in his turn, developed a theory of value of his own, borrowing 
elements from the Marginalist economics in analyzing the social conditions of 
the use of money, pointing out that it was relational in two ways, between the 
subject and the object and between the objects of exchange. He did not really 
solve the question of the objectification of value, either. To him, the formation 
of economic values was a special case of the general process of valuation.
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It was Karl Marx who posed the problem of the comparability of the objects 
of exchange most explicitly in analyzing the ‘dialectic’ of the value and money 
form of commodities, or their ‘moneyness.’ What is it that makes the products 
of labor take the form of value, and express their value in money? In posing the 
question, he emphasized the genuinely social origins and character of value. As 
he argued, only in an economy consisting of private producers related to each 
other through the exchange of the products of their labor do they take the form 
of value and express it in objective monetary prices. Consequently, their value 
is a social construct and not any natural substance. At the same time, Marx 
argued that in order to be exchanged, the different products of private labor 
become social and must be comparable and commensurate. Therefore, they 
must possess a common substance that allows comparing and measuring their 
relative value on a common stock. As is well known, Marx, following the classi-
cal political economy of his predecessors, thought that this common substance 
was human labor that was incorporated in all its products. He reached this 
conclusion partly via exclusion: as use values, the products of labor obviously 
differ from each other qualitatively, and therefore it is not possible to com-
pare their use values in quantitative terms. The problem with his explanation is 
that the labor of each individual worker that is incorporated in its products is 
always concrete and differs both qualitatively—in kind—and quantitatively—
in its intensity—from case to case. Nothing exists that would be common to 
all types and individual instances of labor. General labor is, just as all general 
concepts, an abstraction but, in contrast to such typical abstract concepts like 
the fruit or the animal, it is to Marx not simply a ‘thought’ abstraction, the 
result of the process during which an observer eliminates in his thinking all 
unessential features of a particular phenomenon until only the most relevant, 
as if its true essence, remains. As Marx argued, abstract labor—and value—is 
instead a ‘real’ abstraction, the result of a process that somehow takes place 
in the social reality itself when the products of different kinds of labor meet 
each other in the market in order to be exchanged and realize their value. This 
means that general, abstract labor as well as its result, abstract value, are, in 
fact, social constructs. A few of Marx’s followers and interpreters, most nota-
bly Isaac Rubin (1973) and Franz Petry (1916), pointed out the importance 
of the social conditionality of value in Marx’s reasoning, but it was lost to the 
majority of Marxists because they interpreted Marx in the spirit of his prede-
cessors, classical political economists, an interpretation undoubtedly not alien 
to Marx either. The problem with Marx’s labor theory of value, as well as his 
analysis of the value and money forms, is that they become easily functional or 
even circular: in order to be exchanged in the markets, the products of labor 
must have a common substance that makes them comparable, and they become 
comparable only because they are exchanged in the market. As a consequence, 
value is both a natural substance of things exchanged and a social construct. 
The reasoning is not, in some respects, all that different from the functionalist 
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explanation of the advent of money, common both in the political economy 
and the neoclassical economics, according to which money had to be invented 
because it makes the exchange of commodities more fluent or, to express it in 
the parlance of modern economics, reduces their transaction costs.
This study does not claim to have a final solution to the ‘secret’ of value and 
money. Nevertheless, it takes the centrality of the question of comparability 
and commensuration of the commodities to the constitution of the capitalist 
markets seriously, as well as the social processes and formations that make it 
possible. The Marginalists and their followers, the neoclassical economists, pre-
sumed that the buyers are fully informed about the quality and, consequently, 
of the relative utility of the goods bought and sold on the markets. To Marx, 
the use value of the commodities exchanged was no problem either: It depends 
on their capacity to satisfy human needs that should be self-evident to every 
normal person. Economic theory recognizes that economic actors are often 
not in possession of complete information about the objects of trade and has 
developed ways to handle that. However, the problem becomes more compli-
cated and serious if we recognize that in many cases, the markets are plagued 
by a more principal quality uncertainty that is not mainly due to the lack of 
reliable information. This is true of the objects Karpik (2010) calls singulari-
ties, mainly goods of culture and personal services. As he formulated it, the 
multidimensionality of singularities makes their comparability often difficult, 
if not completely impossible. The judgments of taste concerning their quality 
and worth face the same problem as in Kant’s famous antinomy of taste: how 
can an evaluation of the beauty that cannot consequently refer to any shared 
rules and objective standards of taste have universal validity and be shared by 
others. The appreciation of works of art offers the best example of what Karpik 
has in mind. Although one can often give good reasons for one’s judgments 
of beauty and sometimes reach an at least provisional agreement about it, one 
can always find other interpretations that are equally valid and good. The taste 
preferences of the individual consumers in the economic markets of singulari-
ties are indeterminate and highly unstable because there is no way of knowing 
the ‘real’ quality and worth of the objects of exchange. There is no standard of 
goodness to compare or measure their worth. The judgments vary from time to 
time, from one situation to another, from one observer to another. They could 
just as well be otherwise. Without any remedies available, such a state of affairs 
would lead to a market failure.
The solution that Karpik offers to the dilemma of quality uncertainty includes 
various market devices, from critiques, appellations, and guidebooks to top ten 
lists, sales figures, and literary prizes. These, as well as the opinions distributed 
through personal networks, give support and guidance to the taste of the indi-
vidual consumers without being all too binding and robbing the consumers of 
their freedom of choice. The market devices constitute different market regimes 
(authenticity, expert, popular, and mega regimes), which all follow their own 
logic of functioning, including their market competition and price formation. 
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Therefore, there is hardly anything like the standard market of economic the-
ory, trading with homogenous and freely substitutable goods or services; it is a 
rare exception rather than the norm.
What this study adds to Karpik’s analysis is twofold: in the modern, increas-
ingly aesthetisized markets of consumption, the problem of singularities and 
their principal quality uncertainty does not restrict itself to cultural goods and 
personal services, but easily concerns almost all kinds of markets, including 
many durables, cars, PCs, cell phones, and the like. Therefore, it is quite justi-
fied to say that they are all in the need of their market devices that first con-
stitute the market regimes of their own. In other words, they are, at least to a 
degree, aesthetic markets. However, in contrast to the markets of culture and 
art, many markets also rely on other kind of devices than connoisseurial, based 
on the aesthetic judgments of taste. These other kind of devices are what Blank 
(2007) calls procedural. They are, as a rule, more objective and rely on some 
technical standards of goodness or, as in the case of the financial markets, on 
advanced mathematical-statistical methods of calculation. However, just like 
the connoisseurial devices, they take into account only some aspects or dimen-
sions in comparing their objects and compress them into some measurable var-
iables. Despite their seeming objectivity they are just as much social constructs 
as Karpik’s aesthetic or connoisseurial devices. As such, they could just as well 
be otherwise. Their seeming objectivity results from the fact that in many cases, 
professional experts have been active in constructing them and thus eventually 
guaranteeing their validity and legitimacy. These two principally different kind 
of market devices do not exclude each other. Many markets can rely on both 
of them at the same time. Financial markets offer a good example. They make 
often use of both advanced mathematical-statistical models of calculation and 
rely on the judgments of their market analysts, who are always, however well 
informed they might be, to some degree subjective. The market devices can also 
contribute to the differentiation of the markets into a more restricted status, or 
luxury, market and a popular, mass market.
The role of social status, which the producer and his or her produce enjoys, 
has been a traditional object of study in economic sociology. It is well-known 
that status can have a decisive impact on the functioning of the markets, includ-
ing their price formation leading, for instance, to a situation where higher price 
is taken as a sign of the higher quality of a commodity, and not vice versa. Rising 
prices can almost paradoxically lead to an increase in the demand. Status hier-
archies create quality differences or can be identical with them. Status markets 
can therefore be added to Karpik’s list of market regimes, partly overlapping 
with his expert and authenticity regimes. They can rely on both impersonal and 
personal market devices. Status hierarchies and status competition, both on the 
side of the producers and the consumers, can operate in all kinds of consumer 
goods markets, from cultural goods to financial assets, and have an impact on 
their pricing as, for instance, Podolny’s (2005) and Aspers’s (2010) empirical 
and historical studies have shown. Pierre Bourdieu’s fields of culture are arenas 
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where ‘struggles’ over the good and legitimate taste are waged. They are, per 
definition, relatively autonomous of economic priorities. Their peculiarity is 
their unintentional intentionality. Bourdieu’s theory of cultural distinctions 
and fields of culture is united with Karpik’s analysis of the quality uncertainty 
by the centrality of the judgment of taste. The struggle over the good and legiti-
mate taste contributes to the preservation and renewal of status hierarchies and 
social privileges but, at the same time, it effectively hides its social function in 
the struggle for power behind the gratuitous cultivation of the good taste. What 
makes Bourdieu’s theory of the fields of culture particularly interesting from 
the point of view of the analysis of economic markets is their close adherence to 
the status markets, in which the relative value and quality of goods is based pri-
marily on existing status hierarchies among the producers and the consumers. 
One can therefore apply Bourdieu’s theory of cultural distinctions and the three 
forms of capital, economic, cultural, and social, in analyzing the emergence 
and functioning of the status markets of various kinds. Status markets, a well- 
established object of study in economic sociology since Thorstein Veblen’s clas-
sical study on conspicuous consumption (1918), can thus be placed on the same 
theoretical platform with the markets of singularities. Their more systematic 
analysis also adds more flesh to Orléan’s (2014), rather general, considerations 
of the role of emulation and imitation in the determination of economic value.
However, Bourdieu’s fields of culture are only one alternative among the 
social formations of taste that operate in the consumer goods markets. The 
other two are fashion and social worlds. Fashion and social worlds are play 
worlds that do not serve any outer purpose. They are both aesthetic formations. 
Many leisure time activities, such as hobbies or sports, are typical social worlds. 
The main criteria of a social world are that one can identify its core activity, 
or activities, what belongs and does not belong to the world in question, as 
well as what makes a performance good or better than another. A social world 
has its own—mostly tacit—rules of conduct and standards of worth. Therefore, 
it can offer a solution to the quality uncertainty plaguing many markets. The 
standards of goodness are mostly not generalizable, however, outside the often 
rather narrow ‘borders’ of a particular social world. Therefore, their economic 
importance is somewhat limited. Fashion is a setter of taste trends guiding 
the consumers’ choices in a more or less binding way. It operates in many big 
economic markets. It is undoubtedly economically functional in capitalism by 
making perfectly useful objects obsolete, but this does not explain how it suc-
ceeds in alluring the consumers, why they follow its seasonal or other kind of 
regular changes more or less enthusiastically. There is no practical reason why 
something is in fashion—it could just as well be otherwise. There is no way of 
predicting what will be in fashion in the future. Fashion is not by any means 
restricted only to the clothes market but with its regular seasonal cycles, fashion 
shows and exhibitions, fashion journals and journalists, and professionals of all 
kinds, cultural intermediaries included, it is much more firmly institutional-
ized in clothes markets than in other markets. The economic relevance and 
Conclusion 151
weight of the social worlds and fashion varies a great deal from the relatively 
modest or limited weight of the social worlds to fashion’s almost overwhelming 
impact on the markets of many consumer goods.
With the analyses of the three main social formations of the collective taste 
formation, fashion, social worlds, and fields of culture, it is possible to show the 
main social processes that economic markets rely on ‘spontaneously,’ which the 
economic actors can, in many cases, make active use of. These social formations 
operate not only, or not even predominantly, in the economic markets. How-
ever, whenever operative in economy, all three formations have a direct impact 
on the market structure and price formation, both in need of more detailed 
analyses in the future. It is important to note here that these three social forma-
tions explain the social mechanisms and processes that are active behind the 
formation of the market regimes, their distinctions of taste, and the formation 
of a common taste. Without them market devices could not operate properly.
In the neoliberal economic policy, which has dominated European and 
Northern American politics reaching to the rest of the world too during the last 
decades, markets play a central role. Market competition is relied on (or at least 
so it is firmly believed) to take care of not only economic efficiency but also 
many social problems. Public services, from education and transport to health 
care and care of the elderly, are increasingly privatized and outsourced. The pol-
iticians and economists ‘market’ private markets as offering a freedom of choice 
to all the citizens. Markets do not always emerge spontaneously, nor can they be 
created overnight. Often the results do not match the great expectations either. 
The markets are not uniform, and their conditions vary considerably from one 
case to another, to such an extent that one can hardly speak about them as any 
homogenous social formation at all. As a concession to the historical school of 
economics that tended to deny the relevance of general concepts and laws in 
economy and human life in general, one could say that there is hardly any such 
thing as a market sui generis. However, as argued in this study, all economic 
commodity markets, in order to function at all, must solve the same problem 
of comparability and commensuration of their objects of exchange. The science 
of economics makes a distinction between free competition and monopolis-
tic or oligopolistic competition, depending on the degree of centralization of 
the markets. As many economists are ready to admit, ‘ideal typical’ markets of 
free competition are in reality rare exceptions, if they exist at all. Such fields of 
economy as barber’s shops that consist of a multitude of small enterprises are 
often taken as examples of free markets, but even they show signs of increasing 
centralization in the shape of leasing and forming of commercial chains, not 
to mention the differentiation of their market through increasing aesthetiza-
tion. They also become differentiated into status markets and standard markets. 
As Fligstein (1996) argues convincingly, the normal situation in most markets 
is that a few big market leaders dominate the market, with a larger group of 
smaller firms following them. In normal times, they divide the markets among 
themselves ‘peacefully.’ Challengers can and do appear from among the smaller 
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firms or outsiders in such markets, but usually a couple of big firms act as mar-
ket leaders setting the ‘rules of the game.’ Consequently, in many markets active 
price competition is rather an exception than the rule.
One of the main results of this study is that markets do not differ only as far as 
their degree of centralization or, for instance, the amount of capital demanded 
to start a new business, are concerned. Just as importantly, they differ depend-
ing on the degree to which they produce, or do not produce, homogenous and 
standardized products that can, or cannot, be substituted for one another. Such 
factors as technical inventions and their patenting are undoubtedly factors in 
promoting market differentiation and monopolistic, in contrast to free, com-
petition. In markets that are ‘plagued’ by quality uncertainty, the structure of 
the market depends at least as much on the specific market devices at work 
and the kind of market regimes established as on their market structure. For 
instance, in practice, fashion markets are often monopolistic, with a couple of 
firms selling fashionable clothes and acting as fashion leaders, others following 
their example. The market leadership can shift occasionally from one firm or 
one group of firms to another, but this does not change the market structure 
as such. In the authenticity regime of the market of quality wines or fine din-
ing, the system of aesthetic evaluation constitutes the market by making their 
singular products comparable and commensurate, at the same time leading 
to market differentiation into luxury and standard markets. These devices of 
evaluation both preserve and establish, and often even exaggerate, the quality 
differences, making some products or services practically non-substitutable by 
elevating them into a quality class of their own, guaranteeing them a leading 
position, at least for a time. This does not mean that their competitors could 
not possibly challenge them at all, thus threatening their leading position, but 
this takes place only occasionally. To succeed in taking over the market leader-
ship presumes that they manage to establish their own taste as the new good 
or legitimate taste in the cultural field of wines and fine dining. Some markets 
of singularities enjoy public protection guaranteed by laws and official regula-
tions, such as for instance, the French wine classification of chateaus that the 
introduction of the wines from the New World to the world markets started 
challenging half a century ago by introducing its own quality standards. It is a 
classic example of the close interplay between legal regulation and taste forma-
tion in a market. In the case of mega regimes, typical of the film and entertain-
ment industry, it is often difficult to say what comes first, the big economic 
resources of the leading companies and the dominating share of the markets, 
kept up to a great extent by forceful efforts of marketing and advertising, or the 
popularity of their films. Do the films sell because they are popular or are they 
popular because they sell well? In such megamarkets, the producers’ economic 
capital plays a more direct and important role than cultural capital. Popular 
opinion regimes, typical of the markets of musical recordings and books, are an 
interesting case because they, in their turn, seem to follow the logic of the fash-
ion markets but at the same time rely on their rather advanced and developed 
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market devices, such as top ten or twenty charts, or literary or musical compe-
titions and prizes. The differentiated fashion markets of ‘haute couture’ come 
close to authenticity regimes, relying on cultural critics and other intermediar-
ies, whereas popular mass fashion relies more directly on the public opinion.
In many markets of the singularities the market devices have come into 
being rather spontaneously and gradually with the historical establishment 
of the markets, whereas others have been consciously created by the involved 
trade organizations. The new market instruments typical of the rapidly growing 
financial markets are often of the second type. One would perhaps not expect 
to find, at the first glance, strong parallels between the markets of art and other 
cultural goods, on the one hand, and financial assets, on the other hand. The 
mathematical models of risk management constituting financial markets by 
pricing risks are a good example of market devices created and established 
highly consciously and purposefully on the initiative of economic and legal 
experts. As their adherents argue, they both increase the liquidity and help to 
minimize the risk of capital invested. At the same time, by simplifying, abstract-
ing, and condensing a multitude of diverse information concerning their assets 
into a single indicator, they can effectively prevent economic actors from pay-
ing attention and pondering the (in principle) endless and to a great extent 
unknown factors affecting the future value and risk of their investments, which 
are always unpredictable. Therefore, rather than making the investments more 
secure they can create a false sense of control, only to collapse totally at the 
outbreak of the next crisis. One can illustrate the same basic dilemma of quality 
uncertainty with an example taken from a completely different economic field. 
A wine lover who follows the advice of the wine guidebooks and wine reviews 
makes his or her life easier and plays it safely but is at the same time risking 
missing something even better, never experienced before. Likewise, a movie 
lover who always goes to see the blockbuster plays it safe by choosing what 
all the others do, thus easily ending up with a feeling of having missed some-
thing really good or more authentic. To take one more example, the ministry 
of higher learning or a private fund financing mainly research and researchers 
who can show high impact factors or figures in citation indexes risks neglecting 
what could be new and innovative in the field of science. To compare, measure, 
and predict, the aesthetic worth of a film, the taste of good wines, or the ‘real’ 
economic value of the derivatives in the financial markets is namely as difficult, 
if not completely impossible.
The advanced instruments of risk assessment of financial assets are among 
the most exciting new market devices from the point of economic sociology. By 
compressing, for instance, the information about the security of several loans 
of various kinds into one single index, thus making comparing their combined 
risk and expected profits possible, they in fact create a completely new com-
modity, or financial asset, out of risk. In many cases, academic economists and 
mathematicians have been conducive in the development and establishment 
of these new market regimes. They are often even celebrated as new advanced 
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scientific innovations. Such instruments constitute new markets very concretely 
by creating a system of evaluation and pricing that makes the trade with the 
new commodities possible at all. One can follow the history of the construction 
of these financial devices and the following constitution of the specific market 
regimes at a close range (cf. MacKenzie & Millo 2003). An important ques-
tion is whether the mathematical-statistical models developed that rely on the 
economic theories in order to be able better to analyze and predict the prices 
of the financial assets have, in fact, become self-fulfilling prophecies, or, rather, 
are they performative. This would be the case if the actual behavior of the inves-
tors would follow their pricing advice closely enough, making their predic-
tions empirically valid. If this were indeed the case, financial markets would be 
largely predictable and without any bubbles and crises—which obviously is not 
true. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that these models are not really performa-
tive. They ‘only’ constitute financial markets.
The privatization of public services, such as education and health care, or 
infrastructures like highways or tunnels, offer another interesting and contem-
porary example of the establishment of completely new markets. It looks almost 
as if in this wave of privatizations, ‘in a state of constrained economy states too 
may end up seeing like a market’ (Fourcade &Healy 2017: 24).  Privatizing—or 
‘marketizing’—highways by introducing road tolls is an old and, at the first 
glance, quite straightforward method: all drivers have to pay a standard sum 
for the right to use a certain stretch of the road. In addition to creating an 
organization of collecting the payments, the owner—or leaser—of the road has 
to make up their mind what exactly the product to be commodified is: sell-
ing by mileage, commodifying the distance driven, offers itself certainly as a 
quite natural measuring stock. However, it shows concretely that in creating 
a private market for public goods, one has to construct some kind of a mar-
ket device that makes the pricing of the goods sold, or their commodification, 
possible. One can claim that this is, in fact, common to all goods: in one way 
or another, they have to be made comparable and commensurate. In the mar-
kets of many ordinary consumer goods, their commodification has taken place 
gradually and spontaneously in history, and their pricing has become custom-
ary and taken for granted. Privatization of infrastructures, such as roads or 
tunnels, is theoretically relatively simple because their product is rather simple 
to standardize. Their customers consist of a great number of anonymous and 
relatively homogenous private individuals, or firms owning trucks and buses. 
In privatizing, for instance, higher learning or health care services, the situa-
tion is different and much more complicated. First, the products are singular 
to a high degree because of their quality uncertainty and are often difficult to 
compare and measure. Therefore, the public authorities, or some other agency 
with enough authority, must first create what often amounts to a quite compli-
cated system of product classification and quality indexes to be used in regu-
lating the market. In this respect, they could well learn a lot from the markets 
of typical singularities such as many cultural products where market devices, 
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both more or less spontaneously established or consciously created, have been 
in use for ages.
Many markets of previous public services are different from the markets, say, 
of the entertainment industry, in that in many cases the state or public organi-
zations are, de facto, the only buyer in the market. The market is therefore a 
monopsony, or a buyer’s monopoly. This is clearly the case when institutes of 
higher learning or research receive their financing according to their achieve-
ments, measured by such instruments or devices as impact factors or citation 
indexes established and controlled by the financing state organ, or when the 
health care authorities of a city or a region buy the services from private provid-
ers using some kind of quality scales of their own. If these services’ customers 
and users pay for their services with their own money or with vouchers given 
to them by the state, the situation is different, but even then the state or the 
ministry of education or health, has to price the services using some kind of 
measuring instruments and market devices with which to classify and evaluate 
them. After all all such markets rely heavily on market devices of one kind or 
another, whether official and formal or unofficial, less organized and informal. 
It is by no means self-evident what kind of devices, if any, are best suited for 
each of the specific tasks.
The wave of privatization hitting many Western European countries, 
together with the deregulation of financial markets, is one of the more obvious 
reasons that the social constitution of the markets has become important to 
study. The aesthetization of consumption and everyday life (Reckwitz 2013), 
or the increasing importance of the consumers’ inner experiences, ‘Erlebnisse’ 
(Schulze 1992), to which some Zeitdiagnoses have paid attention, is another, 
parallel, and arguably as important a trend in modern capitalism. It transforms 
the overwhelming majority of the consumer goods in practice into singulari-
ties and, consequently, the consumers’ choices into a question of aesthetic taste. 
The aesthetization of the world of commodities is actively promoted by the 
so-called creative industries, which extend far over the ‘old fashioned’ or tra-
ditional cultural industries, as the increasing role of design, advertising, mar-
keting and branding and, more recently, the active use of ‘virtual realities’ in 
almost any field of consumption goods proves. It would, however, be too simple 
to identify them as the sole or primary causes of aesthetization. The more fun-
damental factor is that the increasing abundance, variation, and diversification 
of all kinds of consumer goods and services places the buyer and the consumer 
in a demanding situation: how could one possibly know that one has made the 
best and the right choice? In principle, four ways of handling the situation are 
available, one can either act traditionally or habitually and do what one has 
always done, follow the example of the—significant—others, take the advice 
of procedural or aesthetic market devices, or make one’s own private decision, 
notwithstanding the potential risk of failure and disappointment. One can also 
try to cultivate one’s taste and become a real connoisseur, but this is both time- 
and money-consuming, and one can hardly become an expert of taste in more 
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than one limited field of culture—or a couple at most. (It is highly question-
able whether any completely private, autonomous choices, without the ballast 
of history, habits, and tradition, is possible at all.)
The freedom of consumer choice generally associated with the private mar-
kets and the provisioning of goods and services by private firms under free 
competition is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, legitimating instance 
of modern capitalism. It is often idealized in political discourse and set on the 
same footing with such basic political principles like the individual freedom, 
parliamentary democracy, universal suffrage, or the freedom of the press as a 
guarantee of the citizens’ sovereignty. As the argument goes, private markets 
and free competition give every customer-citizen a chance to vote, with his 
own money, for what is available, produced, and sold on the market, accord-
ing to his or her private preferences, thus effectively steering the direction of 
production and distribution according to his or her own needs, wishes, and 
preferences! However, as Tom Malleson (2014) has argued, this is only half the 
truth, or even less. He presents a long list of convincing arguments, all shed-
ding serious doubt on the claims of customer sovereignty. According to Pareto 
optimality, the decisive criterion of the fairness of the markets is whether 
they make someone better off without weakening the position of any other. 
As Malleson argues (2014: 95), even if markets could prove to be efficient or 
optimal providers of goods and services, they are by no means just. Following 
its advice, the richest and well-to-do citizens could well benefit while leaving 
the fate of the rest intact, even if not making anyone worse off. This is a general 
moral problem of the fairness of the markets or the market economy in gen-
eral. Malleson’s other, and equally serious, doubts are more straightforward. 
His most obvious argument is that, since the customers have very different 
amounts of money at their disposal, the rich have much more ‘votes’ than the 
poor. In other words, they decide, in practice, to a greater extent what is in 
demand and therefore offered on sale. The poor have no other choice than to 
be satisfied with the assortment of goods the rich prefer. Second, monopo-
lies undermine what Malleson calls the market’s democratic potential, or the 
efficient allocation of resources, because they distort the prices from their 
true costs and benefits. The neglect of externalities is the third reason that 
markets fail. Externalities, like pollution, are costs that all people, even people 
who have nothing to do with their cause, have to bear. Fourth, public goods 
offer often opportunities to free riders who can use them even if they have not 
participated in paying their costs. Fifth, ‘markets are inadequate on making 
long-term decisions because market prices are determined by current supply 
and demand and cannot pay attention to future demands nor guide long-term 
planning. They can only aggregate the preferences of current consumers and 
not those of future generations’ (Malleson 2014: 98). Sixth, contrary to what is 
often believed, ‘markets can fail to reflect collective choice. While prices reflect 
the aggregate of private preferences, it is important to realize that such an 
aggregate may be very different from what people think is best collectively, for 
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the society as a whole’ (Malleson 2014: 98.) To take a current example, while 
people may privately prefer to eat beef steak and welcome low prices of meat, 
they might collectively very well think that raising beef cattle is ecologically 
harmful and it should therefore be restricted or closed down (Malleson 2014: 
96–98). These are important critical and principal arguments or dilemmas of 
the presumed market fairness, all well-known from economic and political 
literature. To Mallison, they all offer a good enough reason to propose and 
promote real economic democracy, in the form of cooperatives, workers’ own-
ership, and industrial democracy instead of the ‘free choice’ and ‘democracy of 
the markets.’ Ideally, the cooperative movement could combine both consum-
ers’ and producers’ interests or, rather, treat one and the same person both as a 
worker and a consumer (cf. Olsén et al. 1999).
One can pose one more, more principal and critical question to the advocates 
of a full-blown market economy. If quality uncertainty of commodities is more 
the general rule than a rare exclusion, restricted only to some economically 
rather unimportant markets, such as works of art, it becomes highly question-
able whether the markets can fulfill their promise of optimizing the utilities at 
all, or the well-being of the consumers with the economic resources at their 
disposal, a promise that has been the main legitimating arguments of the pri-
vate market economy. If the individual preferences are highly unstable—as they 
most typically are in the fashion and popular opinion markets—and sensitive 
to the impact of the choices of other consumers (cf. Orléan’s imitative princi-
ple) and if, in addition, the preferences are not independent of each other, the 
claim becomes even more problematic. It can, with good reason, be questioned 
as to whether it makes any sense at all to expect any optimality of the function-
ing of the markets under normal conditions. The question becomes even more 
astute if, as argued in this treatise, all markets are socially constituted and not 
any natural mechanisms or technical instruments. Because the markets differ 
radically from each other, one should always reflect on their performance and 
preserve a critical stance to their principles and consequences.
Because markets presume and are first made possible by making, in one 
way or another, principally qualitatively different objects comparable and 
commensurate, they tend to make the social relations one-dimensional (cf. 
Marcuse 1964), or if you like, reify them in the sense that Marx had in mind 
in his Critique of Political Economy. In the case of the market of singularities, 
broadly speaking, the problem of reification due to commensuration becomes 
obvious because market devices make qualitatively different objects commen-
surate, always simplifying their multidimensionality and holistic nature by 
classifying and compressing them into a single measure or two. For instance, 
the price difference between the high-quality and the low-quality end of the 
markets, or between luxury goods and standard goods, can reflect quality dif-
ferences, but they can equally well distort or overemphasize such differences. 
To take another example, in other markets of singularities, relatively small 
differences are made into cutting points between excellence and ordinariness, 
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thus establishing two completely separate classes of goods or services and 
their markets.
Marx thought that the reification inherent in the commodity economy can be 
overcome only by radically transforming the capitalist relations of production, 
after which human beings would become real masters of their own social rela-
tions and history instead of being subsumed under the objectified social forms 
as they are in the capitalist society. Marx’s communism promised to realize the 
empire of human freedom on a higher level due to the advanced degree of the 
forces of production, economic efficiency, and the division of labor. This was 
not nostalgic longing after a return to any simpler mode of production of peas-
ants and artisans or to barter trade and natural economy. In his opinion, the 
great historic mission of capitalism is the coming into being of a new human 
being, rich in needs and many-sided in capacities. How this radical transfor-
mation, the end of reification and the consequent increase in human freedom, 
can be accomplished, remains to great extent an open question. To answer 
this question, one must, in accordance with young Marx, be willing to believe 
that overcoming the rule of private property ends the alienated state of human 
beings, realizing their true human nature that they, in fact, share with human-
ity. The other option is to believe in older Marx’s prophecy, which says that once 
the problem of material scarcity has definitely been solved and the amount of 
the time needed to produce the necessities of life reduced to a minimum, men 
and women can spend almost all their time in the ‘empire of freedom,’ realizing 
their true inclinations and capabilities. If anything, life in communism would 
be close to the ideal of aesthetic creativity. The problem with Marx’s, admittedly 
not very concise, characterizations of his future communist society was that it 
lies beyond the social, that is, without any social institutions that would medi-
ate between the individuals and the society as a whole. It was missing how peo-
ple would order their social relations in this coming society, both their relations 
to other human beings and to the world of objects. One could pose the same 
question in another way by wondering how a common taste, or communities of 
taste, would become distilled out of the tastes of the multitude of individualities 
with their abundant needs and capacities. Because Marx was inclined to use 
metaphors of aesthetic creativity or the artistic genius in painting the coming 
life in his communism, his ideal figure was a creative artist-producer, a direc-
tor of orchestra, if you like, and not an ordinary admirer of art or a listener to 
music, or the consumer of other aesthetic objects and services.
Max Weber’s analysis of the Western process of rationalization, the central 
elements of which are monetary calculation and capital accounting, as well as 
Georg Simmel’s prognosis of the increasing objectification of culture at the cost 
of the inner, subjective culture, of which the money economy with its objec-
tified exchange relation is the primary example, are both in their own ways 
critical accounts of the threatening one-dimensionality of the social relations in 
the modern capitalist society. To them, unlike to Marx, the future had no radi-
cal emancipatory alternatives on offer. At the most, modern individuals could 
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cultivate their own inner richer life in the smaller social circles or intimate 
spaces preserved intact in the great transformation of the modern culture. At 
best, they could take advantage of the increasing differentiation of the society 
that expects only a partial involvement in any one objectified social relation or 
institution, thus leaving the rest of their personality on their own.
In Max Weber’s analyses of the Western process of rationalization inherent in 
the systematic quest for profit in modern capitalism and its bureaucratic organ-
izations, formal rational action was a necessary prerequisite for the efficiency 
of economic and administrative activities under the prevailing conditions of 
mass consumption and mass administration, or the government of the masses. 
As Weber argued, it was the formal rationality, best exemplified in money and 
capital accounting, and above all in the double bookkeeping of a capitalist firm, 
allowing unequivocal comparing the means with the ends, that was character-
istic of the economic action and relations in modern capitalism. At the same 
time, he was careful to note that formal rationality represented only one pos-
sible type of rationality, alien to substantive rationality that paid attention to 
the satisfaction of human needs or to some intrinsic value. At the same time, 
he could not but regret—just like many other cultural critics of modernity in 
his times—the loss of the incomparable deeper cultural meanings and values 
due to these developments. Weber even went so far as to predict that the pro-
cess of rationalization would, in the end, lead to the complete loss of cultural 
meanings and personal freedom. His contemporary Georg Simmel was as radi-
cal in fearing, following Friedrich Nietzsche, the loss of the spiritual nobility 
(‘Vornehmheit’) in the modern society as a consequence of the leveling out 
of all genuine cultural distinctions. To Simmel in particular, money expressed 
the ambivalence of modernity in an accentuated form: it both quantified all 
 distinctions—a million dollars is only a million times more than one dollar—
but also empowered its owner by liberating her or him from the traditional 
social obligations and leaving the future open. As the perfect medium, the 
means of the means, money realized almost any goal, even those unknown and 
unanticipated at the present.
Instead of dreaming of overcoming reification, or what in fact amounts to the 
same, of all objective social institutions, economic organizations included, and 
the following loss of subjective meaning, it is more reasonable to problematize 
the limits of reification, or commensuration, and the role that economic mar-
kets should play in organizing social relations. According to Habermas’s Theory 
of Communicative Action (1984), in a modern differentiated society, economic 
and political relations are part of the systems of the economy and state, or pub-
lic administration. These systems operate with the generalized media of money 
and power, respectively, in coordinating social interaction. The rest of the social 
relations belong to the life world, ‘Lebenswelt,’ where coordination of social 
interaction takes place through, in the best case, rational communication and 
aims, in the final instance, at reaching agreement and, ideally, factual, norma-
tive, and aesthetic consensus. In the life world we share and refer to a common 
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culture, which includes everything from factual beliefs and shared knowledge, 
normative expectations to the aesthetic standards of authenticity. In addition 
to paying attention to the centrality of the media money and power in the two 
social systems, economy and public administration, Habermas was interested 
in the changing borderlines between the two social systems and the life world 
of meaningful action. In his opinion, the general tendency of our times is for 
the two systems to intrude into the life world by applying their specific systemic 
principles of coordination of action partly replacing their normative and aes-
thetic self-regulation. What Habermas had in mind was the increasing formal 
and legal regulation of the family life, family relations, and relations between 
partners as examples of what he thought to be the colonialization of the life 
world by the system of formal, public administration. Speaking about ‘coloni-
zation’ does not deny the importance of these measures of social regulation and 
the following potential increase in the social equality due to them. However, it 
pays attention to the political and ethical problems that tend to rise with chang-
ing the lines demarcating what, at different times and under different circum-
stances, have fallen under the competence of the formal bureaucratic and legal 
administration and what has been left to the more informal, often traditional 
rules and practices of the society. These are problems typically associated with 
the social policy of welfare state. The welfare state, the public administration, 
and their expansive tendencies have by no means disappeared from the socio-
political agenda; since the publication of Habermas’s work, new social prob-
lems emerging all the time. However, the ‘colonialization’ of the life world by 
the economic subsystem, and the ‘economizing’ of the public administration 
through the marketization and privatization of the public services have become 
arguably an equally, if not even more important, social and political challenge 
in many Zeitdiagnoses and political prognoses. Privatization and deregulation, 
at least seemingly, frees the public bodies and political decision makers from 
the burden and responsibility of making demanding decisions about the distri-
bution and use of the scarce resources only to transform them to another level, 
creating new challenges regarding how to control the economic performance of 
the new markets by establishing effective and functional market devices.
The differentiation of the social systems in a modern society is a double-
edged sword. The social systems of economy and public administration sim-
plify the coordination of social action by making it one-dimensional in their 
own way, comparing and measuring all in money or formal and legal catego-
ries and in bureaucratic entities, not paying attention to the concrete person or 
case in question. They make their objects comparable and commensurable by 
abstracting from their multifaceted reality. The system of economy take account 
of the reality only insofar as it recognizes its features as relevant according to its 
own criteria and standards, dismissing other features and traits that cannot be 
counted in money as irrelevant at best or as disturbing at worst. In this sense, it 
tends to treat all persons and cases as comparable, not paying attention to the 
specificity of the individual in question. Without going into a more profound 
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discussion about the benefits of Habermas’s theory, it suffices here to say that it 
serves as a reminder that the alternatives facing us are not a total reification and 
objectification of all social relations, or a society without any over-individual, 
objective social institutions or formal organizations. What can and should be 
seriously questioned instead are the conditions and limits of the social constitu-
tion of such institutions as well as their consequences. The economic markets 
analyzed in this study offer in this respect a good, currently highly relevant 
example. If markets are, as claimed here, socially constituted institutions and 
if they rely, as a rule, on some specific market devices and social formations of 
taste, they should always be open to critical evaluation. Despite the seeming 
naturalness of some market regimes and their devices, they are always social 
constructs and as such not part of any ‘second nature’ in the sense of being 
irreversible and beyond critical reflection and political control. In principle, 
they can always be otherwise, substituted for other kinds of economic institu-
tions and social arrangements that are coordinated by, for instance, collegial 
bodies of professionals, normative regulations, and ideals established through 
the processes of democratic deliberation, or habits and traditions. This is true 
of the most central social institution of modern capitalist economy, money, the 
deciphering of which poses the fundamental challenge to economic sociology.

Notes
1. Introduction: Making the Incomparable  Comparable
 1 Abbott argues in the same line that ‘in the context of excess, there is no scar-
city, hence there can be no prices, no budget constraints’ (Abbott 2014: 12). 
The other side of the coin is that ‘the scarcity is induced precisely because of 
the staggering excess of possibilities’ (Abbot 2014: 14).
 2 In earlier times, in previous historical social formations, it would not make 
sense to speak about the social embeddedness of economic relations since 
they had not been differentiated from other social systems. Looking at them 
from the present perspective, one can, however, retrospectively identify ele-
ments and features that we would naturally call economical. If they were 
exposed to monetary market relations these were, as a rule, rather marginal 
or subsumed under other social, political and cultural constraints and im-
peratives. Their analysis demands, therefore, a specific theoretical approach 
of their own, beyond the scope of this study (cf. e.g., Sahlins’s Stone Age 
Economics [1972] or Bloch’s [1968] classical studies of feudalism.)
 3 Botanical classification in the spirit of the famous Swedish botanist Carl 
Linné, who invented the general classification of flowers and plants accord-
ing to their pistils and stamens was a great progress in natural science in the 
18th century, just as double accounting was in business enterprises a couple 
of hundred years earlier. Even though sharing the same logic of comparison 
by abstraction Linné’s system of botanical classification follows a different 
scale of measurement than, for instance, bookkeeping with monetary prices. 
Linné ‘measured’—or rather classified and ordered—his plants and flowers 
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with a nominal scale, which, according to the Oxford Dictionary is ‘a dis-
crete classification of data, in which data are neither measured nor ordered, 
but subjects are merely allocated to distinct categories.’ In this scale it makes 
sense to say that two plants belong to one and the same family of plants but 
not to say that one of them is more of, say, a daffodil than another, even less 
that it would be more valuable than the other. Prices of commodities, in 
their turn, are measured on a ration scale that permits counting quantitative 
differences of value and, in addition, has a zero point. In this scale, one can 
therefore claim that something is, say, twice as expensive as something else.
 4 It should be noted, that not even the markets of homogenous and standard-
ized goods would be able to function without many legal rules and institu-
tions, starting from the legal protection of private property and commercial 
contracts between private individuals to the regulation and guarantee of 
the value of money by the central bank. These are measures that even the 
most stubborn anti-etatist advocate of freedom of the markets admits and 
defends. Thus, all markets are in one way or another legally embedded. As 
we shall see, the legal guarantees are, however, not the only prerequisites for 
the proper functioning of a commodity market.
 5 Karpik’s concept of singularities, central to his sociology of the markets, 
differs from the use that Callon and Muniesa make of it. To them, singulari-
zation is the process through which objects are identified as belonging to a 
certain class or group or another, distinctive from others, whereas Karpik 
emphasizes more the problem of their incomparability as a consequence of 
which they are difficult to rate.
2. Economic Sociology in a Theory-historical Perspective
 1 The term Sozialökonomie, or socioeconomics, was not Weber’s own inven-
tion but was used by others—Werner Sombart among them—but it did not 
have any well-established or standard usage in German (Tribe 2014: 725).
 2 For a detailed account of the various stages and the problems that Weber 
faced in editing the Ground Plan series, see Schluchter 2009: 1–134 and 
Swedberg 1998: 197–293. Schluchter also dates, as reliably as possible, the 
different parts of Weber’s manuscript and places them in the correct order.
 3 This short description of the themes covered in Weber’s Ground Plan series 
gives a good picture of the general idea and content of what he understood 
under the label of socioeconomics (Sozialökonomik), as he christened his 
own approach to distinguish it from both older political economy and 
modern economics. It was an attempt to consolidate economic history and 
the history of economic thought with economic theory. In this enterprise, 
sociology played an important role. The authors whom Weber recruited 
to contribute to his series represented both of these schools of thought. 
They came mostly from among the younger generation, who had obviously 
more understanding to the need of consolidating opposite and competing 
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positions, which for quite long time had waged a vehement struggle, known 
as the ‘Methodenstreit,’ over the hegemony of interpreting the society, his-
tory and culture in the German academia.
 4 Weber (1975; cf. Zafirovski 2001) criticized the attempt to base its claims on 
any psycho-physiological foundations of human being.
 5 In Economy and Society, in his sociological Kategorienlehre, or system of 
concepts, Weber introduced four ideal or pure types of individual action: 
value rational, goal rational, traditional, and affectual or emotional. As a 
matter of fact, only the goal rational type designated rationality in any ordi-
nary sense of the word. It is oriented to the rational choice of means to reach 
a goal, whatever this goal happens to be (Weber 1968a:24). Goal rationality 
is often interpreted as instrumental or technical rationality. A value rational 
actor is ‘determined by a conscious belief for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects 
of success’ (Weber 1968a:24). It could hardly be claimed to be rational in 
any usual sense of the word. The two last types of action are explicitly ir-
rational, contrary to instrumental rationality. Traditional action is simply 
motivated by the fact that ‘we have always acted like this,’ whereas affectual 
actions are emotionally motivated.
 6 The problem that faced the ‘subjectivist’ economists was that firms do not 
know or have any utilities, as Veblen (1998 [1908]: 164) pointed out in his 
critical comment on the American Marginalist, Irving Fischer. Only  human 
beings did. The second-generation Marginalists, Friedrich von Wieser, 
Eugen Böhm-Bawerk (from Austria), John Bates Clarke in the USA, Kurt 
Wicksell in Sweden, and Philip H. Wicksteed in the UK, solved it by dis-
tinguishing mediate from immediate marginal utilities. According to the 
marginal productivity of the firm, the price and volume of its product input 
depends on its marginal product. The optimal production decision of a firm 
depends on marginal quantities: a firm maximizing its profits produces until 
the additional cost of an extra unit of its product is equal to its contribution 
to the total income of the firm. This idea or generalization of the principle 
of marginal utilities to the costs of production was generally adopted first 
in the 1930s. Taken together, these ideas offered the economists a theory of 
the optimal use of resources with which one can optimize the satisfaction 
of one’s preferences in terms of utilities, condensed in the concept of the 
general equilibrium. (See Mäki & Sappinen 2011: 294.) In Veblen’s opinion, 
this did not, however, save the theory from the critique of its hedonistic 
postulate on which it relied in the end and which it tried to ‘take account of 
in terms of extension.’
 7 As Norkus (2010: 48) pointed out, Weber comes to this insight first in 
his late writings: ‘In his late work Weber identified (national) economics 
(“Nationalökonomie”) increasingly with the institutional abstract theory of 
economy which is both in need and makes possible sociology as an com-
plementary or alternative science.’ The analyses of such social institutions, 
including authority, religion, and law, which Weber had earlier understood 
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to be part of the field of economic sociology are now special subfields of 
sociology on their own, alongside the very economic sociology.
 8 Weber’s (1990) outline of his lectures on general or ‘theoretical’ economics 
from 1898, almost twenty years before he developed his own system of so-
ciological concepts of economic action, quite closely follows the teachings 
of the Austrian Marginalists. In presenting its theoretical status, he explic-
itly pointed out the ‘constructed nature’ of its economic subject who is, in 
contrast to empirical human beings, completely informed, selects the best 
means to reach its goals, and dedicates all its energy to economic activity. 
On the other hand, Weber relativized it by referring to the fact that ‘the 
abstract theory takes at its starting point the modern occidental type of a 
human being and its economizing’(Weber 1990: 29).
 9 For instance, to Jevons, one of the founding fathers of Marginalism, eco-
nomics was the science of ‘calculative hedonism.’ The new science of eco-
nomics presumed that one could quantify individual preferences. On the 
other hand, he did not think it possible to compare the preferences of dif-
ferent individuals with one another (Gagnier 2000:49–50).
 10 One could see Simmel’s conception of value as a rather freely interpreted 
version of the Marginalists’ idea of the determination of value as a com-
bination of utility and scarcity, both having their impact on the marginal 
utility, which Simmel however formulated in more abstract terms without 
any reference to the concept of the marginal utility.
 11 As Zuckerman (2010: 369–370) argues, investors in real estate markets are 
generally more prone to be ’bullish’ than ’bearish’, that is, they buy when 
they expect prices to go up but are not as ready to sell when their expecta-
tions are the opposite. Furthermore, this is not due to any psychological 
factors but rather is inbuilt in the very structure of the markets. As he con-
cludes, ‘it should thus not be surprising that real estate markets are notori-
ously prone to bubbles’ (Zuckerman 2010: 370).
 12 As Fourcade et al. (2015) have shown, even today economics is, of all the 
social sciences, the most self-contained and less inclined to take notice of 
the results and contributions of other disciplines.
3. What is Money?
 1 Cf., ‘What appears to happen is, not, that gold becomes money, in conse-
quence of all other commodities expressing their value in it, but, on the 
contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in gold, 
because it is money. The intermediate steps of the process vanish in the re-
sult and leave no trace behind. Commodities find their own value already 
completely represented, without any initiative on their part, in another 
commodity existing in company with them’ (Marx 1973a: 92).
 2 See, for instance, Mankiw’s and Taylor’s (2011:617–618) textbook on 
 economics.
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 3 Cf. Geoffrey Ingham’s exposition in The Nature of Money (2004), which re-
fers to Merger’s ‘rational choice’ explanation of money as the standard one.
 4 It was this theory that Max Weber referred to approvingly in his Economy 
and Society (Weber 1968a: 78; cf. also A.M. Mitchell-Innes’s articles pub-
lished shortly after Knapp’s treatise on money in 1905: What is Money 
[1913] and The Credit Theory of Money [1914].)
 5 The money and prices in international transactions is a challenge to the 
state theory of money. In international economy, it was therefore even more 
natural to be a ‘metallist.’ According to Wray (2014: 8), the development of 
the gold standard was a solution to the problem of what could be used as 
international—stateless—money.
 6 It is understandable that the majority of the theoreticians of money take its 
function as a means of exchange as their starting point. One could hardly 
regard any unit of measurement as money. This is, however, not the central 
element of the state theory of money. In addition to money being a means of 
accounting, the state must authorize it. It presumes the existence of a ‘commu-
nity of money.’ (Paul 2012: 161). Cryptocurrencies, arguably the best known 
among them being Bitcoin, do not have any state bank backing them. The 
creation of many of them has, in fact, been motivated by a strong anti-etatist 
ideology. But in the end, they do have an ‘official’ exchange rate with strong 
state currencies, dollars and euros guaranteeing their validity as money.
 7 The state theory of money, or Chartalism, resembles the theoretical under-
standing of the uses of money and price common in the socialist economy. 
In practice, socialist economic systems, in the Soviet Union and East Eu-
rope, were hardly ever pure centrally planned economies but always in-
cluded bigger or smaller elements of market economies. The role of money 
in a socialist economy was, at times, vehemently disputed. Prices were in 
general based on the cost of production, and money was mainly used as a 
means of accounting (see Nove 1980: 175 and 186). The market relations of 
supply and demand played only a minor role.
 8 Esposito (2010: 99) draws from this the further conclusion that any ‘real’ 
market economy is a capitalist one: ‘One can speak about a market in the 
real meaning when money does not any more serve the concrete achieve-
ment of goods but serves the profit instead.’
 9 According to Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s classical critique (1898(1896), 
Marx’s theory of the prices of production in the third volume of Capital 
contradicts the law of value in the first volume. For a recent reappraisal of 
the debate, see Moseley (2015).
 10 There is another serious simplifying assumption in Marx’s theory of value, or 
the doubling of the commodity into use value and value as well as labor into 
concrete and abstract labor. Following the standard conception of the classi-
cal political economy, Marx conceives the use values of commodities as their 
capacity to satisfy human needs, as given and unproblematic, well-known 
to their buyers and consumers. As Baudrillard (1981) pointed out, from 
his semiotic perspective it is highly questionable to think of commodities, 
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with their multiple meanings, as satisfying some ‘real’ needs. This becomes 
even more accentuated in the modern world where designing, marketing, 
advertising, and branding are essential ingredients in almost any marketable 
commodity from potatoes to wines, from shoes to cars, and from trousers to 
computers. A logical conclusion is that there is no such thing as a standard 
market in which use values or utilities are fixed and known to all the actors 
(cf. Jagd 2007: 84; Falk 1994), or, if it exists at all, it is a rare exception.
4. Sociological Theories of the Market
 1 In their interesting empirical study of the price behavior of, admittedly, a rel-
atively small number of American firms, Hall and Hitch (1939) came to the 
conclusion that ‘entrepreneurs thought that a price based on full average cost 
(including a conventional allowance for profit) was the “right” price.’ The 
result resonates with Fligstein’s reasoning. The study was inspired by Cham-
berlin’s (1933) work on monopolistic competition. As the authors conclude, 
competition between firms did have an effect on the formation of prices but 
not as usually predicted: ‘One common procedure was the setting of a price 
by a strong firm at its own full cost level, and the acceptance of this price by 
other firms in the “group”; another was the reaching of a price by what was 
in effect an agreement, though an unconscious one.’ (Hall & Hitch 1939: 19).
 2 For the important role of galleries and the gallerists, see also Yogev (2010).
 3 See also Baumol (1986: 10): ‘The art market contrasts sharply with those 
for manufactured products, such as steel bolts or ball bearings in terms of 
determinacy of equilibrium price level. There the key to equilibrium is re-
sponsiveness to supply.’ As Baumol (1986: 14) concludes, there is ‘no way of 
predicting in art markets, just like stock markets’ (cf. Stein 1977).
 4 See, however, Grampp (1989) who claims that aesthetic value, like every 
other form of value, is just a specific form of economic value and in princi-
ple reducible to it.
 5 As Zuckerman (1999: 1402) has interestingly pointed out, the constitution 
of a market depends in fact on two related processes. First, the object must 
be recognized as ‘legitimate,’ that is, classified as belonging to one and the 
same market. This creates the structure of the market. Second, their value 
must be valued and the object ordered in relation to the value of the other 
products in the same market.
 6 Thévenot (2015) offers another interesting, and slightly different, perspec-
tive on the social construction of value through product certifying in the 
electric power infrastructures.
 7 Karpik (1999) analyzed the French market of legal services and lawyers in 
his earlier comprehensive historical studies.
 8 According to Fourcade (2012: 530), the early French system of wine clas-
sification, originally constructed in the mid-19th century, followed quite 
closely the prevalent market prices, which were understood to be the most 
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reliable source of information about the quality of the wines (in Cóte d’Or 
with historical statistics going as far back in history as the year 1635).
5. The Three Social Formations of Taste in  
Economic Markets
 1 The Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Europe acknowledged, 
or had to acknowledge, fashion as an important social phenomenon, even 
though it did not really fit into their system of centrally planned economy 
(see Gronow and Zhuravlev 2015).
 2 There is, of course, no market of first names, but in some countries rankings 
of the most popular boys’ and girls’ names of the year are published regu-
larly. One could guess that such lists mostly help parents to avoid the top 
ten or twenty names and choose something they view as more original, only 
to discover the next year that many other parents have thought exactly the 
same. If this were the case, these rankings are effective devices in promoting 
common taste as anti-fashion.
 3 I’m grateful to Arto Noro for not only pointing out the exemplary nature of 
sports fishing as a social world but also for offering me a learned insight into 
its cultural manifoldness and richness.
6. The Aesthetization of Everyday Consumption
 1 Schulze draws the picture of the modern society as a mass society with 
gloomy colours in his later writings (1998 and 2003) in which he argues that 
the desires of the modern consumer tend to be manipulated and to become 
unauthentic.
 2 The American film industry of the 1930s, controlled by the ‘five major and 
three minor companies,’ offers a good example of the marketing strategies 
used to direct the movie-going tastes of the masses in a relatively central-
ized mass market. These included, in addition to the various attempts and 
methods to control and own the main distribution channels, ‘“block book-
ing” whereby those exhibitors who wanted to exhibit movies featuring some 
of the big movie stars had to rent a set of other movies too; distributing 
only a limited number of printed copies allowing only a tiny fraction of the 
theaters to rent the movie relegating independently owned theaters to the 
lowest priority; a relatively small number of theaters had a right to the “first 
runs” and charged higher ticket prices. The market was differentiated into 
A and B movies. (Surdan 2015: 229–232).
 3 Cf. Schumpeter’s (1939) well-known distinction between scientific and 
technical discoveries and social innovations. In order to become com-
mercially successful, the first ones must find or create social practices into 
which they fit and make themselves thus needed.
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7. Finance Capital and the New Financial Markets
 1 For an interesting comparative study of the spread of neoliberal economic 
thinking and policy favoring financialization in four countries, see Four-
cade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002).
 2 Esposito (2010:155) formulated this even more pointedly, ‘one buys and 
sells a promise, and the whole trade of derivatives concentrates around this 
promise. In fact, the majority of deals with derivatives are completed with-
out the exchange of anything at all, except the mutual observation of the 
observers and their expectations.’
 3 Speculation was one of the main reasons for the nomination of a state com-
mittee in Germany to inspect and make recommendations about the rules 
and regulations of better trading practices in the German Stock Exchange 
in the middle of the 1890s. Max Weber was an economic expert in this com-
mittee. He even published a booklet, ‘The Stock Exchange’ (Die Börse 1999 
[1895]), targeted to a common readership. In it Weber defended modern 
stock exchange, which he regarded as an essential part of modern capital-
ism, against accusations of its speculative nature. Weber thought that harm-
ful speculation was more typical among small-scale, amateur investors, and 
as a remedy, he relied on the normative self-regulation of the professional, 
bigger investors and traders.
 4 As Rona-Tas and Hiss (2010: 116) pointed out, expert judgment is more 
important in corporate than in consumer credit rating whereas formalized, 
‘actuarial’ calculation dominates consumer credit rating.
 5 In What Money Can’t Buy, Sandel’s (2012) presents an impressive list of 
newly emerged markets in the USA, trading all from hiring people to stand 
in line to get access to papal masses to procreation rights, death bonds 
and college admissions, and questions their ethical foundations, with good 
reason.
 6 According to Robert K. Merton (1968 [1957]: 421), who pointed out the 
importance of self-fulfilling prophecies in social science, ‘the self-fulfilling 
prophecy is, in the beginning a false definition of the situation evoking a 
new behaving which makes the originally false definition come true.’ The 
new conceptualizations of financial markets, which were conducive in cre-
ating these new economic institutions, differ from Merton’s definition of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy. They are not false in the beginning but completely 
new definitions of the situation (Burns & DeVille 2003). It is an interest-
ing coincidence that Robert Merton’s son, Robert C. Merton, a Nobel prize 
winner in Economics, is one of the developers of the Black-Scholes model, 
also referred to as Black-Scholes-Merton model.
 7 The French strawberry market at Fontaines-en-Sologne, established in 
1981, uses up-to-date technology. More than anything else, it is ‘a concrete 
realization of the pure model of perfect competition’ as presented in eco-
nomic theory (Garcia-Parpet 2007: 20).
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ronowJukka Gronow’s book Deciphering Markets and Money solves the problem of the specific social conditions of an economic order based on money 
and the equal exchange of commodities. Gronow 
scrutinizes the relation of sociology to neoclassical 
economics and reflects on how sociology can contribute 
to the analyses of the major economic institutions. The 
question of the comparability and commensuration of 
economic objects runs through the chapters of the book. 
The author shows that due to the multidimensionality 
and principal quality uncertainty of products, markets 
would collapse without market devices that are either 
procedural, consisting of technical standards and measuring 
instruments, or aesthetic, relying on the judgements of 
taste, or both. In his book, Gronow demonstrates that in 
this respect, financial markets share the same problem as 
the markets of wines, movies, or PCs and mobile phones, 
and hence offer a highly actual case to study their social 
constitution in the process of coming into being. 
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